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To: Mr. Justice Powell January 15, 1981 
From: David Levi 
No. 80-1045: Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc., et al., 
v. Internat'l Longshoremen's Ass'n 
Questions Presented 
1. Whether a dispute between management and labor, 
arising out of the Union's refusal to load ships headed for 
Russia, is a "case involving or growing out of any labor 
"-._...... dispute" within the terms of the Norr is-LaGuardia Act. 
2. If the dispute is within the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act, whether a federal court may enjoin the strike pending 
arbitration under the principles stated in Boys Markets and 
Buffalo Forge. 
I. Facts and Decision Below 
On January 4, 1980, the United States began a grain 
embargo against the Soviet Union following the invasion of 
Afghanistan. Shortly thereafter, the International President 
of the International Longshoremen's Association (!LA), Thomas 
Gleason, announced that he was instructing all !LA unions on 
the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts to boycott all shipments to the 
Soviet Union of any materials including grain. The !LA also 
adopted a resolution that its members would not handle ~ 
cargo bound to or coming from the Soviet Union. The !LA 
boycott was therefore considerably broader than the more 
limited embargo ordered by President Carter. The Union 
boycott was purely a political boycott; no action was sought 
from the employers of union members. 
Jacsonville Bulk Terminals(JBT) has a shipping 
terminal in Jacksonville, Florida, from which it loads 
superphosphor ic acid onto ships bound for Russia. JBT is a 
subsidiary of ~ooker Chemical Co. which in turn is a 
subsidiary of / Occidental Petroleum Corp. Occidental has a 
contract with the Soviet Union for the supply of 
'' 
y 
superphosphoric acid. JBT is a party to the collective 
bargaining agreement between the Jacksonville Maritime 
Association and Local 1408 of the ILA. On January 15, 1980, 
Local 1408 refused to load a Norwegian vessel scheduled to 
pick up a cargo of acid from JBT for deli very to the Soviet 
Union. 
The collective bargaining agreement between JBT and 
the Local includes a no-strike clause: 
"During the term of this agreement the 
employer agrees that there shall be no lockout of 
the members of the Union, and the Union agrees that 
there shall ~ stike ot any kind or degree 
whatsoever, walkout, suspens1on o wor , curta1lment 
or~Tmltation of production, slowdown, or any other 
interruption or stoppage, total or partial, of the 
employer's operation for any cause whatsoever." 
In addition, the agreement contains a grievance and 
arbitration provision: 
"Matters under dispute which cannot be 
promptly settled between the Local and an individual 
Employer shall, no later than 48 hours after such 
discussions, be referred in writing covering the 
entire grievance in a Port Grievance Committee .•• A 
majoirty decision of this Committee shall be final 
and binding on both parties ... 
Finally, the agreement contains two provisions 
relevant to its scope. First, it provides that the Agreement 
covers "all matters affecting wages, hours, and other terms 
and conditions of employment and that during the term of this 
Agreement the Employers will not be required to negotiate on 
any further matters affecting these or other subjects not 
specifically set forth in this Agreement." And second, the 
agreement expressly reserves to JBT control over the - --- ---- -~ .... ------
management of its business and the direction of its work __________ , _____ , ________________________ ~________________________ , ____ _ 
force: "The Management of the Employer's business and the 
' .....--' 
direction of the work force in the operation of the business 





the Union's refusal to load 
JBT sought to compe}2)arbitration 
it ~ough;-~emporary restrainin 
the 
and, 
a Qd Er~nary injunc!ion to halt the boycott. The district 
court complied, enjoining the union from refusing to load the 
three ships then in port and ordering the union to process its 
grievance through the arbitration procedures specified in the 
collective bargaining agreement. 
After the three ships were loaded, President Carter 
extended the trade embargo to include superphosphoric acid. 
On appeal, the CAS reversed the issuance of the 
injunction. The first question for the CA concerned the 
court's jurisdiction. Now that the trade embargo was 
extended, JBT would be sending no further ships to Russia in 
the foreseeable future, and the dispute might appear to be 
moot. The CA found, however, that the dispute 






review." To satisfy this exception to the normal mootness 
rules, when the matter is not brought as a class action, it 
must be shown that the challenged action is of such short 
duration that it cannot be fully litigated prior to its 
expiration and that there is a likelihood that the same 
complaining party would again be subjected to the same action. 
Given that it only takes a day or two to load a ship, if an 
injunction is issued, the ship will have departed before an 
appellate court can review the matter. Further, there is a 
"reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will 
be subjected to the same action again." The ILA maintains ) 
its policy. Russian troops are still in Afghanistan. 
Turning to the merits, the CA found that a strike to .... 
Jt \' 
achiev~ a political goal is a labor dispute within the meaning 
i:!:' ... 
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. That Act provides that "No court ............ -of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any 
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any 
case involving or growing out of any labor dis:eute" to 
l l 
... 
JH· t>f' prohibit a strike. 29 u.s.c. §104 (a) . "Labor diS:QUte" is 
in the Act as "any controversy concerning terms or ~ 
conditions of employment or concerning the association 
-J~A~uh \\ 
or ~~---. 
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, 
changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of 
employment." Relying on an earlier panel decision of the CAS, 
, . 
.. ,, 
United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 519 F. 2d 
1236 (CAS 1975), and without further analysis, the CA 
concluded that the dispute was a "labor dispute." 
Having determined the threshold question in the 
affirmative, the CA was confronted with the classic Buffalo 
Forge/ Boys Market problem of accommodating the pro------ ~ 
1~rbitration policy '~f the LMRA with the ~hti-injunction policy 
of Norris-LaGuardia. In Buffalo Forge the Court found that a ------sympathy strike by a union in violation of a no-strike clause 
in a collective bargaining agreement could not be enjoined. 
The Court found that "the Union has gone on strike not by 
reason of any dispute it or any of its members has with the 
employer, but in support of other local unions." Certainly, 
the question of whether the sympathy strike violated the no-
strike clause, and appropriate remedies if it did, would be 
subject to the arbitration procedures. But the strike itself 
could not be enjoined if it "was not over any dispute between 
the Union and the employer" subject to the arbitration 
provisions. 
Similarly, in this case the dispute was not "over" 
any arbitrable grievance. The dispute was over the Russian 
invasion of Afghanistan--"The Union's grievance is not, as 
asserted by JBT, a complaint against JBT doing business with 
the Soviets. It is a complaint against the actions of the USSR 
itself." No arbiter could resolve that grievance. Thus 




parties' agreement is arbitrable, the underlying dispute 
between the !LA and the Soviet Union is not." 
II. Discussion 
There are two questions for the Court:~whether 
or not Norris-LaGuardia has any application at all in this 
setting, and~ if it does, whether Buffalo Forge should 
be cut back to permit injunctions in such a case. 
A. Norris-LaGuardia and Political Strikes 
The Court is presented with a question of statutory 
interpretation that would settle this case without reaching 
the more difficult Buffalo Forge controversy. The Norris-
~ 
LaGuardia Act appl} es only to-~s "i .. nvolving or growing ou.t 
of [a] labor dispute." Labor dispute is defined in the act as 
"any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment 
or concerning the association or representation of persons in 
negotiating ... or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of 
employment." 
1. The Chief's Dissent from Denial 
You may recall that the Court granted cert after the 





affair was not within the Norr is-LaGuardia Act. The Chief 
argued as follows: 
"A necessary prerequisite for application of 
the Buffalo Forge doctrine is that there be a "labor 
dispute" between the empoyer and the employees, as 
that term is defined in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 
There is no "labor dispute" here and there is no 
basis in any of our decisions for applying Norris-
LaGuard ia to poli tically-moti va ted work stoppages, 
concerning subjects over which employers have no 
control." 
The Chief cited a decision of the CA2 for support--Khedivial 
Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers International Union,278 F.2d 49, 50-
51 (CA2 1960) (political boycott of Egyptian ships in 
retaliation for Egyptian boycott of American ships dealing 
with Israel is not a 'labor dispute'), as well as a summary 
affirmance by the CAS--West Gulf Maritime Assn. v. -------------------------------------
International Longshoremen's Assn., 413 F. Supp. 372 (SD Tex. 
1975), aff'd summarily, 531 F.2d 574 (CAS 1976) (union's 
refusal to load grain on political grounds, not a labor 
dispute). See also NLRB v. International Longshoremen's 
Assn., 332 F. 2d 99 2, 995 (CA4 1964) (pol i tically-moti va ted ILA 
boycott of all ships that were trading or had traded with Cuba 
is not a 'labor dispute' within the meaning of §2(9) of the 
NLRA). 
As a practical matter, since the Chief joined the 5-a4 ) 
majority in Buffalo Forge, this rationale may be the key to ~ 
majority if the CAS is to be reversed. 
Jo 
Yet the argument is not altogether easy to make--
'---
there is little in the way of legislative history one way or 
the other while precedents both are few in number and 
unhelpful in analysis--and th~re are some risks in adopting 
this line of approach if you hope to get the Court to reverse 
its Buffalo Forge position: By arguing that this dispute is 
"political" the Court might seem to be reaffirming the 
approach in Buffalo Forge that disputes such as this can be 
bifurcated into (1) a dispute over an underlying 
nonarbi trable/poli tical grievance and ( 2) a dispute over the 
meaning of the no-strike clause. Since the Chief joined the 
majority in Buffalo Forge it is easier for him to adopt this 
approach. 
2. The Argument Against Coverage 
The argument that this political strike is not 
covered by Norris-LaGuardia runs as follows. First, 
injunctions against political sympathy strikes was not one of 
the abuses against which Norris-LaGuardia was aimed. As 
Justice Stevens explained in his dissent in Buffalo Forge, the ~S 
Act was passed primarily in order to protect "labor's ability~ 
to organize and to bargain collectively. 
of injunctions against strike activity in 
vvv 
It was the histor~
furtherance of union 
organization, recognition, and collective bargaining, rather 
than judicial enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements, 
.LUo 
that led to the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 
1932." The statement of purpose preceding the Act identifies 
this primary purpose. 
Second, the specific language of Norris-LaGuardia 
may indicate a limitation upon coverage. The definition of 
"labor dispute" refers to "any controversy concerning terms or 
conditions of employment, or concerning association or 
representation." The definition seems to focus on particular 
working conditions and on the right to concerted activity. 
Third, several precedents from this Court and from ~ 
the circuit courts support a limited reading of the "labor 
dispute" definition. In Columbia River Co. v, Hinton, 315 
u.s. 143 (1942), a fish processor sued a union of independent 
fishermen under the Sherman Act. The processor asked for 
injunctive relief and the association argued that injunctive 
relief was barred by Norris-LaGuardia. Fishermen who belong 
to the union are individual entrepreneurs without an 
employment relationship with any employer. The Union acts as 
a collective bargaining agency in the sale of fish caught by 
its members. The Union's demand that processors buy only from 
Union members led to the antitrust action. The CA found 
Norris-LaGuardia applicable; the Court reversed: 
"That a dispute among businessmen over the 
terms of a contract for the sale of fish is 
something different from a 'controversy concerning 
terms or conditions of employment •.. " calls for no 
extended discussion [T] he Act was not intended 
to have application to disputes over the sale of 
commodities." 
....... 
Similarly, in Federation of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 u.s. 99 
(1968), the question was whether certain union practices 
imposed upon orchestra leaders, and resisted by these leaders 
as violations of the antitrust laws, were such as to amount to 
a labor dispute. Application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act would 
exempt the union's practices from the anti-trust laws. The 
Court found that the particular practices--e.g. price lists, 
forcing leaders to favor local musicians--were within the 
notion of a labor dispute which the Court defined by "the 
presence of a job or wage competi ton or some other economic 
inter-relationship affecting legitimate union interests 
between the union members and the [employers]." 
More to the point, in several lower court cases the 
precise sort of dispute in this case--a political sympathy 
strike--has been held to be outside of the Norr is-LaGuardia 
Act. In Khedivial Line v. Seafarers' International Union, 278 
F. 2d 49 (CA2 1960) (Lumbard, Moore, Friendly) , the employer 
applied for an injunction when the union placed a picket line 
around his ship to protest Nasser's boycott of American ships 
doing business with Israel. The employer was an Egyptian 
company. The CA distinguished this Court decision in Marine 
Cooks v. Panama Steamship Co., 1960, 362 u.s. 365: 
"In the Marine Cooks case the foreign shipowner 
was one of the persons alleged to be creating the 
substandard wages and working conditions against 
which defendants were protesting. Here, the 
shipowner was not the cause of the picketers' 
grievance. [W] hatever had been done here was 
the United Arab Republic's doing, not plaintiff's. 
,, '. 
.•. We do not believe the prohibition of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act against the grant of injunctions in 'a 
labor dispute' extends to picketing directed against 
policies of the government of the owner of a vessel 
as distingusihed from activities of the owner. 
Broad as the Act's definition of 'labor dispute' is, 
it is not broad enough to encompass that." 
12 • 
Fourth, the Court has recognized in applying §7 of 
the NLRA--protecting acti vi tes that are for the "mutual aid 
and protection" of employees--that some activities by 
employees may be purely political and not directed to the 
"concerns of employees as employees." Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 
437 u.s. 556 (1978). Certain political leafletting, for 
example, may not be protected by the labor laws. Thus, in 
general, the courts treat political activity on a different 
basis than activity directed to working conditions and terms 
of employment in the traditional sense. 
3. The Argument for Coverage 
/~: 
Both the Union and the Solicitor General argue that 
--------~--------
the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies--although the SG ..___. 
the injunction was properly issued by the district 
thinks that l~? 
~ . 
court. They 
point to language in opinions of this Court suggesting that 
the Act is not to be interpreted narrowly. See Marine Cooks & 
Stewards v. Panama Steamship Co., 362 u.s. 365, 369 (1960). 
And they point to the decision of the Court in New Negro 
.. 13 • 
Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 u.s. 552 (1938). In 
that case, the Court found that the Act did apply to prohibit 
an injunction of picketing of a store by members of a civic 
group who were seeking to encourage the store to hire more 
black workers. That the picketers were not union organizers 
or store employees, made no difference: By its terms the Act 
expressly applied to labor controversies "regardless of 
whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation 
of employer and employee." That the source of dispute was 
race discrimination rather than, for example, discrimination 
against union members, made no difference either: 
"The Act does not concern itself with 
background or the motives of the dispute. 
desire for fair and equitable conditions 
employment on the part of persons of any race 




is quite as important .•• as fairness and equity in 
terms and conditions of employment can be to trade 
or craft unions or any form of labor organization or 
association. • •• There is no justification in the 
apparent purposes or the express terms of the Act 
for limiting its definition of labor disputes and 
cases arising therefrom by excluding those which 
arise with respect to discrimination in terms and 
conditions of employment based upon difference of 
race or color." 
Rather more persuasively, it is also argued that the ~ 
~~ 
dispute here is nothing if not a labor dispute. The company 
- ........ '." • h • .A'l 
complained to the district court tha0>the Union was refusing ~
to load cargoes headed for the Soviet Union in violatin of the 
collective bargaining agreement. The company alleged the 





agreement and they rested their entitlement to injunctive 
relief on the rights arising from the labor agreement. Quite 
1( \.. 
simply the dispute here concerns the application of the no-
...... ..--
strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement. This 
----------------'------- J 
must be a controversy "concerning terms or conditions of 
employment." Indeed, the agreement not to strike is by 
contract a "term or condition" of employment. Unlike the CA2 
decision in Khedivial, supra, involving a foreign shipowner 
which had no collective bargaining agreement with the 
picketing union, here the dispute centers around the rights 
guaranteed in the collective bargaining agreement. 1 
3. Conclusion 
I think it is fairly apparent that none of the 
opinions of the Court, cited by either side, settles the 
question of whether or not the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies to 
a political dispute. I am convinced by the SG's argument that 
~ 
this matter arises out of a labor dispute. The Company is 
1The SG also argues that since the strike was over an 
arbitrable dispute--concerning cargo-handling assignments and the 
employer's right to choose its customers--the matter must be a 
labor dispute. He suggests further that even had there been no 
dispute over the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, 
the matter might still be a labor dispute: the essence of ~ the 
matter is that em lo ees are refusing to acce t their work 
aqs1gnments. The employer/emp oyee relat1onship is at the heart 
of the controversy. 
.. ' 
' ' 
seeking an injunction because it claims that the union has 
given up the right to strike no matter what the reason. This 
was the quid pro guo for the Company's agreement to binding 
arbitration. Khedivial is distinguishable--no collective 
bargaining agreement existed--and no other case from any other 
circuit conflicts with the decision of the CAS here that the 
dispute is within the Act. 
As I indicated above, I can well understand why the 
Chief takes the position that he does. He joined Buffalo 
Forge. The Court in that case drew a distinction between the 
dispute over application of the no strike clause and the 
dispute over the under lying "nonarbi trable" grievance. He is C ~ s 
therefore accustomed to a mode of analysis that looks to the ~~ 
underlying grieva~e and considers the grievance to be outside 
of the arbitration agreeme~t (non-arbitrable) or, as here, to 
be outside of the Norris LaGuardia Act. 
But the dissent in Buffalo Forge, which you joined, 
reject_g_d the significance attached by the Court to the fact -----that the underlying grievance was not arbitrable. The 
employer had agreed to arbitration on the basis that all 
strikes were to be illegal: "A sympathy strike in violation 
of a no-strike clause does not directly frustrate the 
arbitration process, but if the clause is not enforceable 
against such a strike, it does frustrate the more basic policy 
of motivating employers to agree to binding arbitration by 
giving them an effective 'assurance of uninterrupted operation 
J.O. 
during the term of the agreement.'" 428 u.s. at 423-424. The 
majority recognized that the agreement to arbitrate might be 
enforced by injunction and that the arbitrator's award once 
given was likewise enforceable by injunction. Yet it made 
little sense to permit an injunction after the arbitrator had 
reached his conclusion that the sympathy strike was illegal, 
but not permit the court to issue an injunction pending the 
arbitration where it was clear that the strike would be found 
illegal by the arbitrator. The point was that the parties had 
agreed to settle their differences--all of their differences--
through arbitration. 
If you continue to accept the viewpoint of the ~~ 
dissent in Buffalo Forge then I think you must view the ~ 
dispute in this case to be a labor dispute. The parties have 
agreed to settle their differences through arbitration. The 
union has agreed to a sweeping no strike clause. The 
collective bargaining agreement appears to have been violated. 
Surely this is a labor dispute. 
In short, and putting aside the difficulties 
~ 
~~\ 
;; I /,U). 
4~ 
0 f /.}_ ;:;;;: 
putting together a Court, I would not decide the case on the ~~ 
basis that Norris LaGuardia simply does not apply. I think it~ 
I 
does apply essentially for the same reason that I think ~ -p~ 
~~ Buffalo Forge was wrong: the employer thought he had an 
agreement that would put a stop to all strikes and it is that~~ 
agreement that he is seeking to enforce. On the other hand, ~~~ 
if you think~at )the Court will not overrule Buffalo Forge or 
.L I • 
if you think that Court ought not to reconsider a case so 
recently decided, then I think there may be some justification 
in following the Chief's position. Buffalo Forge 
characterizes the dispute in terms of the underlying 
grievance. So may you--if you are content to follow Buffalo ~ 
Forge. ~ 
~~ 
B. Applying Boys Market and Buffalo Forge 
If you find that Norris-LaGuardia has no 
application, the case is over. But if Norris-LaGuardia is 
applicable the Court will have to consider how Boys Market and 
Buffalo Forge apply to this case. 
In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 
770, 398 u.s. 235 (1970), the Court reversed its holding in 
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), that 
the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia preclude a 
federal court from enjoining a strike in breach of the no-
strike clause of the collective bargaining agreement. Relying 
upon the "devastating implications for the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements and their accompanying no-strike 
obligations if equitable remedies were not available," and 
relying further on a need to accommodate Norris-LaGuardia and 
the LMRA, with its pro-arbitration policy, in the light of 
contemporary conditions, the Court found that an injunction 
was appropriately granted on the facts of that case. 
., 
'· 
In Buffalo Forge, however, the Court narrowed Boys 
Market by holding that an injunction could not issue when the 
ll , , 
grievance underlying the union's strike was nonarbitrable. In 
that case the union was striking to show sympathy for another 
union negotiating wi ththe same employer. There was nothing 
that an arbitrator could do to remove the source of the 
grievance. The Court found, therefore, that since the strike 
was not "over any dispute between the Union and the employer 
that was even remotely subject to the arbitration provisions 
of the contract," it did not amount to an evasion of "an 
obligation to arbitrate," and therefore fell outside of the 
Boys Market analysis. I have already described above the 
dissent by Justice Stevens, which you joined. 
I simply cannot see how Buffalo Forge is ~ 
~~~--
distinguishable from this case. The SG and the employer make ~ . 
tZ<.A-.hf..4.7££L~:AA 
SG argues that the underlying dispute is~ a game at tempt. The 
multifaceted. It is not only between the ILA and Russia. It ~ 
is also whether the !LA "had any right under the collective '/ ~ 
bargaining agreement to dictate JBT's selection of its~ 
customers or to object to cargo-handling assignments where the~ 
cargo is ••• politically offensive." These last two dispute
h . b .. ~ are arbitrable under the terms of t e collect1ve arga1n1ng~ ~
agreement. The SG claims that for this reason the Court need~/-
not overrule its decision in Buffalo Forge in order to ~ 
true~ reverse. Yet he does not explain how this can be 
Presumably in Buffalo Forge the unions refusal to cross a 
picket line and decision to stage a sympathy strike was also a 
dispute as to whether the union had the right, under the 
collective bargaining agreement, to dictate the employer's 
labor policies with respect to other unions or whether the 
employees could object to work assignments if they were not 
happy with the employer's treatment of other workers. The 
ease with which one can recharacterize the "underlying 
dispute" demonstrates how questionable the holding was in 
Buffalo Forge. But I do not think it provides a basis for 
distinguishing the case. 
Similarly, in addition to urging the Court to 
overrule Buffalo Forge, JBT argues that it can be 
distinguished on the basis that the work stoppage issue 
related to a disagreement over the employer's right to choose 
its customers as part of its exercise of its management 
prerogatives--expressly protected in the collective bargaining 
agreement. What was at stake was management's ability to 
choose its business partners. Yet one could equally well 
argue that what was at stake in Buffalo Forge was management's 
prerogatives--viz. its ability to offer terms of employment to 
other workers. 
Buffalo Forge held that when the dispute between the 
employer and the union centers on the application of the no-
strike clause, that dispute is arbitrable, but no injunction 
will issue pending arbitration. I think it disingenuous to 
suggest that the dispute in this case is more than a dispute 
. ' 
over the application of the no-strike clause. But it is worth 
thinking some more about these attempts to distinguish or 
limit Buffalo Forge. If a convincing case can be made, it 
might be the best way to decide the matter. 
Of course Buffalo Forge is a fat target. Because 
you joined the dissent in that case, I have not undertaken to 
fully critique the case. The dissent is fairly convincing. 
Also you have written recently to indicate how limited are 
management's other remedies in cases in which a no-strike 
------------~~---------------------------------clause has been breached. See your concurring opinion in 
Complete Auto Transit v. Reis, 49 U.S.L.W. 4473 (May 4, 1981). 
I attach a copy of your opinion in that case. If you would 
like more on Buffalo Forge, I can provide it. 
III. Conclusion 
In sum, I think that there are essentially three 
courses you can follow: 
(1) you can adhere to the dissenting position in 
Buffalo Forge, and hope that this position now attracts a 
majority, Jl.,o ~ ~ ~. ~ C 'f w». 
1M_ fJ't./L~- tJ- ~ ~ ~ -
(2) you can affirm, regretfully, on the basis of 
stare decisis and Buffalo Forge, N~; -
....... 
or, (3) if you feel compelled to follow Buffalo Forge, 
you might consider that the matter is outside of Norris-
LaGuardia altogether as a political question. 
I do not see a way to distinguishing Buffalo Forge. 
Rumor has it that Justice Brennan, a dissenter in Buffalo 
Forge, will vote to affirm because he does not think that the 
Court can keep flipflopping on these issues. A third position 
is available, although I do not think that it or Buffalo Forge 
makes much sense. If you feel compelled to follow Buffalo 
Forge, because it is the "law," then you may look at the case 
through the eyes of the Buffalo Forge majority, permitting the 
"underlying grievance" to characterize the case. If we say 
that the "real" dispute here is between Russia and the ILA, 
then it is certainly plausible to say that this dispute is not 
covered by Norris-LaGuardia. In the end this may be the 
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INTERNATIONAL LO~SHORRMEN'S ASS'N: ~. V 
Feder~vil Timely 
SUMMARY: This case probably should have been straight-
lined with No. 80-1058, Hampton Roads Shipping v. International 
Longshoremen's Ass'n. Because of its political views, the resp 
union refuses to provide services to any ship carrying cargo 
bound to or from the Soviet Union. The DC ordered arbitration 
and enjoined such work stoppages pending arbitration. The CAS 
upheld the order to arbitrate, but set as ide the anti-strike 
injunction on the authority of Norris-LaGuardia and Buffalo 
Forge. Petrs argue that the work stoppage was outside Norris-
., 
LaGuardia and that there is a conflict wi t h CA2 on this point. 
Petrs also urge the Court to reconsider it~ 5-4 decision in 






FACTS: Petr Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, !DC., maintains a 
bulk marine shipping terminal in Jacksonville, FL.l With 
longshoremen who are members of Local 1408 of the resp ILA, JBT 
loads superphosphoric acid (SPA) onto ships destined for the USSR 
from Jacksonville. 
On 1/4/80, in response to the USSR's invasion of 
Afghanistan, President Carter issued an embargo against grain 
shipments to the USSR. The embargo expressly exempted unshipped 
grain committed to the USSR under a 1975 agreement, and did not 
extend to non-grain products such as SPA. 
A few days later, resp adopted a resolution providing that 
its members would not handle any cargo bound to or coming from 
the USSR. No action was sought from the employers of union 
members and nothing that the employers did could have eliminated 
the cause of the boycott. 
On 1/15/80, a Norwegian ship entered the Port of 
Jacksonville to take on SPA for transport to the USSR. Pursuant 
to the ILA resolution, Local 1408 refused to handle the cargo. 
At no time did Local 1408 refuse to handle any other cargo. 
The collective bargaining agreement between JBT and Local 
1408 contains a no-strike clause,2 a clause requiring 
v ./ 
1 The other petrs are Hooker Chemical Corp. and Occidental 
Petroleum Corp, both corporate parents of JBT. 
~ The no-strike clause prohibits - ...... 
j 
"any strike of any kind or degree whatsoever, walkout, 
suspension of work, curtailment or limitation of production, 
slowdown, or any other interruption or stoppage, total or 
partial, of the employer's operation for any cause 
whatsoever." 
••• , .... Jo"f ·~ 
, .. I ' o 
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arbitration,3 a clause stating that the management of the 
employer's business and the direction of the ·workforce "are 
exclusively vested in the Employer as fucntions of Management," 
and a clause stating that the agreement is 
"intended to cover all matters affecting wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment and 
the Employers will not be required to negotiate on 
any further matters affecting these or other subjects 
not specifically set forth in this Agreemen t." 
JBT sought to compel arbitration, and pending arbitration 
it sought a TRO and a preliminary injunction to halt the boycott. 
The U.S. govt appeared and advised the DC that there was no 
prohibition of export of SPA to the USSR, that appropriate 
governmental action had been taken to controL exports to the USSR 
in order to protect the public interest, and that "private action 
by longshore workers to interfere with such exports are [sic] not 
warranted." 
The DC (Susan Black, MD Fla) ordered arbitration and, 
pending arbitration, enjoined the union from refusing to work 
aboard 3 Norwegian ships then in port. The DC held that Norris-
LaGuardia was not applicable, reasoning that a purely political 
strike does not "involv[e] or grow[] out of any labor dispute" as 
~ those terms are used in §§4(a) and 13(c) of that statute, 29 USC 
§§104 (a), 113 (c), and that the ordinary criteria, including the 
public interest as voiced by the U.S. govt, required entry of the 
preliminary injunction. 
3 The arbitration clause provides that "Matters under 
dispute which cannot be promptly settled between the Local and an 
individual Employer" shall be referred to arbitration. 





The 3 ships were then loaded with SPA and left 
Jacksonville. Late in February, the President extended the trade 
embargo with the USSR to include SPA. ,.-
The union appealed the injunction, arguing that the DC' s 
decision substantially burdened its members' first amendment 
rights and that the case was not moot. 
HOLDING BELOW: Consolidating this case with its review of 
an ED La decision that had enforced some arbitration awards 
requiring the !LA to load grain,4 CAS upheld the order to 
arbitrate but set aside the anti-strike injunction, reasoning as 
follows: 
(1) The case is not moot because the controversy qualifies 
as capable of repetition but evading review and "[w] hile the 
record is unclear concerning SPA, statements made at oral 
argument indicate that some is still being loaded for shipment to 
the Soviet Union". 
(2) The injunction against the concerted refusal to work on 
certain ships violated neither the 1st nor the 13th Amendments. 
(3) A strike to achieve a political goal is a "labor ---------dispute" covered by Norris-LaGuardia. United States Steel Corp. 
v. United Mine Workers, Sl9 F2d 1236 (CAS 1975), cert. denied, 
428 US 910 (1976) (Brown, Wisdom, Coleman) (pre-arbitration 
4 In the ED La case, the CA affirmed t he DC's decision to 
the extent that it enforced arbitration awa r ds enjoining work 
stoppages as to specific vessels which were the subject of 
specific grievances. TheCA found error, however, in the DC's 
decision enjoining such work stoppages with respect to grain 
destined for the Soviet Union under U.S. export license on any 
vessels that arrived thereafter in the Port of New Orleans. [See 





injunction against coal miners' strike to protest the importation 
of South African coal by an electric power company, although not 
aimed at the miners' employer, held barred by Norris-LaGuardia). 
The CA found it "difficult satisfactorily to reconcile" United 
States Steel with West Gulf Maritime Ass'n v. International 
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 413 FSupp 372 {SD Tex 1975), aff'd 
summarily, 531 F2d 574 {CAS 1976) {union's refusal on political 
grounds, in violation of a no-strike agreement, to load grain on 
a ship bound for the Soviet Union does not present a labor 
dispute triggering Norris-LaGuardia). The CA cited Khedival 
Line, SAE v. Seafarers International Union, 278 F2d 49 {CA2 1960) 
{Lumbard, Moore, Friendly; p/c) {politically-motivated SIU 
boycott of Egyptian ships to retaliate for Egyptian blacklist of 
American ships that dealt with Israel held not to trigger Norris-
LaGuardia since the plaintiff employer "was not the cause of the 
picketers' grievance"; but injunction denied for failure of 
federal jurisdiction), as in accord with West Gulf Maritime 
Ass'n. See also NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n 
["Ocean Shipping"], 332 F2d 992 {CA4 1964) {Sobeloff, Bell; Bryan 
dissenting) {politically-motivated ILA boycott of all ships that 
were trading or had traded with Cuba held not a "labor dispute" 
within the meaning of §2{9) of the National Labor Relations Act, 
as amended; refusing enforcement of NLRB order finding unfair 
labor practice in union's refusal to provide workers for such 
ships). But to the extent of any inconsistency, the CA found 
United States Steel more persuasive than the other cases. 
{4) "While the question whether the s trike itself violated 
the parties' agreement is arbitrable, the underlying dispute 
between the ILA and the Soviet Union is not." Since arbitration 
• • . .::"!_ .... ..,. ...... 
C. I, ' 
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could not "resolve the grievance between the !LA and the Soviet 
Union," petrs could not bring themselves within the Boys Markets 
- -Buffalo Forge exception to Norris-LaGuardia. 
CONTENTIONS: (Question 1: Whether Norris-LaGuardia 
applies.) Petrs say there is a direct conflict with CA2's 
Khedival case and that since the NLRA and Norris-LaGuardia are in 
pari materia and should be construed in like manner, the decision 
in the present case is also at odds with CA4' s Ocean Shipping_. 
(Question 2) Petrs argue that the CA's decision misapplies 
Buffalo Forge. The employer in this case received explicit 
contractual recognition of its right to manage its own business. 
Any disagreement about the scope of the authority reserved by 
that clause was subject to mandatory arbitration under· the 
contract. Such a disagreement is precisely what happened here. 
(Question 3) Petrs urge the Court to reconsider Buffalo Forge in 
light of the effects manifested here: specifically, unions are 
permitted to engage in political strikes despite having pledged 
not to strike "for any reason whatsoever"; more generally, 
employers are being denied any genuine quid pro quo for their 
commitments to arbitrate grievances. 
Resps reply that the CA made a straightforward application 
of Buffa1o Forge. Also, in "th~ precise situation of this case", 
CA4 has come out the same way. Hampton Roads Shipping Ass'n v. 
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 631 F2d 282 (CA4 1980), petn 
for cert. pending, No. 80-1058 (same conf. list and sheet as the 
present case, but not straight-lined). Respsargue that this is 
a "labor dispute" because it involves a disagreement between the 
employer and the union over whether the latter is contractually 
required to work in the circumstances of this case. Resps 
,'."'t';• , . I< '"'·'•, 
. • . .. , 
c 
distinguish Ocean Shipping and Khedival on the ground that the 
unions' employers were not involved in those cases. Resps also 
note that Khedival long preceded Buffalo Forge. The union "does 
not punish anyone whose conscience is less sensitive. •i 
Accordingly, it is absurd to characterize this as a dispute 
between the employer and the union over management prerogatives. 
DISCUSSION: In my opinion, the only reason to take this 
case or Hampton Roads Shipping would be to reconsider Buffalo 
Forge. 
Norris-LaGuardia. In saying that there is a "labor 
dispute" but that it is not an arbitrable dispute over 
management's rights, the union attempts to have it both ways. 
~ That 
f( Buffalo Forge. 
sort of inconsistency, however, is a natural result of 
Thus, the views of the CA4 in Hampton Roads 
Shipping, decided one week before CAS decided this case, are 
identical to those of the CAS. See 631 F2d at 28S. The fact 
that Khedival predates Buffalo Forge says nothing about the 
tension between Khedival and this case on the Norris-LaGuardia 
question. However, Khedival can be distinguished on the ground 
that the boycott in that case was directed at the policies of the 
government of the employer, whereas in the present case the 
boycott is more nearly directed at policies of the employer. 
That brings the present case closer to Marine Cooks & Stewards v. 
Panama Shipping Co., 362 US 36S (1960) (picketing of Liberian 
vessel by American union to protest the effect of "flags of 
convenience" on wages and working ' conditions of American seamen 
held a "labor dispute" triggering Norris-LaGuardia). 
Application of Buffalo Forge to Political Boycotts. There 
appears to be no principled basis for distinguishing political 
c 
-8-
boycotts from sympathy strikes for purposes of arbitrability. If 
that is so, there can be little doubt that the CA has correctly 
applied Buffalo Forge. 
Reconsideration of Buffalo Forge. In their Buffalo Forge 
dissent, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens argued 
that if a union has contractually promised not to strike for any 
reason, but then strikes during the term of the contract, a DC 
has the power to enjoin the strike pending arbitration. In my 
opinion, post-Buffalo Forge experience shows the correctness of 
the dissent. The record in the present case, however, does not 
contain the kind of empirical data that would be needed to reach 
such a judgment. Also, since the problem from the employer's 
perspective is economic damage, some tension might be relieved if 
the Court were to allow LMRA §301 damages suits against 
individual employees. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, No. 
79-1777, to be argued February 24. 
Assuming the Court remains persuaded of the wisdom of 
Buffalo Forge as applied to sympathy strikes, this petn should be 
denied. If the Court wishes to hear one of these ILA political 
boycott cases, the present case is preferable to Hampton Roads 
Shipping. Judge Rubin's opinion is more exhaustive than Judge 
Sprouse's opinion in Hampton Roads Shipping; the latter does not 
discuss whether this boycott is covered by Norris-LaGuardia. 
Response filed. 
02/03/81 Coleman Opns in petn 
~· 
p-v (4* 
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CHAMBE RS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
j)uputnt <!Jtmrl ttf f~t ~tc~ j)tatcg 
Jfaslrhtghtn. ~. <!J. Z!lgt).!.~ 
March 11, 1981 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 80-1045, Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. 
I.L.A. 
No . 80-1058 , Hampton Roads Shipping Ass 'n v. 
I.L.A. 
I enclose a draft of 1 my proposed dissent from 
denial of cert in this case . 
Regards , 
FIRST DRAFT 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackroun 
Mr. Justi ce Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
From~ The Chief Justice 
Circulated: i?M 1 l 19Bl 
F.ocirculated: ____________ _ 
No . 80-1045 , Jacksonville Bulk Terminals , Inc. , et al. v . 
International Longshoremen ' s Ass ' n , et al . 
No . 80-1058, Hampton Roads Shipping Ass ' n , et al. v . 
International Longshoremen's Ass'n , et al . 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER , dissenting . 
03/ll/81 
In these cases two Courts of Appeals overturned preliminary 
injunctions ordering the International Longshoremen ' s Association 
and Locals of that Association, pending arbitration , to cease and 
desist from refusihg to handle certain cargo bound to or from the 
Soviet Union . The work stoppages were carried out , in clear 
violation of collective bargaining agreements , pursuant to a 
resolution of the Association entered into -in response to the 
Soviet Union ' s invasion of Afghanistan . They also went beyond 
. . . 
~ . 
the official retaliatory embargo imposed by the United States on 
certain trade with the Soviet Union. 
Each of the pertinent collective bargaining agreements 
contains a clause prohibiting any strike or work stoppage, a 
clause requiring arbitration of all grievances, a clause stating 
that the management of the employer's business and the direction 
of the workforce "are exclusively vested in the Employer as 
functions of Management," and a clause stating that the agreement 
is 
"intended to cover all matters affecting wages, hours, 
and other terms and conditions of employment and ... 
the Employers will not be required to negotiate on any 
further matters affecting these or other subjects not 
specifically set forth in this Agreement." 
The employers sought to compel arbitration; pending arbitration 
they sought temporary restraining orders and preliminary 
injunctions to halt the plainly illegal work stoppages. 
In No. 80-1045, the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Florid~ ordered arbitration and, pending 
arbitration, enjoined the union from refusing to work aboard 3 
named ships then in port. The court held that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act was not applicable, reasoning that a purely 
political strike does not "involv[e] or grow[] out of any labor 
dispute" as those terms are used in §§4(a) and 13(c) of that 
statute,l and that the ordinary criteria, including the public 
1 29 U.S.C. §§104(a), 113(c) (1976). Section 4(a) 
provides: 
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to 
interest as voiced by the United States in argument to the 
District Court,2 required entry of the preliminary injunction. 
3, 
The Court of Appeals reversed. New Orleans Steamship Association 
v. General Longshore Workers, 626 F.2d 455 (C.A.5 1980). 
In No. 80-1058, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of West Virginia also issued a preliminary 
injunction pending arbitration. That court based its decision 
primarily on the management discretion clause in the agreement. 
The Court of Appeals reversed. Hampton Roads Shipping 
Association v. International Longshoremen's Association, 631 F.2d 
282 (C.A.4 1980) . 
Both Courts of Appeals took the view that the anti-
injunction staridards of the Norris-LaGuardia Act as elaborated in 
issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction 
in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to 
prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in 
such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing , 
whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts: 
"(a ) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in 
any relation of employment ... " 
Section 13(c ) provides : 
"The term 'labor dispute ' includes any controversy 
concerning terms or conditions of employment , or concerning the 
association or representation of persons in negotiating , fixing , 
maintaining , changing , or seeking to arrange terms or conditions 
of employement , regardless of whether or not the disputants stand 
in the proximate relation of employer and employee . " 
2 The United States advised the District Court that there 
was no prohibition of export of the products in question to the 
U.S.S.R. , that appropriate governmental action had been taken to 
control exports to the U.S.S.R . in order to protect the public 
interest, and that "private action by longshore workers to 
interfere with such exports are [sic] not warranted ." 
; r . . 
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 US 235 (1970); and 
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 US 397 
(1976), apply to these cases. Noting that the obvious, 
underlying "dispute" between the union and the U.S.S.R. cannot be 
resolved by the arbitration,3 the Courts of Appeals concluded 
that Buffalo Forge precluded the injunctions. 
That approach misses the point. A necessary prerequisite 
for application of the Buffalo Forge doctrine is that there be a 
"labor dispute" between the employer and the employees , as that 
term is defined in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 29 U.S.C. §§104(a), 
113 ( c ) ( 19 7 6 ) . The r e i s no " 1 abo r d i s put e " her e and there i s no 
basis in any of our decisions for applying ; Norris-LaGuardia to 
purely political work stoppages, concerning subjects over which 
the employer has no control. Prior decisions of other federal 
courts s o recognize. See Khedival Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers 
International Union, 278 F2d 49 (CA2 1960) (politically-motivated 
boycott of Egyptian ships to retaliate for Egyptian blacklist of 
American ships that dealt with Israel is not a "labor dispute" 
triggering Norris-LaGuardia); West Gulf Maritime Ass'n v. 
International Longshoremen 's Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 372 (S.D. Tex. 
1975), aff'd summarily, 531 F.2d 574 (C.A.5 1976) (union's 
refusal on political grounds, in violation of a no-strike 
3 The Fifth Circuit remarked, "Unfortunately, no 
arbitrator can tell the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan." 
New Orleans Steamship Ass'n, supra , at 467. That, of course, 




agreement, to load grain on a ship bound for the Soviet Union 
does not present a "labor dispute"). See also NLRB v. 
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 332 F.2d 992 (C.A.4 1964) 
(politically-motivated ILA boycott of all ships that were trading 
or had traded with Cuba is not a "labor dispute" within the 
meaning of §2(9) of the National Labor Relations Act). 
The present cases plainly do not involve "labor disputes" 
within the meaning of Norris-LaGuardia. Although the injunctions 
must reflect sensitivity to First and Thirteenth Amendment 
values,4 the work stoppages at issue clearly do not remotely 
warrant the additional protective umbrella of the national labor 
policy. 
Because both Courts of Appeals have, in my view, erroneously 
viewed a strike to achieve a purely political goal of the Union 
as a "labor dispute" reached .bY Norris-LaGuardia , and because I 
do not believe in any event that our decision in Buffalo Forge 
precludes anti-strike injunctions in these cases , I would grant 
certiorari and summarily reverse the judgments of the Courts of 
Appeals. Our caseload problems cannot justify tolerance of suc h 
egregious abuse of judicial power as manifest in these holdings. 
4 Noting that none of the respondents was enjoined from 
speaking and that the injunctions prohibit only concerted work 
stoppages, the Fifth Circuit rejected respondents ' claims that 
the injunctions violated First and Thirteenth Amendment rights. 
New Orleans Steamship Ass'n, supra , at 462-463. 
·-... 
March 12, 1981 
No. 80-1045 Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. I.L.A. 
No. 80-1058 Hampton Roads Shipping Ass 1n. v. I.L.A. 
Dear Chief: 
I approve of your draft of a proposed dissent from 
denial of cert, as I do not understand Buffalo Forge as 
reaching •political• rather than •1abor 1 disputes. 
I agree with John, however, that the question is 
an important one, apparently arises with some frequency, and 
I therefore think it would be best to grant the case. 
In sum, my first vote is to grant, and failing 
three other votes to take the case, I would like for you to 
add my name to my dissent. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
LFP/lab 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~u:prtmt QJLtttrt cf tltt~itt~ .§hrlt.s' 
~a.il'Jringfctt, ~. <!J. 2Dgt>t,;J 
March 12, 1981 
Re: 80-1045 - Jacksonvile Bulk Terminals v. 
I.L.A. 
80-1058 - Hampton Roads Shipping Assn. 
v. I.L.A. 
Dear Chief: 
Although you make a substantial case for 
summary reversal, I think it may be better to hear 
argument in these cases. After full argument, we 
might decide to confine Buffalo Forge to the 
sympathy strike situation and discourage the 
extension of its reasoning to different fact 
situations such as this. 
Respectfully, 
/L 
~he Chief Justice 
Copies to The Conference 
·~ . .:·rc·. 
" .. 
JVJr. .Just leo Stflwa.rt 
Mr . Ju;;·tl~..;o Wl'J:i te 
Mr . Jus tic ; ..~11··shall 
Mr. Justi · ,j :1 ;. ~,ckmun 
r-ir . ,Tt at r : :·o ·;oll 
V · Ju ' lo J' ·rnquis t 
Mr . .J LlS L lC ) ~:ten .. -ens 
From : 'rho Chief JLlSt i ce 
lst PRJN:PED DRA:Ffircul at od: ---· 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED0~A¥FJAR 13 1981 
JACKSONVILLE BULK TERMINALS, INC., ET AL, v.. 
, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S 
ASSOCIATION ET AL. 
~N PETITION FOR WRIT OF CER'l'IQHARI T() THE UNITED STATE~ 
cqUHT OF APPEALS FQR TI!E FIFTH CIHCUIT 
HAMP::FON E.OADS SHIPPING A-SSOCIATION, E'r AL, v. 
• ~ J. ,. • 
INTE~NATIONAL LONGSHO;REMEN'S 
ASSOCIATION EJT AL. 
' flN PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATEE\ 
CQURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIHCUIT 
Nos. 80-1045 and 80-1058. Decided March -, 1981 
CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER, dissenting. 
In these cases two Courts of Appeals overturned prelim8 
inary injunctions ordering the International Longshoremen's 
Association and Locals of that Association, pending arbitra-
tion, to cease and desist from refusing to handle certain cargo 
bound to or from the Soviet Ui1ion. The work stoppages 
were carried out, in clear violation oi collective-bargaining 
agreements, pursuant to a resoiutioii. o'i the Association en-
( 
tered into in response to the Soviet Union's invasion of 
Afghanistan.1 
Each of the pertinent collective-bargaining agreements 
contains a clause 12rohibiting any strike or work stoEEa.ge, a 
tJlause requi'ring arbitration of all grievances, a clause stating 
that the management of the empioyer's business and the di-
rection of the workforce "are exclusively vested in the Em-
ployer as functions of Management," and a clause stating 
that the agreement is 
"intended to cover all matters a.ffecting wages, hours, 
( 
. 1 The work stoppages al,;o went beyond the official retaliatory embargo 
impo~ed by the United States on certain tfa& with the Soviet Union• 
. . 
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and other terms and conditions of employment and .. , 
the Employers will not be required to negotiate on any 
further matters affecting these or other subjects not spe-
cifically set forth in this Agreement." 
The employers sought to compel arbitration; pending arbi-
{ tratior1 they secured temporary restraining orders and prelim-
inary· injunctions to halt the :elainly illegal work stoppages. 
In No. 80-1045, the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Florida ordered arbitration and, pending 
arbitration, enjoined the union from refusing to work aboard · 
3 named ships then in port The court held that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act was not applicable, reasoning that a purely 
political strike does not "in vol v [ e] or grow [] out of any 
labor dispute" as those terms are used in § § 4 (a) and 13 (c) 
of that statute/ and that the ordinary criteria, including the 
public interest as voiced by the United States in argument 
to the District Court,8 required entry of the preliminary in-
junction. The Court of Appeals reversed. New Orleans 
Bteamship Assn. v. General Longshore W orker.s, 626 F. 2d 
455 (CA5 1980). 
1 29 U. S. C. §§ 104 (a), 113 (c) (1976). Section 4 (a) provide~:~: 
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any re-
straining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any ca:;e invulv~ 
ing or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any per:>on or persons 
participating or intere:;ted in sucl1 dispute (as these terms are herein de-
fined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts: 
" (a) Cea:>ing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any 
relation of employment . ... " 
Section 13 (c) providel:l : 
"The term 'laiJor di~pute' includeb any controversy concerning terms or 
conditiunt~ of employment, or con<!erning the a8Sociation or repre::~entation 
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to ar-
range terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the 
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." 
8 The United Stat~s advised the District Court that there was no pro ... 
hibition of export of the products in question to the U. S. S. R. , that ap-
propriate governmental action had been taken to control exports to the 
U. S. S. R. in order to protect the public interest, and that "private action 
by longshore workel.1l to interfere ·with such exports are [sic] not 
wa:n:ante~." 
~. 
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In No. 80-1058, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of West Virginia also issued a preliminary 
injunction pending arbitration. That court based its deci-
sion primarily on the management discretion clause in the 
agreement. 'The Court of Appeals reversed. Hampton 
Roads Shippiny Assn. v. International Longshoremen's Assn.; 
'31 F. 2d 282 (CA4 1980). 
On appeal, both Courts of Appeals took the view that the C':/4 4 'i- ( Jl/ ~ 
anti-injunction standards of the Norris-LaGuardia Act as ~
elaborated in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of ~· _ 
America, 428 U.S. 397 (1976); and Boys Market, Inc. v. Re.. . 
tail Clerks Union, 398 D. S. 235 (1970), apply to these cases,  
Noting the obvious, that the underlying "dispute" between h...J-,ru-zA-L~ 
Lhe union and the U. S. S. R. cannot be resolved by the arbi- /~- ~ ~ -- --. ~ -
tration, 1 the Court of Appeals concluded that Buffalo Forge "0 ~­
precluded the injunctions. ~ q ~ 
That approach wholly misses the point. A necessary pre-
requisite for application of the Buffalo Forge doctrine is that 
there be a "labor dispute" between the employer and the em-
ployees, as that term is defined in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 
There is no "labot dispute" here and there is no basis in auy-
1 
of our decisions for applying Norris-LaGuardia to politically-
motivated work stoppages, concerning subjects over _which 
employers have no control. Decisions of other federal courts 
'so recognize. See KhediviaZ Line, S. A. E. v. Seafarers Inter-
national Union, 278 F. 2d 49, 5Q-51 (CA2 1960) (politically-
motivated boycott of Egyptian ships to retaliate for Egyptian 
blacklist of Ametl.can shl.ps that deait with Israel is uot a 
"labor dispute" triggering Norris-LaGuardia); liVest Gulf 
Maritime Assn. v. lnternational Longshoremen's Assn., 413 
F. Supp. 372 (SD Tex. 1975), aff'd summarily, 531 F. 2d 574 
(CA5 1976) (union's refusal on poliLical grounds, in violation 
of a no-strike agreement, to load grain on a ship bound for 
4 The Fifth Circuit renmrked, "1Jnfortunutely, no arbitrator cuu tell the 
Soviets to Withdraw from Afghani::~tanf' New Orleans Steamship Assn., 
supra, at 467. That, of eour~e, be~ tlw que::~tion: the arbitrator can 
'tommand the Union rwL to ;;trike. 
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' 
the Soviet Union does not present a "labor dispute"). See 
also N LRB v. International Longshoremen's Assn., ·332 F. 2d 
992, 995-996 (CA4 1964) (politically-motivated ILA boycott 
of all ships that were trading or had traded with Cuba is not 
a. "labor dispute" within the meaning of § 2 (9) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act). 
The present cases plainly do not ill volve "labor disputes" 
within the meaning of Norris-LaGuardia. ~ Although injunc-
tions must reflect sensitivity to First and Thirteenth Amend-
ment values/ the work stoppages at issue clearly do not 
remotely warrant the additional protective umbrella of the 
national labor policy. 
Because both Courts of Appeals have, in my view, errone· 
I ously viewed a strike to achieve a E._Urely political goal-however worthy-of the Union · as a "labor dispute" protected 
by Norris-LaGuardia, and because I do not believe in any 
event that our decision in Buffalo Forge precludes anti-strike 
injunctions in these cases, I would grant certiorari and sum~ 
marily reverse the judgments of the Courts of Appeals. Our 
caseload problems cannot justify tolerance of such egregious 
abuse of judicial power as manifest in these holdings. 
6 Noting that none of the re~pondents wa~> enjoined from speaking and 
that the injunctions prohibit only concerted work 8toppuges, the Fifth 
Circuit rejected respondents' claims that the injunctions violated First and 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 80-104S, Jacksonville Bulk TerminalsL 
Inc. v. ILA 
No. 80-10S8, Hampton Roads Shipping Assn 
v. ILA 
At Conference today, we voted to hear the 
problem presented by these cases. I intend to 
vote to grant in the CAS case, Jacksonville Bulk 
Terminals, and to hold the CA4 case, Hampton Roads 
Shipping, for Jacksonville. The issues are more 
fully ventilated in the CAS opinion. Judge 
Sprouse's opinion for CA4 in Hampton Roads 
Shipping does not discuss the Norris-LaGuardia 
issue, although he impliedly decides the issue in 
favor of the union. 
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JusTICE PoWELL, concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment. 
The Court's opinion makes clear that Congress, in enacting 
the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, did not intend to hold individuals liable in ~am­
ages for wildcat strikes. I therefore join the Court's judg-
ment and most of its opinion. I do not, however, share the 
Court's view that there remains to management a "significant 
array of other remedies," ante, at 15, n. 18, with which to 
deter or obtain compensation for illegal strikes. In fact, the 
"remedies" said to be available are largely chimerical. 
I 
Collective-bargaining agreements typically contain a prom-
ise by the union not to strike during the agreement's term. 
Unions agree to these no-strike clauses in exchange for the 
employer's promise to arbitrate disputes arising in contract 
administration. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 
U. S. 448, 449, 455 (1957). Each promise is the "quid pro 
quo" for the other, United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. 
Co., 363 U. S. 564, 567 (1960), because the employer yields 
traditional managerial autonomy in exchange for industrial 
peace. 
Despite the mutual benefits of the no-strike/grievance-ar-
bitration pact, strikes in breach of contract occur with dis-
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turbing frequency. In some cases, these strikes are encour-
aged or even instigated by union leaders.1 Often, however, 
they are true "wildcats"-strikes that arise spontaneously to 
protest grievances against the company and, occasionally, 
against the union leadership itself. Responsible unions dis-
approve of such strikes, but some officials, especially those at 
the local level, may acquiesce in them because of the fervor 
of intransigent members. 
Whatever the cause, strikes in breach of contract frequently 
injure all concerned: the employer/ employees, and the pub-
lic. Strikes and lockouts by their nature squander hu-
man working capacity, the full use of which is essential to 
the enjoyment of the Nation's productive potential. To be 
sure, the national labor policy recognizes that, in some cir-
cumstances, the use of weapons of strike and lockout is con-
sistent with and protected by law. Labor, management, and 
the public nevertheless share a "common goal of uninter-
rupted production." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf 
Mfg. Co., 363 U. S. 574, 582 (1960). The essential tenet of 
our labor policy is that "a system of industrial self-govern-
ment" based on consensual (albeit vigorously negotiated) 
labor contracts, see United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. 
1 Strike encouragement sometimes is explicit but more often is cryptic. 
A union may employ subtle signals to convey the messa ge to strike. One 
court noted that unions sometimes employ "a. nod or a wink or a 
code ... in place of the word 'strike.'" United States v. UMW, 77 F. 
Supp. 563, 566 (DC 1948), aff'd,- U.S. App. D. C.-, 177 F. 2d 29, 
cert. demed, 338 U. S. 871 (1949). 
2 Production disruptions have obvious short-term adverse consequences. 
And one commentator has pointed out that the long-term consequences of 
these strikes may be even more severe. A strike rends the "closely inte-
grated supply and distribution systems" that the company has developed. 
M. Jay Whitman, Wildcat Strikes: The Unions' Narrowing Path to Recti-
tude?, 50 Ind. L. J. 472, 473 (1975). Such systems "presume predicta-
bility. A business with a reputation for labor problems, let alone wild-
cats, simply cannot provide its customers with that predictability," ibid., 
leading once-regular customers to seek other sources of supply. 
COMPLETE AUTO TRANSIT, INC. v. REIS 3 
Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570 (1960) (BRENNAN, J., concurring), is 
preferable to "strikes, lockouts, or other self-help," Boys Mar-
kets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U. S. 235, 249 
(1970). 
When the Taft-Hartley amendments were enacted in 1947, 
the Nation had experienced a wave of labor unrest.3 Con-
gress found that "the balance of power in collective bargain-
ing" had been destroyed because employers, who had prom-
ised to arbitrate disputes in exchange for no-strike promises, 
often failed to obtain the industrial peace for which they 
bargained. S. Rep., supra, n. 3, at 14." 
II 
It is increasingly clear that the 1947 Taft-Hartley amend-
ments did not provide employers with an effective remedy 
for wildcat strikes. The Court today holds, properly I think, 
that Congress intended to foreclose a damages remedy against 
individual wildcat strikers. The Court states, however, that 
there remains a number of legal weapons with which to deter 
or terminate illegal strikes, or to obtain compensation when 
they occur. Ante, at 15-16, n. 18. In support of its view, 
the Court contends that the employer may (i) obtain an in-
3 The Senate Report accompanying the Taft-Hartley amendments 
observed that the Nation in 1945 experienced 
"the loss of approximately 38,000,000 man-days of labor through strikes. 
This total was trebled in 1946 when there were 116,000,000 man-days 
lost .... " S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1947) (hereinafter 
S. Rep.). 
• The Senate Report stated that if workers "can break agreements with 
relative impunity, then such agreements do not tend to stablize industrial 
relations. The execution of such an agreement does not by itself promote 
industrial peace. The chief advantage which an employer can reasonably 
expect from a collective labor agreement is assurance of uninterrupted 
operation during the term of the agreement. Without some effective 
method of assuring freedom from economic warfare for the term of the 
agreement, there is little reason why an employer would desire to sign such 
a contract." Id., at 16. 
·~ 
•; 
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junction, (ii) discharge the strikers, (iii) request the union 
to use its internal disciplinary powers, or (iv) sue the union 
entity for damages. Ibid. In reality. more often than not, 
each of these remedies is illusory. 
Injunctions in labor disputes are generally prohibited by 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 5 In Boys lvfarkets, Inc. v. Retail 
Clerks Local 770, 398 U. S. 235 (1970), the Court recognized 
a limited exception to the anti-injunction provisions of that 
Act. Boys Markets permits injunctions to terminate strikes 
pending arbitration if the grievance underlying the strike is 
arbitrable. Hmvever, Boys Markets offers only "narrow" 
relief, id., at 253, because injunctions cannot be obtained in 
strikes of other kinds. E. g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. United 
Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976) (injunctions not available 
in sympathy strikes). Moreover, even when an injunction 
is available, workers on strike often are disinclined tO obey 
it.6 Courts may be reluctant to impose contempt penalties 
on individual workers; if ordered, such penalties are difficult 
to enforce. 
Nor is discharge a realistic remedy in most cases. Because 
a strike in breach of contract is unprotected conduct under 
the National Labor Relations Act, see NLRB v. Sands Mfg. 
Co., 306 U. S. 332 (1939), workers who strike illegally may 
be terminated. It therefore has been argued that discharge 
effectively deters strikes and punishes wrongdoers because 
discharge is "the industrial equivalent of capital punish-
ment." M. Jay Whitman, Wildcat Strikes: The Union's 
5 Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. § 104, provides, in 
pertinent part: 
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any re-
straining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case 
involving or growing out of any labor dispute. . .. " 
° Compare Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Local 11,.87, UMW, 457 F. 2d 162 
(CA7 1972) with Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Local1l,B7, UMW, 500 F. 2d 950, 
952 (CA7 1974). See Gould, On Labor Injunctions Pending Arbitration: 
Recasting Buffalo Forge, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 533, 541, and n. 47 (1978). 
) l'.·~ 
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Narrowing Path to Rectitude?, 50 Ind. L. J. 472, 481 (1975). 
There are at least three reasons why this remedy in practice 
often is not effective. First, in a large wildcat strike, whole-
sale discharges are not practical because an employer cannot 
terminate all or most of his labor force without crippling 
production. See Boys Markets, 81tpra, at 248-249, n. 17.7 
Second, certain kinds of selective discharges arguably are 
illegal. The National Labor Relations Board takes the posi-
tion that an employer may not discipline a union officer more 
severely than other strike particip~nts, even where the union 
officer failed to fulfill a contractual undertaking to help ter-
minate strikes.8 In any event, discharging only selected 
strikers is unlikely to influence the rank-and-file to return 
to work. Such discharges actually may aggravate worker dis-
content and thereby prolong the strike. Cedar Coal Co., v. 
UMW, 560 F. 2p 1153, 1157 (CA4 1977), cert. denied, 434 
U. S. 1047 (1978); see 86 Harv. L. Rev. 447, 454, n. 33 
(1972). At a minimum, strikers may insist that their dis-
charged colleagues be reinstated as a condition to returning 
to work. Fishman & Brown, Union Responsibility for Wild-
7 Discharging the entire work force would "caus[e] mountainous per-
sonnel problems. Consider the sheer logistics of hiring, training and ac-
climating an entirely new work force with suitable skil1s. Even if a 
new labor force could be recruited, the time and expense of this process, 
from recruitment to full promotion, could very well sound the death knell 
of the business ." Fishman & Brown, Union Responsibility for Wildcat 
Strikes, 21 Wayne L. Rev. 1017, 1021 (1975). 
8 E. g., Miller Brewing Co., 254 N. L. R. B. No. 24 (Jan. 14, 1981); 
South Central Bell Telephone Co., 254 N. L. R. B. No. 32 (Jan. 14, 1981); 
Precision Casting Co., 233 N. L. R. B. 183 (1977). The Board's position 
is so clear that employers may be deterred from conducting selective dis-
charges. This Court has not addressed the question, but some courts of 
appeals have not warmly received the Board's reasoning. See Gould, Inc. 
v. NLRB, 612 F. 2d 728 (CA3 1979) (denying enforcement to 237 
N. L. R. B. 881 (1978)), cert. denied, - U. S. - (1980); Indiana & 
Mich. Electric Co. v. NLRB, 599 F. 2d 277 (CA7 1979) (denying enforce-
ment to 237 N. L. R. B. 226 (1978)); see also NLRB v. Armour-Dial, 
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cat Strikes, 21 Wayne L. Rev. 1017, 1022 (1975). Third, 
arbitrators not infrequently refuse to sustain discharges of 
strikers. See Handsaker & Handsaker, Remedies and Pen-
alties for Wildcat Strikes: How Arbitrators and Federal 
Courts Have Ruled, 22 Cath. U. L. Rev. 279, 284 (1973). 
The union itself normally will not discipline its striking 
members. Most unions have the legal authority to take such 
action, see Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 
64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1065 (1951), but the power seldom 
is used. In a wildcat strike, worker recalcitrance sometimes 
is directed at the incumbent union leadership as much as at 
company management. In these circumstances, the union's 
attempt to discipline is unlikely to be effective and may be 
counterproductive. Moreover, under this Court's decision in 
Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW, 444 U. S. 212 (1979), a parent 
union normally is not obligated to take affirmative steps to 
prevent or terminate a wildcat strike. Absent such an obliga-
tion, there is little incentive for the union to intervene, even 
where intervention would be useful. 
Finally, a suit for damages against the union entity rarely 
is feasible. 9 Last Term, in Carbon Fuel, supra, we largely 
9 Sophisticated employers for tactical reasons may elect to forego 
tenable post-strike suits for damages. As the Court points out, such suits 
may "exacerbate industrial strife," ante, at 15, n. 18, and thereby delay 
the dissipation of the acrimony engendered by the strike. Employers also 
may elect not to sue tor damages because they do not want to subject 
themselves to the disclosure attendant to litigation. A damages suit 
"necessarily involves detailed discussion of an employer's most intimate 
financial secrets. By making a damage claim, the employer puts its 
finances at issue in the litigation . The discovery rules of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure give the union and its accountants the right to 
explore every corner of the employer's books. If the union conducts its 
case properly, it will know everything from per-unit profit to the finer 
details of corporate management." M. Jay Whitman, supra, n. 1, 50 Ind. 
L. J., at 474 (footnote omitted). 
Finally, part of the price of settling the strike often is a promise that the 
company will waive its claim for damages. Ransdell v. International 
' ~: .. 
COMPLETE AUTO TRANSIT, INC. v. REIS 7 
foreclosed this possibility when we held that liability nor-
mally may not be imposed on a parent union 10absent proof 
that it authorized or ratified the strike.11 It is a foolish 
union that would invite a damages suit by explicitly endors-
ing a strike in this manner. See n. 1, supra. 
III 
The Court plainly is unrealistic, therefore, when it suggests 
that employers have at their disposal a battery of alternate 
remedies for illegal strikes. Ante, at 15, n. 18. The result 
of the absence of remedies is a lawless vacuum. Despite a 
no-strike clause, a plant may be closed with adverse conse-
quences that often are far-reaching. The strike injures the 
employer, other companies and their employees, and con-
sumers in general. Frequently, the strike is harmful even· 
to the majority of strikers, who feel obligated to honor the 
picket line of minority wildcatters. 
It is, of course, the province of Congress to set the Nation's 
labor policy. I do not suggest that authorizing a damages 
remedy against individual wildcat strikers would be desira-
ble. I do believe, however, that the absence of an effective 
remedy leaves such strikes undeterred and the public interest 
unprotected. The National Labor Relations Act, as amended 
in 1947, was intended to further broader national interests 
Assn. of Machinists, 97 L. R. R. M. 2738 (ED Wis. 1978); Gould, On 
Labor Injunctions, Unions, and the Judges: The Boys Market Case, 1970 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 215, 231 (1970). 
1° Carbon Fuel did not consider the quantum of proof necessary to 
establish damages liability against a local union. Because of the local's 
proximity to workers, an inference of agency-and hence, liability-
arguably may arise even without explicit proof of strike authorization or 
ratification. See § 301 (e) of the Act, 29 U.S. C. § 185 (e). The possi-
bility that the local will be liable may be of little practical benefit, how-
ever, because the local often is judgment-proof. 
11 Carbon Fuel recognized, of course, that an explicit contractual under-
taking by the parent to intervene to terminate wildcats could be the basis 







8 COMPLETE AUTO TRANSIT, INC. v. REIS 
than those of either labor or management. It was conceived 
not only as a charter for labor rights but also as a framework 
of law to promote orderly labor relations. Wildcat strikes 
are at war with these objectives. 
80-1045 JACKSONVILLE BULK v. INTERNAT'L LONGSHOREMEN Argued 1/18/82 
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Justice Rehnquist ~ ~ 
Justice Stevens /'2Jit;, 
~ L,_~ ~f dk~,.,J.~ 
~~~J ... ~~~ ... ~~~ ... 
~~- ~ ~ ~#Vi d.-'2~ 
~r~a-~~c!·-<~ 
Justice O'Connor :JlW. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE W>< . ..J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
,ju:prmtt <!fottrl of flrt ~~ ,jtatt.s-
~rur~ 10. (!}. 2!lgt)!.~ 
January 22, 1982 / 
RE: No. 80-1045 Jacksonville Bulk Terminal v. International 
Longshoremen's Association 
Dear Chief: 
Thurgood has agreed to do the opinion for the Court in 
the above. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
.· 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
~ttprtlru <!Jtmrt of t4t ~b ~taitg 
~a:sJringhtn. til. <.q. 20~)!.~ 
January 22, 1982 
RE: 80-1045 - Jacksonville Bulk Terminal v. International 
Longshoremen's Association 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I am reexamining my position with respect to Buffalo Forqe . 
There were several votes contingent on whether that case should 
be overruled . I will let you know . 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
-
~uprtme <!Jonrt ttf Utt ~b .§taftg 
'Jfasf(tttgton.1B. <!f. 20?)1.~ 
January 27, 1982 
RE: No. 80-1045, Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. ILA 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
If Buffalo Forge v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 
(1976), can be read to prevent a fed~ral court from 
enjoining a union from refusing to handle cargo to or from a 
foreign country it does not approve of, in violation of the 
no-strike clause in its contract, I would join to overrule 
it. 
Regards, 
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
January 28, 1982 
RE: No . 80-1045 - Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. Et al . 
v . Internatlonal Longshoremen's Assn . 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE : 
One of "us irreconcilables " will be doing a 




January 28, 1982 
80-1045 Jacksonville Bulk Storage v. !LA 
Dear Chief~ 
I would consider joining an opinion to overrule 
Buffalo Forge. 
It cut back substantially on Bov's Market, and 
seems to me to be contrarv to national policy in favor of 
arbitration. 
As was evident from the briefing and argument of 
this case, the rationale of Buffalo Forge is being read to 
justify a strike for any political or policy cause wholly 
unrelated to disputes between management and unions over the 
terms and conditions of employment. Unlike the union 
movement in some other countries, American unions only 
rarely have authorized or tolerated strikes in the interest 
of furthering a political cause, foreign or domestic. 
The sanctioning of such strikes by this Court 
could encourage a change in this policy of restraint by u.s. 
unions. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
~uprtttU' ~onrt of ' 11l' ;·n!~ti'l .f·bfrn· 
.,_,., }!inr;!pngton, p. ~. !:I.02Jl.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CON NOR 
,, . 
February 8, 1982 
No. 80-1045 Jacksonville Bulk Storage 
v. ILA 
Dear Chief, 
As I indicated at the Conference, I would 
also consider joining an opinion to overrule 
Buffalo Forge. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
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[March -, 1982] ~~ 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. ~ J ~~­
In this case, we consider the power of a federal court to en-~., 4 , 
join a politically motivated work stoppage in an action ~ ':u-o-~ 
brought by an employer pursuant to § 301(a) of the Labor  ~ 
Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S. C. § 185(a) ~ 
(giving federal courts jurisdiction over breach-of-contract ac- ~ 
tions between an employer and a labor organization), to en- S-?<.- p 6-, 0 
force a union's obligations under a collective-bargaining 
agreement. We first address whether the broad anti-injunc-
tion provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. 
§ 101 et seq., apply to politically motivated work stoppages. 
Finding these provisions applicable, we then consider 
whether the work stoppage may be enjoined under the ra-
tionale of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 
U. S. 235 (1970), and Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelwork-
ers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976), pending an arbitrator's decision on 
whether the strike violates the collective-bargaining 
agreement. 
I 
On January 4, 1980, President Carter announced that, due 
to the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan, certain 
trade with the Soviet Union would be restricted. 
.. , 
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Superphosphoric acid (SPA), used in agricultural fertilizer, 
was not included in the Presidential embargo. 1 On January 9, 
1980, respondent International Longshoremen's Association 
(ILA) announced that its members would not handle any 
cargo bound to, or coming from, the Soviet Union or carried 
on Russian ships. 2 In accordance with this resolution, re-
spondent local union, an ILA affiliate, refused to load SPA 
bound for the Soviet Union aboard three ships that arrived· at 
the shipping terminal operated by petitioner Jacksonville 
Bulk Terminals, Inc. (JBT) at the Port of Jacksonville, Flor-
ida during the month of January 1980. 
'On February 25, 1980, the embargo was extended to include SPA along 
with other products. On April24, 1981, President Reagan lifted the SPA 
embargo as part of his decision to remove restrictions on the sale of grain 
to the Soviets. By telegrams dated April 24, 1981 and June 5, 1981, the 
ILA has recommended to its members that they resume handling goods to 
and from the Soviet Union. Although the work stoppage is no longer in 
effect, there remains a live controversy over whether the collective-bar-
gaining agreement prohibits politically motivated work stoppages, and the 
Union may resume such a work stoppage at any time. As a result, this 
case is not moot. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 
397, 403, n. 8 (1976). 
2 The President of the ILA made the following announcement: 
"In response to overwhelming demands by the rank and file members of 
the Union, the leadership of the ILA today ordered immediate suspension 
in handling all Russian ships and all Russian cargoes in ports from Maine to 
Texas and Puerto Rico where ILA workers are employed. 
"The reason for this action should be apparent in light of international 
events that have affected relations between the U. S. & Soviet Union. 
"However, the decision by the Union leadership was made necessary by 
the demands of the workers. 
"It is their will to refuse to work Russian vessels and Russian cargoes 
under present conditions of the world. 
"People are upset and they refuse to continue the business as usual policy 
as long as the Russians insist on being international bully boys. It is a 
decision in which the Union leadership concurs." Brief for Respondents 2, 
n. 2 . 
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In response to this work stoppage, petitioners JBT, 
Hooker Chemical Corporation, and Occidental Petroleum 
Company (collectively referred to as the Employer)3 brought 
this action pursuant to § 301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U. S. C. 
§ 185(a), against respondents ILA, its affiliated local union, 
and its officers and agents (collectively referred to as the 
Union). The Employer alleged that the Union's work stop-
page violated the collective-bargaining agreement between 
the Union and JBT. The Employer sought to compel ar-
bitration under the agreement, requested a temporary re-
straining order and a preliminary injunction pending arbitra-
tion, and sought damages. ~
The agreement contains both a ad no-strike claus nd a 
provision requiring the resolution of a dtspu~gh a 
grievance procedure, ending in arbitration. 4 The no-strike 
clause provides: 
"During the term of this Agreement, ... the Union 
agrees there shall not be any strike of any kind or degree 
whatsoever, ... for any cause whatsoever; such causes 
3 JBT is a wholly owned subsidiary of Oxy Chemical Corporation, which 
is a subsidiary of Hooker. Ownership of all these corporations is ulti-
mately vested in Occidental. Hooker Chemical Company manufactures 
SPA at a manufacturing facility in Florida. Pursuant to a bilateral trade 
agreement between Occidental and the Soviet Union, SPA is shipped to 
the Soviet Union from the JBT facility in Jacksonville. 
' The grievance and arbitration clause provides in relevant part: 
"Matters under dispute which cannot be promptly settled between the 
Local and an individual Employer shall ... be referred . . . to a Port 
Grievance Committee. . . . In the event this Port Grievance Committee 
cannot reach an agreement . .. the dispute shall be referred to the Joint 
Negotiating Committee .. . . 
"A majority decision of this Committee shall be final and binding on both 
parties and on all Employers signing this Agreement. In the event the 
Committee is unable to reach a majority decision within 72 hours after 
meeting to discuss the case, it shall employ a professional arbitrator .. .. " 
I 
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including but not limited to, unfair labor practices by the 
Employer or violation of this Agreement. The right of 
employees not to cross a bona fide picket line is recog-
nized by the Employer .... " 
The United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Florida ordered the Union to process its grievance in accor-
dance with the contractual grievance procedure. The Dis-
trict Court also granted the Employer's request for a prelimi-
nary injunction pending arbitration, reasoning that the 
political motivation behind the work stoppage rendered the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act's anti-injunction provisions 
inapplicable. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the District Court's order to the extent it required 
arbitration of the question whether the work stoppage vio-
lated the collective-bargaining agreement. New Orleans 
Steamship Association v. General Longshore Workers, 626 
F. 2d 455 (1980). 5 However, the Court of Appeals disagreed 
with the District Court's conclusion that the provisions of the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act are inapplicable to politically moti-
vated work stoppages. Relying on]luffalo Forge, the Court 
of Appeals further held tnat tneEmployer was not entitled to 
an injunction pending arbitration because the underlying dis-
pute was not arbitrable. We agree with the Court0i"Ap-
pea1Sti'i'atthe-provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act apply 
to this case, and that, under Buffalo Forge, an injunction 
pending arbitration may ~
5 The Union concedes that the question whether the work stoppage vio-
lates the no-strike clause is arbitrable. In a consolidated case, the Court 
of Appeals upheld an injunction issued by the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Louisiana enforcing an arbitrator's decision that 
the ILA work stoppage violated a collective-bargaining agreement. New 
Orleans Steamship Association v. General Longshore Workers, 626 F. 2d 
455, 469 (CA5 1980). 
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II 
Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides in part: 
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction 
to issue any restraining order or temporary or perma-
nent injunction in any case involving or growing out of 
any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons par-
ticipating or interested in such dispute ... from doing, 
whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts: 
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to re-
main in any relation of employment." 29 U. S. C. § 104. 
Congress adopted this broad prohibition to remedy the grow-
ing tendency of federal courts to enjoin strikes by narrowly 
construing the Clayton Act's labor exemption from the Sher-
man Act's prohibition against conspiracies to restrain trade, 
see 29 U.S. C. §52. See, e. g., H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8, 10-11 (1931). This Court has consis-
tently given the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act a broad interpretation, recognizing excep-
tions only in limited situations where necessary to 
accommodate the Act to specific federal legislation or para-
mount congressional policy. See, e. g., Boys Markets, Inc. 
v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235, 249-253 (1970); Rail-
road Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 353 ~ 
u. s. 30, 39-42 (1957). 
The Boys Markets exception, a refine in Bufj'alo Forge 
Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 . . 97 (1976), is re evant 
to our decision today. In Boys Markets, this Court re-exam-
ined Sinclair Refining Co.v . Atkinson , 370 U. S. 195 (1962), 
which held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes a federal 
district court from enjoining a strike in breach of a collective-
bargaining agreement, even where that agreement contains 
provisions for binding arbitration of the grievance concerning 
which the strike was called. 398 U. S., at 237-238. The 
Court overruled Sinclair and held that, in order to accommo--
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date the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia to 
the subsequently enacted provisions of § 301(a) and the 
strong federal policy favoring arbitration, it was essential to 
recognize an exception to the anti-injunction provisions for 
cases in which the employer sought to enforce the union's 
contractual obligation to arbitrate grievances rather than to 
strike over them. I d., at 249-253. 6 
After Boys Markets, the Courts of Appeals divided on the 
question whether a strike could be enjoined under the Boys 
Markets exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act pending ar-
bitration, when the strike was not over a · evance that the 
union d alrreedto ar itrate. 7 In Buffalo Forge, the Court 
reso ved this con c an eld that the Boys Markets excep-
tion does not apply when only the question whether the 
strike violates the no-strike pledge, and not the dispute that 
precipitated the strike, is arbitrable under the parties' collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. 8 
The Employer argues that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does 
not apply in this case because the political motivation under-
lying the Union's work stoppage removes this controversy 
from that Act's definition of a "labor dispute." Alterna-
tively, the Employer argues that this case fits within the ex-
ception to that Act recognized in Boys Markets as refined in 
Buffalo Forge. We review these arguments in·turn. 
6 In Boys Markets, the underlying dispute was clearly subject to the 
grievance and arbitration procedures of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment, and the strike clearly violated the no-strike clause. 
7 See cases cited in Buffalo Forge, 428 U. S., at 404, n. 9. 
8 In Buffalo Forge, the strike at issue was a sympathy strike in support 
of sister unions negotiating with the employer. The Court reasoned that 
there was no need to accommodate the policies of the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act to § 301 and the federal policy favoring arbitration when a strike is not 
called over an arbitrable dispute, because such a strike does not directly 
frustrate the arbitration process by denying or evading the union's promise 
to arbitrate. 428 U. S., at 407-412. 
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III 
At the outset, we must determine whether this is a "case 
involving or growin~ispute" within the 
meamng of § 4 of the oms- aGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. 
§ 104. Section 13(c) of the Act broadly defines the term la-
bor dispute to include "any controversy concerning terms or 
conditions of employment." 29 U. S. C. § 113(c). 9 
The E~es that the existence of political mo-
tives takes this work stoppage controversy outside the broad 
scope of this definition. This argument, however_. has no ba-
sis in the plain statutor Ian a e of the Norris-La uardia 
Act or in our pnor interpretations of that Act. Further-
more, the argument is contradicted by the legislative history 
of not only the Norris-LaGuardia Act but also the 1947 Taft-
Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA). 
A 
An action brought by an employer against the union repre-
senting its employees to enforce a no-strike pledge generally 
involves two controversies. First, there is the "underlying 
dispute," which is the event or condition that triggers the 
work stoppage. This dispute may or may not be political, 
and it may or may not' be arbitrable under the parties' collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. Second, there is the parties' 
dispute over whether the no-strike pledge prohibits the work 
stoppage at issue. This second dispute can always form the 
basis for federal court jurisdiction, because § 301(a) gives fed-
9 Section 13(c) provides: 
(c) The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or 
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation 
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to ar-
range terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the 
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." 
-:>\ 
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eral courts jurisdiction over "[s]uits for violation of contracts 
between an employer and a labor organization." 29 U. S. C. 
§ 185(a). 
It is beyond cavil that the second form of dis ute-whether 
the coTiective-bargaining agreement either forbids or ermits -- -the union to refuse o pe orm certain work-is a "contro-
versy cO'ii'Ce"'rning the terms or condfti();s of emloyment." 
29U. K rr-§1T3"{c'):--Tll1s § 30factl0n was brought o re-
solve just such a controversy. In its complaint, the Em-
ployer did not seek to enjoin the intervention of the Soviet 
Union in Afghanistan, nor did it ask the District Court to de-
cide whether the Union was justified in expressing disap-
proval of the Soviet Union's actions. Instead, the Employer 
sought to enjoin the Union's decision not to proViaeTaoor, a 
decision w Icnt11e-EmpiOyerbeli ve~rms of 
the collective-bargaining agreement. It is this contract dis-
pute, and not the political dispute, that the arbitrator will re-
so!Ve~nd ~rts are ~
The plain language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not 
except labor disputes having their genesis in political pro-
tests. Nor is there any basis in the statutory language for 
the argument that the Act requires that each dispute rele-
vant to the case be a labor dispute. The Act merely reJLuires 
that the case..J!Ivolv!:., "any" labor di - ute. Therefore, the 
plain terms of § 4(a) and § 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act de-
prive the federal courts of the power to enjoin the Union's 
work stoppage in this § 301 action, without regard to whether 
the Union also has a nonlabor dispute with another entity. 10 
10 Of course, there are exceptions to the Act's prohibitions against en-
joining work stoppages. See, e. g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks 
Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970). The employer may obtain an injunction to 
enforce an arbitrator's decision that the strike violates the collective-bar-




§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U. S. C. § 185. 
See, e. g., Buffalo Forge, 428 U. S., at 405. See also-, and note ti?- 1% J 
infra (discussing Board's authority under 29 U. S. C. §§ 160(k), 160(1), to 
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The conclusion that this case involves a labor dispute 
within the meaning of the Norris- a Guardia Act comports 
with this Court's consistent interpretation of that Act. 11 Our 
decisions have recognized that the term "labor dispute" must 
not be narrowly construed because the statutory definition it-
self is extremely broad and because Congress deliberately in-
cluded a broad definition to overrule judicial decisions that 
had unduly restricted the Clayton Act's labor exemption from 
the antitrust laws. For example, in Marine Cooks & Stew-
ards v. Panama Steamship Co., 362 U. S. 365, 369 (1960), 
the Court observed: 
petition for an injunction upon finding reasonable cause to believe that the 
strike is an unfair labor practice). 
11 The Employer's reliance on Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 556 
(1978), to argue that a politically motivated strike is not a labor dispute is 
misplaced. In Eastex, we addressed whether certain concerted activity 
was protected under § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 157, and we recog-
nized that "[t]here may well be types of conduct or speech that are so 
purely political or so remotely connected to the concerns of employees as 
employees as to be beyond the protection of§ 7." !d., at 570, n. 20. Al-
though the definition of a "labor dispute" in § 2(9) of the NLRA, 29 
U. S. C. § 152(9), is virtually identical to that in § 13(c) of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. § 113(c), and the two provisions have been con-
strued consistently with one another, e. g., United States v. Hutcheson, 
312 U. S. 219, 234, n. 4 (1941), this similarity does not advance the Em-
ployer's argument. Union activity that prompts a "labor dispute" within 
the meaning of these sections may be protected by§ 7, prohibited by§ 8(b), 
29 U. S. C. § 158(b), or neither protected nor prohibited. The objective of 
the concerted activity is relevant in determining whether such activity is 
protected under§ 7 or prohibited by§ 8(b), but not in determining whether 
the activity is a "labor dispute" under § 2(9). 
Moreover, the conclusion that a purely political work stoppage is not pro-
tected under § 7 means simply that the employer is not prohibited by 
§ 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(1), from discharging or disci-
plining employees for this activity. It hardly establishes that no "labor 
dispute" existed within the meaning of§ 2(9). Similarly, if the employees 
protested such sanctions under the collective-bargaining agreement, an ar-
bitrator might ultimately conclude that the sanctions were proper, but this 
would not alter the obvious fact that the matter is a labor dispute. 
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"Th[e] Act's language is broad. The language is 
broad because Congress was intent upon taking the fed-
eral courts out of the labor injunction business except in 
the very limited circumstances left open for federal juris-
diction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The history 
and background that led Congress to take this view have 
been adverted to in a number of prior opinions of this 
Court in which we refused to give the Act narrow inter-
pretations that would have restored many labor dispute 
controversies to the courts." (emphasis added; footnote 
omitted) 
The critical element in determining whether the provisions 
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act apply is whether "the employer-
employee relationship [is] the matrix of the controversy." 
Columbia River Packers Association v. Hinton, 315 U. S. 
143, 147 (1942). In this case, the ~er and the Union t ~~. 
representing its employees are the disputants;-ind their dis-
pute concerns the interpretati~ contract that de-
fines their relationship. 12 Thus, the employer-employee rela-
tionship is the matrix of this controversy. 
Nevertheless, the Employer argues that a "labor dispute" 
exists only when the Union's action is taken in its own "eco-
nomic self-interest." The Employer cites American Federa-
tion of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U. S. 99 (1968), and Colum-
bia River Packers Association, supra, for this proposition. 
12 A labor dispute might be present under the facts of this case even in 
the absence of the dispute over the scope of the no-strike clause. Regard-
less of the political nature of the Union's objections to handling Soviet-
bound cargo, these objections were expressed in a work stoppage by em-
ployees against their employer, which focused on particular work 
assignments. Thus, apart from the collective-bargaining agreement, the 
employer-employee relationship would be the matrix of the controversy. 
We need not decide this question, however, because this case does involve 
a dispute over the interpretation of the parties' collective-bargaining 
agreement. 
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In these cases, however, the Court addressed the very differ-
ent question whether the relevant parties were "labor" 
groups involved in a labor dispute for the purpose of deter-
mining whether their actions were exempt from the antitrust 
laws. 13 These cases do not hold that a union's noneconomic 
motive inevitably takes the dispute out of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, but only that that protections of that Act do 
not extend to labor organizations when they cease to act as 
labor groups or when they enter into illegal combinations 
with nonlabor groups in restraint of trade. 14 Here, there is no I 
question that the Union is a labor group, representing its 
own interests in a dispute with the Employer over the em-
ployees' obligation to provide labor. 
Even in cases where the disputants did not stand in the 
relationship of employer and employee, this Court has held 
that the existence of noneconomic motives does not make the 
13 In American Federation of Musicians , the Court held that, although 
orchestra leaders acted as independent contractors with respect to certain 
"club-date" engagements, the union's involvement with the leaders was not 
a combination with a nonlabor group in violation of the Sherman Act. In 
finding that leaders were a "labor group," and a party to a labor dispute, 
the Court relied on the "'presence of a job or wage competition or some 
other economic interrelationship affecting legitimate union interests be-
tween the union members and the independent contractors."' 391 U. S. , 
at 106 (quoting the opinion of the District Court). In Hinton, the Court 
found that the union was merely an association of independent fish sellers 
involved in a controversy with fish buyers over a contract for the sale of 
fish; they were not employees of the buyers, nor did they seek to be. 315 
U. S., at 147. 
The Employer's reliance on Bakery Drivers Union v. Wagshal, 333 
U. S. 437 (1948), is similarly misplaced. In that case, the Court held only 
that a controversy between two businessmen over delivery times or meth-
ods of payment does not become a labor dispute merely because a union 
representative, with or without his employer's consent, sought to obtain 
payment pursuant to a particular method. I d., at 443-444. 
" The Employer's economic-motive analysis also leads to the untenable 
result that strikes in protest of unreasonably unsafe conditions and some 
sympathy strikes are not "labor disputes." 
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Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable. For example, in New 
Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552 
(1938), this Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohib-
ited an injunction against picketing by members of a civic 
group, which was aimed at inducing a store to employ Negro 
employees. In determining that the group and its members 
were "persons interested in a labor dispute" within the mean-
ing of § 13, the Court found it immaterial that the picketers, 
who were neither union organizers nor store employees, 
were not asserting economic interests commonly associated 
with labor unions-e. g., terms and conditions of employment 
in the narrower sense of wages, hours, unionization or bet-
terment of working conditions. I d., at 560. Although the 
lower courts found Norris-LaGuardia inapplicable because 
the picketing was motivated by the group's "political" or "so-
cial" goals of improving the position of Negroes generally, 
and not by the desire to improve specific conditions of em-
ployment, this Court reasoned: "The Act does not concern it-
self with the background or the motives of the dispute." 303 
U. S., at 561. j ~/-" ~ C) 
B · ~~ 711-v 
The Employer's argument that the Union's mo~ation for~~ 
engaging in a work stoppage determines whether the Norris-
LaGuardia Act applies is also contrary to the legislative his-
tory of that Act. The Act was enacted in response to federal 
court intervention on behalf of employers through the use of 
injunctive powers against unions and other associations of //~ 
employees. This intervention had caused the feder~J judi- "? f1._...() 
ciary to fall intoaisrepute among large se ents of his N a-
tion's~n. ee generally S. ep. No. 163, 72d Cong., 
1st Sess. 8, 162-18 (1932); 75 Cong. Rec. 4915 (1932) (remarks _____,. 
of Sen. Wagner). -----. 
Apart from the procedural unfairness of many labor injunc-
tions, one of the greatest evils associated with them was the 
- - - ·-. .... :r-""-· ~:-
.... "\.... · 
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use of tort-law doctrines, which often made the lawfulness of 
a strike depend upon ~iews of social and economic 
P,olicy. See, e. g., Cox, enE P"roblems in the Law of 
Grievance Arbitration, 30 Rocky Mountain L. Rev. 24 7, 256 
(1958). In debating the Act, its supporters repeatedly ex-
pressed disapproval of this Court's interpretations of the 
Clayton Act's labor exemption-interpretations which per-
mitted a federal judge to find the Act inapplicable based on 
his or her appraisal of the "legitimacy" of the union's objec-
tives. 15 See, e. g., 75 Gong. Rec. 4916 (1932) (remarks of Sen. 
Wagner) (definition of labor dispute expanded to overrule 
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921)); 
id., at 5487-5488 (remarks of Sen. Geller) (bill brought forth 
to remedy decisions allowing injunction in Duplex and in Bed-
ford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters Association, 274 U. S. 37 
(1927)). See also id., at 4686 (remarks of Sen. Hebert) (com-
mittee minority agreed that injunctions should not have is-
sued in Bedford and Duplex). See generally H.R. Rep. No. 
669, 72d Gong., 1st Sess. 8, 10-11 (1932). The legislative 
history is re lete with criticisms of the ability of powerful 
em~s to use ederal judges as "strike- reaking' agen-
cies; by virtue of their almost unbridled "equitable discre-
tion," federal judges could enter injunctions based on their 
disapproval of the employees' objectives, or on the theory 
that these objectives or actions, although lawful if pursued by 
a single employee, became unlawful when pursued through 
the "conspiracy" of concerted activity. See, e. g., 75 Gong. 
Rec. 4928-4938 (1932); id., at 5466--5468; id., at 5478-5481; 
id., at 5487-5490. 
Furthermore, the question whether the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act would apply to politically motivated strikes was brought 
to the attention of the 72nd Congress when it passed the Act. 
15 See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 468-469 
(1921). See also Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters Association, 274 
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Opponents criticized the definition of "labor dispute" in 
§ 13(c) on the ground that it would cover politically motivated 
strikes. Representative Beck argued that federal courts 
should have jurisdiction to enjoin political strikes like those 
threatened by labor unions in Europe. 75 Cong. Rec. 
5471-5473 (19.32) (discussing threatened strike by British 
unions protesting the cancellation of leases held by Commu-
nist Party members, and threatened strikes by Belgian 
unions protesting a decision to supply military aid to Po-
land). 16 In response, Representative Oliver argued that the 
federal courts should not have the power to enjoin such 
strikes. ld., at 5480-5481. Finally, Representative Beck 
offered an amendment to the Act that would have permitted 
federal courts to enjoin strikes called for ulterior purposes, 
including political motives. This amendment was defeated 
soundly. See id., at 5507. 
Further support for our conclusion that Congress believed 
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies to work stoppages in-
stituted for political reasons can be found in the legislative 
history of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA. 
That history reveals that Congress rejected a proposal to ~e­
peal theN'orris-LaGuardia Act with respect to one broad cat-
----n-~------ -egory of political strikes. 17 The House bill included definitions ---
'
6 The thrust of this objection was "that it takes no account whatever of 
the motives and purposes with which a nation-wide strike or boycott can be 
commenced and prosecuted." 75 Cong. Rec. 5472 (1932) (remarks of Rep. 
Beck). 
17 In relying on this history, we do not argue that congressional rejection 
of a broad repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes accommodation of 
that Act to the LMRA. See Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 
195, 204-210 (1962). In Boys Markets Co. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 
U. S. 235, 249 (1970), this Court put that argument to rest. Rather, we 
rely on this legislative history because it demonstrates that Congress be-
lieved that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did apply to controversies concerning 
politically motivated work stoppages. Furthermore, in this case, unlike 
Boys Markets, we are not asked to accommodate the Norris-LaGuardia 
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of various kinds of labor disputes. See H.R. 3020, 80th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 1 Legislative History of the LMRA 158 
(1947) (Leg. His.); H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Con., 1st Sess., 
18--19, 1 Leg. His. 292, 309-310. Of relevance here, § 2(13) 
defined a "sympathy" strike as a strike "called or conducted 
not by reason of any dispute between the employer and the 
employees on strike or participating in such concerted inter-
ference, but rather by reason of either (A) a dispute involving 
another employer or other employees of the same employer, 
or (B) disagreement with some governmental policy." H.R. 
3020, § 2(13), 1 Leg. His. 168 (emphasis added). Section 12 
of the House bill made this kind of strike "unlawful concerted 
activity," and "it remove[d] the immunities that the present 
laws confer upon persons who engage in them." H.R. Rep. 
No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, 1 Leg. His. 314. In par-
ticular, the Norris-LaGuardia Act would not apply to suits 
brought by private parties to enjoin such activity, and dam-
ages could be recovered. See id., at 23-24, 43-44, 1 Leg. 
His. 314-315, 334-335. In explaining these provisions, the 
House Report stated that strikes "against a policy of national 
or local government, which the employer cannot change," 
should be made unlawful, and that "[t]he bill makes inapplica-
ble in such suits the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which heretofore 
has protected parties to industrial strife from the conse-
quences of their lawlessness." I d., at 24, 44, 1 Leg. His. 
315, 335. 
The Conference Committee accepted the Senate version, 
which had eliminated these provisions of the House bill. 18 
Act to a specific federal act or to the strong policy favoring arbitration. 
'
8 The Senate had declined to adopt these provisions of the House bill. 
The Senate Report explained that it did not want to impair labor's social 
gains under the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the NLRA of 1935, but instead 
wanted to remedy "specific types of injustice" or "clear inequities" by "pre-
cise and carefully drawn legislation." S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1, 1 Leg. His. 407. Some of the concerted activities listed in § 12 of 
.,, 
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The Conference Report explained that its recommendation 
did not go as far as the House bill, that § 8(b) prohibits juris-
dictional strikes and illegal secondary boycotts, and that the 
Board, not private parties, may petition a district court 
under § lO(k) or § 10(1) to enjoin these activities notwithstand-
ing the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. H.R. Conf. 
Rep. No. 510, 80th Gong. 1st Sess. 36, 42-43, 57, 58-59, 1 
Leg. His. 540, 546-547, 561, 562--563. In short, Congress 
declined in 1947 to adopt a broad "political motivation" excep-
tion to the Norris-LaGuardia Act for strikes in protest of 
some governmental policy. Instead, if a strike of this nature 
takes the form of a secondary boycott prohibited by § 8(b), 
Congress chose to give the Board, not private parties, the 
power to petition a federal district court for an injunction. 
See 29 U. S. C. §§ 160(k), 160(1). 
c 
This case, brought by the Employer to enforce its collec-
tive: bargaining agreement with the Union, involves a "labor 
dispute" within any common-sense meaning of that term. 
w ere we to ignore this plam interpretation and hold that the 
political motivation underlying the work stoppage removes 
this controversy from the prohibitions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, we would embroil federal judges in the very 
scrutin of "legitimate objectives" that Con ess intended to 
preyent..lYhen it passe t at Act. T e applicability not only 
of § 4, but of all of the procedural protections embodied in 
that Act, would turn on a single federal judge's perception of 
the motivation underlying the concerted activity. 19 The Em-
the House bill were made unfair labor practices, and the National Labor 
Relations Board, not private parties, could petition a district court for in-
junctions against certain unfair labor practices. See id., at 35, 40, 1 Leg. 
His. 441, 446 (reciting proposed revisions to NLRA, §§ 8(b), lO(k), 10(1)). 
19 This proposed exception does not limit the judge's discretion to consid-
eration of specified external conduct or of provisions in a collective-bar-
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ployer's interpretation is simply inconsistent with the need, 
expressed by Congress when it enacted the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, for clear "mileposts for judges to follow." 75 
Cong. Rec. 4935 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bratton). 
In e~ce, the Employer asks us to disr~ard the l~sla­
tive history of the .Act and to aistort the definition of a labor 
~e in oroer to reach what it believes to be an "equitable" 
result. The Employer's real complaint, however, is not with 
the Union's po 1tlca o Jec wns to the conduct of the Soviet 
Union, but with what the Employer views as the Union's 
br>ach of co:Q.tract. ""'fiieEfuployer's frUstration with this al-
leged breach of contract should not be remedied by charac-
terizing it as other than a labor dispute. We will not adopt 
by judicial fiat an interpretation that Congress specifically re-
jected when it enacted the Taft-Hartley amendments to the 
NLRA. See note 17, supra. In the past, we have consis-
tently declined to constrict Norris-LaGuardia's broad prohi-
bitions except in narrowly defined situations where accom-
modation of that Act to specific congressional policy is 
necessary. We refuse to deviate from that path today. 
IV 
Alternatively, the Employer argues tha.t the Union's work 
guidance to judges in dealing with concerted activity arguably designed to 
achieve both political and labor-related goals. Such mixed-motivation 
cases are bound to arise. For example, in United States Steel Corp. v. 
United Mine Workers, 519 F. 2d 1236 (CA5 1975), miners picketed another 
employer for importing coal from South Africa. The Court of Appeals 
held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act applied, and that the Boys Markets ex-
ception was not available, because "the miners' action was not aimed at 
[their employer] at all, but rather at the national policy of this country's 
permitting the importation of South African coal." 519 F. 2d, at 1247 
(footnote omitted). Under the political-motivation exception, even if the 
miners had picketed because slave labor was employed to mine the im-
ported coal, the Norris-LaGuardia Act might not apply. Minor variations 
in the facts would endow the courts with, or divest them of, jurisdiction to 
issue an injunction, and would create difficult line-drawing problems. 
7 
< ' • 
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stoppage may be enjoined under the rationale of Boys Mar-
kets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970), and 
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 
(1976), because the dispute underlying the work stoppage is 
arbitrable under the collective-bargaining agreement. In 
making this argument, the Employer disavows its earlier ar-
gument that the underlying dispute is purely political, and 
asserts that the Union's work stoppage was motivated by a 
disagreement with the Employer over the management-
rights clause in the collective-bargaining agreement. The 
Solicitor General, in an amicus brief filed on behalf of the 
United States, agrees with the Employer that the work stop-
page may be enjoined pending arbitration. He contends that 
in addition to the political dispute, disputes concerning both 
the management-rights clause and the work-conditions clause 
underlie the work stoppage, and that at least one of these dis-
putes is arguably arbitrable. 20 
We disagree. Buffalo Forge makes it clear that a Boys 
Markets injunction pen ing arbitration shou not Issue un-
lessthe disputeUJioerlymg the work st;;pPage is arbitrable. 
The ra 10n e u alo orge compels the conclusion that 
20 The management-rights clause provides: 
"The Management of the Employer's business and the direction of the 
work force in the operation of the business are exclusively vested in the 
Employer as functions of Management. Except as specifically provided in 
the Agreement, all of the rights, powers, and authority Employer had 
prior to signing of this Agreement are retained by the Employer." 
The work-conditions clause provides: 
"Where hardship is claimed by the Union because of unreasonable or 
burdensome conditions or where work methods or operations materially 
change in the future, the problem shall first be discussed between the local 
and Management involved. In the event an agrement cannot be reached, 
either party may refer the dispute to the Joint Negotiating Committee 
and, if the matter cannot be resolved by that Committee, either party may 
then refer the questin to an arbitrator in accordance with the procedure set 
forth in Clause 15(B)." 
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the Union's work stoppage, called to protest the invasion of 
Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, may not be enjoined pend-
ing the arbitrator's decision on whether the work stoppage 
violates the no-strike clause in the collective-bargaining 
agreement. The underlying dispute, whether viewed as an 
expression of the Union's "moral outrage" at Soviet military 
policy or as an expression of sympathy for the people of Af-
ghanistan, is plainly not arbitrable under the collective-bar-
gaining agreement. 
The attempts by the Solicitor General and the Employer to 
characterize the underlying dispute as arbitrable do not with-
stand analysis. The "underlying" disputes concerning the 
management-rights clause or the work-conditions clause sim-
ply did not trigger the work stoppage. To the contrary, the 
applicability of these clauses to the dispute, if any, was trig-
gered by the work stoppage itself. Consideration of 
whether the strike intruded on the management-rights clause 
or was permitted by the work-conditions clause may inform 
the arbitrator's ultimate decision on whether the strike vio-
lates the no-strike clause. Indeed, the question whether 
striking over a nonarbitrable issue violates other provisions 
of the collective-bargaining agreement may itself be an arbi-
trable dispute. The fact remains, however, that the strike 
itself was not over an arbitrable dispute and therefore may 
not be enjoined pending the arbitrator's ruling on the legality 
of the strike under the collective-bargaining agreement. 
The weaknesses in the analysis of the Employer and the 
Solicitor General can perhaps best be demonstrated by apply-
ing it to a pure sympathy strike, which clearly cannot be en-
joined pending arbitration under the rationale of Buffalo 
Forge. If this work stoppage were a pure sympathy strike, 
it could be characterized alternatively as a dispute over the 
Employer's right to choose to do business with the employer 
embroiled in a dispute with a sister union, as a dispute over 
management's right to assign and direct work, or as a dispute 
over whether requiring the union to handle goods of the em-
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ployer whose employees are on strike is an unreasonable 
work condition. 21 None of these characterizations, however, 
alter the fact, essential to the rationale of Buffalo Forge, that 
the strike was not over an arbitrable issue and therefore did 
not directly frustrate the arbitration process. 
The Employer's argument that this work stoppage may be 
enjoined pending arbitration really reflects a fundamental 
disagreement with the rationale of Buffalo Forge, and not a 
belief that this rationale permits an injunction in this case. 
The Employer apparently disagrees with the Buffalo Forge 
Court's conclusion that, in agreeing to broad arbitration and 
no-strike clauses, the parties do not bargain for injunctive re-
lief to restore the status quo pending the arbitrator's decision 
on the legality of the strike under the collective-bargaining 
agreement, without regard to what triggered the strike. In-
stead, they bargain only for specific enforcement of the 
union's promise to arbitrate the underlying grievance before 
resorting to a strike. See 428 U. S., at 410-412. The Em-
ployer also apparently believes that Buffalo Forge frustrates 
the arbitration process and encourages industrial strife. But 
see id., at 412. 22 However, this disagreement with Buffalo 
2
' In fact, the employer in Buffalo Forge made just such a claim. In 
addition to alleging breach of the no-strike clause, it claimed that the strike 
was caused by "refusal to follow a supervisor's instructions to cross the ... 
picket line." Buffalo Forge, supra, at 401. The district court found that 
the strike was in sympathy with the sister union and was not over a dispute 
that the parties were contractually bound to arbitrate. !d., at 40~03. 
On appeal, the employer did not press its argument that the work stoppage 
was in part a protest over truck driving assignments. !d., at 403, n. 8. 
22 The Employer argues that industrial strife is encouraged because em-
ployers are given the incentive to discharge or discipline the workers for 
refusing to work, which is likely to precipitate further strikes. According 
to this argument, the strike, which began over a nonarbitrable dispute, is 
transformed into a dispute over an arbitrable issue, i. e. the employer's 
right under the collective-bargaining agreement to discipline these work-
ers, and may be enjoined under the Boys Markets/Buffalo Forge excep-
tion. See, e. g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 614 F. 2d 1110, 
80-1045--0PINION 
JACKSONVILLE BULK TERMINALS v. LONGSHOREMEN 21 
Forge only argues for reconsidering that decision. 23 It does 
not justify distorting the rationale of that case beyond recog-
nition in order to reach the result urged by the Employer. 
v 
In conclusion, we hold that an employer's § 301 action to 
enforce the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement 
allegedly violated by a union's work stoppage involves a "la-
bor dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act, without regard to the motivation underlying the union's 
decision not to provide labor. Under our decisions in Boys 
Markets and Buffalo Forge, when the underlying dispute is 
not arbitrable, the employer may not obtain injunctive relief 
pending the arbitrator's ruling on the legality of the strike 
under the collective-bargaining agreement. 
Affirmed. 
1113-1114 (CA6 1980), affd on other grounds 451 U. S. 401 (1981). This 
Court has not addressed the validity of this "transformation" analysis. 
See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S., at 405, n. 4. 
23 The Employer has also requested that we reconsider our decision in 
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976). We de-
cline this invitation. 
... 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~u.prttttt <!fllttrl of tqt ~h .§tat£g 
~aslyingfun. gl. ~· 20§~~ 
March 17, 1982 
Re : No . 81-406 - Mississippi University for Women, et al . 
v . Joe Hogan 
MEMORANDUM TO : Al Stevas / ~(.< r:? 
FROM : The Chief Justice ~ ~ 
I agree with your treatment but not the terminology . 
I have thought in such a case you treat the "unruly " 
paper as " lodged " but not " filed ." 
We can let the matter stand where it lS unt il 
argument . 
cc: The Conference 
March 17, 1982 
80-1045 Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. Longshoremen 
Dear Thurgood: 
Your opinion persuasively argues that the dispute in 
this case was a "labor dispute" involving a central piece of 
the collective bargai.ning agreement. You also demonstrate 
the ease with which a sympathy or political strike can be 
viewed as a strike over the terms of employment. For both 
of these reasons I have always been puzzled by the step away 
from Roy's Market the ~ourt took in Buffalo Forge. 
For the time being I will await the dissent. But 
I would join your opinion if you would add a final section 














To: Justice Powell 
From: David 
--.4 , ,;) I 
Re: Justice Marshall's draft opinion in Jacksonville Bulk 
Terminals: No. 80-1045. 
I had a brief discussion with Justice Marshall's 
clerk the other day about this case--primarily to make sure that our 
opinion in Allied would not conflict in any way. As far as any 
potential conflict is concerned, I do not see any. You might note 
the legislative history discussion at page 15 with some extra care. 
It can be argued that because the House's definition of "sympathy 
strike"--to include strikes against governmental policy--was not 
accepted by the Senate, therefore the Congress did not wish to make 
political strikes and boycotts illegal. Justice Marshall's clerk 
called this to my attention last week. It seems to me, however, 
that it can just as easily be argued that the Senate assumed that 
its very broad definition of secondary boycott--a definition much 
broader than the House's--took up the slack and would cover 
political boycotts of neutrals. At any rate very little can be 
devined from the Senate's refusal to adopt the broader definition of 
sympathy strike for our purposes in Allied, and I did not and do not 
see the need of saying anything in our opinion about this bit of 
legislative history. {It was not argued by the parties.) 
2. 
More importantly, Justice Marshall 1 s clerk told 
me that he would be willing to overrule Buffalo Forge and that it is 
their understanding that Justice Brennan would go along. But he did 
not wish to jeopardize his court by trying to do so in this draft. 
I wonder if it would not make sense for you very 
quickly to circulate something like the following--assuming that you 
still favor overruling Buffalo Forge: 
"Dear Justice Marshall: 
Your opinion persuasively argues that the dispute 
in this case was a "labor dispute" involving a central piece of the 
collective bargaining agreement. You also demonstrate the ease with 
which a sympathy or political strike can ~ be viewed as a strike 
over the terms of employment. For both of these reasons I have 
always been ~y the step away from Boy 1 s Market the Court 
took in Buffalo Forge. 
For the time being I will await the dissent. But 
I b~-t.ha.t :f' would join your opinion if you would add a final 
section overruling Buffalo Forge. 
. I 
1 
. - ·: ... 
. . ' 
. ' .. 
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..... .' 
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.:§up-rnnt ~onrl cf t4t ~lt ~faits 
~a.sfringiltn, ~. <.g. 2Vgt'~.;l 
CHAMBERS O F / T H E CH I E F .J UST IC E 
1 ' 
March 1 7, 1982 
Re : No . 80-1045 - Jacksonville Bulk Terminals 
v. Longshoremen 
Dear Thurgood : 
Unlike Lewis ' " tentative " position I cannot 
agree that a boycott of Soviet shipping is a ~labor 
dispute~ between the ship owner and l9ngshoremen . 
It is purely a political dispute - - and on which I 
agree with the longshoremen, but that- is not the issue . 
I am prepared to overrule Buffalo Forge b u t I 'd 
like to do it some other way than calling a political 
boycott a " labor dispute ." 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. 
~ttpTtntt cqourl of ffrt 'Jlhrittb ~taft.a' 
:.rurfrhtghttt.l9. <!}. 2!lgt~~ 
March 18, 1982 
/ 
RE: No. 80-1045 Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. Long-
shoremen 
Dear Thurgood: 
You•11 recall at conference that my view was that 
this case had to be affirmed unless we were to overrule 
Buffalo Forge. I gather that•s the basis upon which 
you•ve written it and as long as Buffalo Forge stands 
undisturbed 11 11 join it. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~u:punu C!J:aurlaf tltt ~ttittlt .;§fattg 
~as-lfin.g-htn. ~. C!j:. 2UgtJ!. ~ 
March 18, 1982 
j 
Re: 80-1045 - Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. 
International Longshoremen's Association 
Dear Thurgood: 
Although I think that your analysis of the Buffalo 
Forge issue in Part IV of your opinion is correct, I am 
still not persuaded that this case involves ~labor 
dispute~~e-a~e~rr1s-LaGuaidia 
A~~ As your opinion points out, that term is defined 
by §13(c) as a controversy "concerning terms or 
conditions of employment." In my opinion, a 
controversy concerning the question whether 
superphosphoric acid shall be shipped to the Soviet 
Union before it withdraws its armed forces from 
Afghanistan is not such a controversy. I also do not 
agree with the notion that the litigation in which the 
I company seeks to enjoin the strike is the kind of "labor dispute" that the anti-injunction provision of the statute contemplated. If that had been Congress' intent, I would think the statute would simply have 
prohibited all federal injunctions against strikes, 
rather than injunctions against strikes growing out of 
disutes over terms and conditions of employment. I 





Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
~uvumt <!Jonrt ttf tqt 1fuitth ~tatt.il' 
1lJa.5qington. ~· <q. 21l~Jl.~ 
March 18, 1982 
No. 81-1045 Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. 
Internatinal Longshoremen's Association 
Dear Thurgood, 
You have written persuasively concerning whether 
the politically motivated wor k stoppage in this case is a 
labor dispute within the meaning of the anti-injunction 
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. As I indicated at 
. Conference, I could join an opinion overruling Buffalo 
/ Forge. For the present, I shall await further writing. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
..... ~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE 
.$$n.punu (!Jomi of tltt %tilih ;§taftg 
~ngfri:ng-Urn.. ~. <q. 20~J!..;l 
March 18, 1982 
/ 
Re: No. 80-1045 ~ Jacksonville Bulk Terminals 
v. International Longshoreman's Assn. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I will have a dissent around in this case next week . 
Regards , 
CHAMBERS OF 
,§u:pumr <!J tlttr± of f17r ~mittb ,§taft$ 
'J!Taslrbtgton, ~. cq. 20b)Jl.~ / 
JUSTI CE B YRoN R WHITE March 18, 1982 
Re: 80-1045 - Jacksonville Bulk Terminals 
v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n 
Dear Thurgood, 
Please join me in your circulating draft. Although it is 
arguable that the No rris-LaGuardia Act was not intended to 
foreclose injunction s in disputes like this, it seems to .me that 
you have the bet ter of the argument. 
With r e s p e ct t o reconsidering Buffalo Forge, I have be en 
strongly opp osed t o t he notion that the dissenting Justices in a 
particular case s hould feel free to consider overruling that case 
as soon as a new Justice with similar views arrives on the scene 
or as soon as one of the majority is willing to join them. If 
that were the u s ual policy, the law would be in a shambles and 
the Court's authority severely diminished. When a case has 
r~ceived the kind of institutional attention that cases get here, 
the resulting decision has an authority of its own that should 
command more re s pect than the views of individual Justices. At 
least there should be some sound reason for overruling, such as 
experience over a period of time. The continued disagreement of 
those who were in dissent seems to me an unwise predicate for the 
Court to reverse its course. This is particularly true in 
statutory construction cases, where Congress is free to remedy 
what it deems to be improvident interpretations of its laws. 
If this is the kind of dispute within the reach of the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act, as I think it is, reversal of the decision 
below would be little more than a di s agreement with the 
Congressional policy expre s sed in that legislation. That is not 
a legitimate function for us, however. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conf e rence 
cpm 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
..§u.punu ~curl of tqt ~b- ..§taftg 
2masfrin~ iB· (!f. 2U~Jl.~ 
RE: No. 80-1045, Jacksonville Bulk Terminals 
March 19, 1982 
v. International Longshoremen's Association 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I indicated earlier that I could, if necessary, 
overrule Buffalo Forge, but it is now clear to me that we 
need not reach that issue to reverse in this case. 
This case does not involve or grow out of a labor 
dispute as that term is defined in§ 13(c) of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 29 u.s.c. § ll3(c) (1976), or as that term 
is commonly understood. Section 13(c) defines a labor 
dispute as "any controversy concerning terms or conditions 
of employment .... " The dispute in this case is strictly 
a political dispute, not a controversy concerning "terms" 
or "conditions" of employment. If a boycott of shipments 
to or from the Soviet Union is a labor dispute, then every 
challenge of a union or its members to a government policy 
or program can be distorted into a labor dispute. If 
Congress had intended to bar federal courts from issuing 
injunctions in political disputes, it could have simply 
prohibited federal courts from enjoining strikes rather 
than limiting its prohibition to controversies concerning 
"terms or conditions of employment." Therefore, I cannot 
agree with the Court's conclusion that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act bars a federal court from enjoining this 
politically motivated boycott manifested in a work 
stoppage. 
The International Longshoremen's Association objects 
to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. So do I 
and millions of others. I can and do refuse to buy 
Russian products, such as Stolnichnaya vodka. The union 
can do the same, but here it announced that it would not 
... ,· '· 
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handle any cargo bound to, or coming from, the Soviet 
Union, or any cargo carried on Russian ships. This case 
commenced after the ILA refused to load superphosphoric 
acid onto certain ships bound for the Soviet Union in 
accordance with its oppostion to Soviet policy. The ILA 
has no objection to any terms or conditions of employment 
or any other quarrel with employers; it would have loaded 
the superphosphoric acid on any non-Russian ship bound for 
a destination other than the Soviet Union. No one has 
suggested that the ILA's action is actually motivated to 
obtain concessions relating in any way to employment 
conditions. The ILA refused to handle the cargo simply 
because a foreign country brutally invaded another country 
and the union desired to express its opposition to the 
invasion. 
The plain words and plain meaning of§ 13(c) simply 
cannot be read to lead to the conclusion that this case 
involves or grows out of a labor dispute; the ILA members 
are not seeking to make any changes in the terms or 
conditions of their employment. 
As the Court recognizes, we have held that the test 
of whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies is whether 
"the employer-employee ·relationship [is] the matrix of the 
controversy." Columbia River Packers Association v. 
Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 147 (1947). The courts of appeals 
have held that unions are protected by the Norris-
LaGuardia Act when they act to advance the economic 
interests of their members. See, e.g., Brotherhood of 
Railroad Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, 
362 F.2d 649, 654 (CAS 1966). These cases illustrate the 
plain meaning of § 13(c) 's definition of labor dispute--
the Norris-LaGuardia Act protects union organizational 
efforts and efforts to improve working conditions. The 
Court errs in finding that the matrix of this controversy 
is the ILA's relationship with the petitioners. The 
matrix of this controversy is the ILA's objection to the 
Soviet invasion. The ILA's dispute with the petitioners 
merely flows from the particular manner it employed to 
show its opposition to the invasion of Afghanistan. The 
ILA is neither directly -nor indirectly working to advance 
the economic interests of its members, or even the 
economic interests of Soviet or Afghan workers. In 
reality, the ILA's conduct was patently contrary to its 
members' economic interests since it reduces the amount of 
available work and pay. Thus, the cases generally 
explicating the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 
support the conclusion reached from analysis of the plain 
words of§ 13(c): This case simply does not involve or 
grow out of a labor dispute. 
Federal courts have consistently recognized that the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act does not apply to politically 
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motivated work stoppages concerning subjects over which 
employers have no control. These courts, in cases which 
are practically indistinguishable from this case, and in 
fact often involved the same union, properly concluded 
that the Act only applies to disputes concerning terms or 
conditions of employment. 1 This Court has never before 
intimated, as it now proposes to hold, that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act protects the violation of no-strike clauses 
simply because the union has a political view it wishes to 
dramatize. Norris-LaGuardia is not concerned with 
political disputes but only with labor disputes. 
Since the meaning of the words of the statute is 
plain, and since the applicable precedent supports the 
conclusion that this is not a labor dispute, I cannot 
justify a holding that politically motivated strikes are 
outside the coverage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act absent 
clear evidence to the contrary in the legislative history. 
See, e.g., Bread Political Action Committee v. Federal 
Election Commission, 50 U.S.L.W. 4291, 4292 (1982}. The 
excerpts from the legislative history relied upon by the 
Court fall far short of the clear evidence required to 
overcome the plain language of§ 13(c). Frankfurter and 
others cautioned that when the legislative history is 
ambiguous, as it is here, we must follow the words of the 
statute. 
In 1947, Congress declined to amend the federal labor 
laws so that strikes protesting "disagreement with some 
government policy" would not be protected by the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. I Legislative History of the LMRA 168 
(1947}. Similarly, Congress in 1932 rejected an amendment 
which would have permitted federal courts to enjoin acts 
1see Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers 
International Union, 278 F.2d 49, 50-51 (CA2 1960} 
(politically motivated blacklist of Egyptian ships to 
retaliate for Egyptian blacklist of American ships that 
dealt with Israel is not "labor dispute" triggering 
Norris-LaGuardia}; West Gulf Maritime Ass'n v. 
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 372 (SD 
Tex. 1975}, aff'd summarily, 531 F.2d 574 (CAS 1976} 
(union's refusal, on political grounds, in violation of a 
no-strike agreement, to load grain on a ship bound for the 
Soviet Union does not present a "labor dispute"). See 
also NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 332 F.2d 
992, 995-96 (CA4 1964} (politically motivated ILA boycott 
of all ships that were trading or had traded with Cuba is 
not a "labor dispute" within the meaning of § 2{9} of the 
National Labor Relations Act). 
"performed or threatened for an unlawful purpose or with 
an unlawful intent .••. " 75 Cong. Rec. 5507 (1932). 
These amendments would have swept more broadly than the 
plain language of§ 13(c) as it stands. Indeed, 
Representative Beck's amendment would have rendered the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act a nullity, since federal judges would 
have been able to enjoin a strike merely by finding it 
motivated by an "unlawful purpose." Congress might have 
declined to adopt such amendments because they would have 
rendered legitimate union activity unprotected. 
Therefore, the legislative history does not compel a 
conclusion in this case contrary to the plain language of 
§ 13(c). 
Finally, the Court argues that a common-sense 
interpretation of the meaning of the term labor dispute 
supports its conclusion. Even assuming that the "common-
sense" meaning of the term labor dispute is relevant in 
light of Congress' definition in§ 13(c), it does not 
support the proposed opinion. The ILA objects to the 
Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, but it has no 
quarrel with petitioners. There is nothing to suggest 
that anything the petitioners could have done to improve 
the teLms or conditions of employment would have persuaded 
the ILA to load the ships. Thus, common sense, as well as 
the plain meaning of § 13(c), precludes a rational 
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the recorded vote at conference, 5-4 to affirm, left some 
things "in the air." 
As I read the various circulations, (a) John and I see 
this as a purely political dispute and we would reverse 
without reaching the Buffalo Forge issue; (b) Bill Brennan, 
Thurgood, Lewis, and Sandra all think Buffalo Forge should 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1045 
JACKSONVILLE BULK TERMINALS, INC. ET AL., PE-
TITIONERS, v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S 
ASSOCIATION ET AL. 
~ 1/J~AJ...J/!l!JRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF r I r I v - - v ......-, APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[April -, 1982] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case, we consider the power of a federal court to en-
join a politically motivated work stoppage in an action 
brought by an employer pursuant to § 301(a) of the Labor 
Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U. S. C. § 185(a) to 
enforce a union's obligations under a collective-bargaining 
agreement. We first address whether the broad anti-injunc-
tion provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. 
§ 101 et seq., apply to politically motivated work stoppages. 
Finding these provisions applicable, we then consider 
whether the work stoppage may be enjoined under the ra-
tionale of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 
U. S. 235 (1970), and Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelwork-
ers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976), pending an arbitrator's decision on 
whether the strike violates the collective-bargaining 
agreement. 
I 
On January 4, 1980, President Carter announced that, due 
to the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan, certain 
trade with the Soviet Union would be restricted. 
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Superphosphoric acid (SPA), used in agricultural fertilizer, 
was not included in the Presidential embargo. 1 On January 9, 
1980, respondent International Longshoremen's Association 
(ILA) announced that its members would not handle any 
cargo bound to, or coming from, the Soviet Union or carried 
on Russian ships. 2 In accordance with this resolution, re-
spondent local union, an ILA affiliate, refused to load SPA 
bound for the Soviet Union aboard three ships that arrived at 
the shipping terminal operated by petitioner Jacksonville 
Bulk Terminals, Inc. (JBT) at the Port of Jacksonville, Flor-
ida during the month of January 1980. 
'On February 25, 1980, the embargo was extended to include SPA along 
with other products. On April 24, 1981, President Reagan lifted the SPA 
embargo as part of his decision to remove restrictions on the sale of grain 
to the Soviets. By telegrams dated April 24, 1981 and June 5, 1981, the 
ILA has recommended to its members that they resume handling goods to 
and from the Soviet Union. Although the work stoppage is no longer in 
effect, there remains a live controversy over whether the collective-bar-
gaining agreement prohibits politically motivated work stoppages, and the 
Union may resume such a work stoppage at any time. As a result, this 
case is not moot. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 
397, 403, n. 8 (1976). 
2 The President of the ILA made the following announcement: 
"In response to overwhelming demands by the rank and file members of 
the Union, the leadership of the ILA today ordered immediate suspension 
in handling all Russian ships and all Russian cargoes in ports from Maine to 
Texas and Puerto Rico where ILA workers are employed. 
"The reason for this action should be apparent in light of international 
events that have affected relations between the U. S. & Soviet Union. 
"However, the decision by the Union leadership was made necessary by 
the demands of the workers. 
"It is their will to refuse to work Russian vessels and Russian cargoes 
under present conditions of the world. 
"People are upset and they refuse to continue the business as usual policy 
as long as the Russians insist on being international bully boys. It is a 
decision in which the Union leadership concurs." Brief for Respondents 2, 
n. 2. 
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In response to this work stoppage, petitioners JBT, 
Hooker Chemical Corporation, and Occidental Petroleum 
Company (collectively referred to as the Employer) 3 brought 
this action pursuant to § 301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U. S. C. 
§ 185(a), against respondents ILA, its affiliated local union, 
and its officers and agents (collectively referred to as the 
Union). The Employer alleged that the Union's work stop-
page violated the collective-bargaining agreement between 
the Union and JBT. The Employer sought to compel ar-
bitration under the agreement, requested a temporary re-
straining order and a preliminary injunction pending arbitra-
tion, and sought damages. 
The agreement contains both a broad no-strike clause and a 
provision requiring the resolution of all disputes through a 
grievance procedure, ending in arbitration. 4 The no-strike 
clause provides: 
"During the term of this Agreement, ... the Union 
agrees there shall not be any strike of any kind or degree 
whatsoever, ... for any cause whatsoever; such causes 
3 JBT is a wholly owned subsidiary of Oxy Chemical Corporation, which 
is a subsidiary of Hooker. Ownership of all these corporations is ulti-
mately vested in Occidental. Hooker Chemical Company manufactures 
SPA at a manufacturing facility in Florida. Pursuant to a bilateral trade 
agreement between Occidental and the Soviet Union, SPA is shipped to 
the Soviet Union from the JBT facility in Jacksonville. 
4 The grievance and arbitration clause provides in relevant part: 
"Matters under dispute which cannot be promptly settled between the 
Local and an individual Employer shall . . . be referred . . . to a Port 
Grievance Committee. . . . In the event this Port Grievance Committee 
cannot reach an agreement . . . the dispute shall be referred to the Joint 
Negotiating Committee ... . 
"A majority decision of this Committee shall be final and binding on both 
parties and on all Employers signing this Agreement. In the event the 
Committee is unable to reach a majority decision within 72 hours after 
meeting to discuss the case, it shall employ a professional arbitrator . . .. " 
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including but not limited to, unfair labor practices by the 
Employer or violation of this Agreement. The right of 
employees not to cross a bona fide picket line is recog-
nized by the Employer .... " 
The United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Florida ordered the Union to process its grievance in accord-
ance with the contractual grievance procedure. The District 
Court also granted the Employer's request for a preliminary 
injunction pending arbitration, reasoning that the political 
motivation behind the work stoppage rendered the Norris-
LaGuardia Act's anti-injunction provisions inapplicable. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the District Court's order to the extent it required 
arbitration of the question whether the work stoppage vio-
lated the collective-bargaining agreement. New Orleans 
Steamship Association v. General Longshore Workers, 626 
F. 2d 455 (1980). 5 However, the Court of Appeals disagreed 
with the District Court's conclusion that the provisions of the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act are inapplicable to politically moti-
vated work stoppages. Relying on Buffalo Forge, the Court 
of Appeals further held that the Employer was not entitled to 
an injunction pending arbitration because the underlying dis-
pute was not arbitrable. We agree with the Court of Ap-
peals that the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act apply 
to this case, and that, under Buffalo Forge, an injunction 
pending arbitration may not issue. 
II 
6 The Union concedes that the question whether the work stoppage vio-
lates the no-strike clause is arbitrable. In a consolidated case, the Court 
of Appeals upheld an injunction issued by the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Louisiana enforcing an arbitrator's decision that 
the ILA work stoppage violated a collective-bargaining agreement. New 
Orleans Steamship Association v. General Longshore Workers, 626 F. 2d 
455, 469 (CA5 1980). 
., . 
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Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides in part: 
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction 
to issue any restraining order or temporary or perma-
nent injunction in any case involving or growing out of 
any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons par-
ticipating or interested in such dispute ... from doing, 
whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts: 
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to re-
main in any relation of employment." 29 U. S. C. § 104. 
Congress adopted this broad prohibition to remedy the grow-
ing tendency of federal courts to enjoin strikes by narrowly 
construing the Clayton Act's labor exemption from the Sher-
man Act's prohibition against conspiracies to restrain trade, 
see 29 U.S. C. §52. See, e. g., H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d 
Gong., 1st Sess. 7-8, 10-11 (1931). This Court has consis-
tently given the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act a broad interpretation, recognizing excep-
tions only in limited situations where necessary to 
accommodate the Act to specific federal legislation or para-
mount congressional policy. See, e. g., Boys Markets, Inc. 
v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235, 249-253 (1970); Rail-
road Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 353 
u. s. 30, 39-42 (1957). 
The Boys Markets exception, as refined in Buffalo Forge 
Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976), is relevant 
to our decision today. In Boys Markets, this Court re-exam-
ined Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195 (1962), 
which held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes a federal 
district court from enjoining a strike in breach of a collective-
bargaining agreement, even where that agreement contains 
provisions for binding arbitration of the grievance concerning 
which the strike was called. 398 U. S., at 237-238. The 
Court overruled Sinclair and held that, in order to accommo-
date the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia to 
the subsequently enacted provisions of § 301(a) and the 
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strong federal policy favoring arbitration, it was essential to 
recognize an exception to the anti-injunction provisions for 
cases in which the employer sought to enforce the union's 
contractual obligation to arbitrate grievances rather than to 
strike over them. I d., at 249-253. 6 
After Boys Markets, the Courts of Appeals divided on the 
question whether a strike could be enjoined under the Boys 
Markets exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act pending ar-
bitration, when the strike was not over a grievance that the 
union had agreed to arbitrate. 7 In Buffalo Forge, the Court 
resolved this conflict and held that the Boys Markets excep-
tion does not apply when only the question whether the 
strike violates the no-strike pledge, and not the dispute that 
precipitated the strike, is arbitrable under the parties' collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. 8 
The Employer argues that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does 
not apply in this case because the political motivation under-
lying the Union's work stoppage removes this controversy 
from that Act's definition of a "labor dispute." Alterna-
tively, the Employer argues that this case fits within the ex-
ception to that Act recognized in Boys Markets as refined in 
Buffalo Forge. We review these arguments in turn. 
III 
At the outset, we must determine whether this is a "case 
involving or growing out of any labor dispute" within the 
• In Boys Markets, the underlying dispute was clearly subject to the 
grievance and arbitration procedures of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment, and the strike clearly violated the no-strike clause. 
7 See cases cited in Buffalo Forge, 428 U. S., at 404, n. 9. 
8 In Buffalo Forge, the strike at issue was a sympathy strike in support 
of sister unions negotiating with the employer. The Court reasoned that 
there was no need to accommodate the policies of the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act to § 301 and to the federal policy favoring arbitration when a strike is 
not called over an arbitrable dispute, because such a strike does not di-
rectly frustrate the arbitration process by denying or evading the union's 
promise to arbitrate. 428 U. S., at 407-412. 
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meaning of §4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S. C. 
§ 104. Section 13(c) of the Act broadly defines the term 
labor dispute to include "any controversy concerning terms 
or conditions of employment." 29 U. S. C. § 113(c). 9 
The Employer argues that the existence of political mo-
tives takes this work stoppage controversy outside the broad 
scope of this definition. This argument, however, has no 
basis in the plain statutory language of the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act or in our prior interpretations of that Act. Further-
more, the argument is contradicted by the legislative history 
of not only the Norris-LaGuardia Act but also the 1947 
amendments to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 
A 
An action brought by an employer against the union repre-
senting its employees to enforce a no-strike pledge generally 
involves two controversies. First, there is the "underlying 
dispute," which is the event or condition that triggers the 
work stoppage. This dispute may or may not be political, 
and it may or may not be arbitrable under the parties' collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. Second, there is the parties' 
dispute over whether the no-strike pledge prohibits the work 
stoppage at issue. This second dispute can always form the 
basis for federal court jurisdiction, because § 301(a) gives fed-
eral courts jurisdiction over "[s]uits for violation of contracts 
between an employer and a labor organization." 29 U. S. C. 
§ 185(a). 
It is beyond cavil that the second form of dispute-whether 
the collective-bargaining agreement either forbids or permits 
the union to refuse to perform certain work-is a "contro-
9 Section 13(c) provides: 
"(c) The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or 
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation 
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to ar-
range terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the 
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." 
80--1045-0PINION 
8 JACKSONVILLE BULK TERMINALS v. LONGSHOREMEN 
versy concerning the terms or conditions of employment." 
29 U.S. C. §113(c). This §301 action was brought tore-
solve just such a controversy. In its complaint, the Em-
ployer did not seek to enjoin the intervention of the Soviet 
Union in Afghanistan, nor did it ask the District Court to de-
cide whether the Union was justified in expressing disap-
proval of the Soviet Union's actions. Instead, the Employer 
sought to enjoin the Union's decision not to provide labor, a 
decision which the Employer believed violated the terms of 
the collective-bargaining agreement. It is this contract dis-
pute, and not the political dispute, that the arbitrator will re-
solve, and on which the courts are asked to rule. 
The plain language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not 
except labor disputes having their genesis in political pro-
tests. Nor is there any basis in the statutory language for 
the argument that the Act requires that each dispute rele-
vant to the case be a labor dispute. The Act merely requires 
that the case involve "any" labor dispute. Therefore, the 
plain terms of § 4(a) and § 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act de-
prive the federal courts of the power to enjoin the Union's 
work stoppage in this § 301 action, without regard to whether 
the Union also has a nonlabor dispute with another entity. 10 
The conclusion that this case involves a labor dispute 
within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act comports 
with this Court's consistent interpretation of that Act. 11 Our 
10 Of course, there are exceptions to the Act's prohibitions against en-
joining work stoppages. See, e. g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks 
Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970). The employer may obtain an injunction to 
enforce an arbitrator's decision that the strike violates the collective-bar-
gaining agreement and can recover damages for the violation, pursuant to 
§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U. S. C. § 185. 
See, e. g., Buffalo Forge, 428 U. S., at 405. See also 15-16, and note 18, 
infra (discussing Board's authority under 29 U. S. C. §§ 160(k), 160(1), to 
petition for an injunction upon finding reasonable cause to believe that the 
strike is an unfair labor practice). 
n The Employer's reliance on Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 556 
(1978), to argue that a politically motivated strike is not a labor dispute is 
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decisions have recognized that the term "labor dispute" must 
not be narrowly construed because the statutory definition it-
self is extremely broad and because Congress deliberately in-
cluded a broad definition to overrule judicial decisions that 
had unduly restricted the Clayton Act's labor exemption from 
the antitrust laws. For example, in Marine Cooks & Stew-
ards v. Panama Steamship Co., 362 U. S. 365, 369 (1960), 
the Court observed: 
"Th[e] Act's language is broad. The language is 
broad because Congress was intent upon taking the fed-
eral courts out of the labor injunction business except in 
the very limited circumstances left open for federal juris-
diction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The history 
and background that led Congress to take this view have 
misplaced. In Eastex, we addressed whether certain concerted activity 
was protected under § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 157, and we recog-
nized that "[t]here may well be types of conduct or speech that are so 
purely political or so remotely connected to the concerns of employees as 
employees as to be beyond the protection of§ 7." !d., at 570, n. 20. Al-
though the definition of a "labor dispute" in § 2(9) of the NLRA, 29 
U. S. C. § 152(9), is virtually identical to that in § 13(c) of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. § 113(c), and the two provisions have been con-
strued consistently with one another, e. g., United States v. Hutcheson, 
312 U. S. 219, 234, n. 4 (1941), this similarity does not advance the Em-
ployer's argument. Union activity that prompts a "labor dispute" within 
the meaning of these sections may be protected by§ 7, prohibited by§ 8(b), 
29 U. S. C. § 158(b), or neither protected nor prohibited. The objective of 
the concerted activity is relevant in determining whether such activity is 
protected under§ 7 or prohibited by§ 8(b), but not in determining whether 
the activity is a "labor dispute" under § 2(9). 
Moreover, the conclusion that a purely political work stoppage is not pro-
tected under § 7 means simply that the employer is not prohibited by 
§ 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(1), from discharging or disci-
plining employees for this activity. It hardly establishes that no "labor 
dispute" existed within the meaning of § 2(9). Similarly, if the employees 
protested such sanctions under the collective-bargaining agreement, an ar-
bitrator might ultimately conclude that the sanctions were proper, but this 
would not alter the obvious fact that the matter is a labor dispute. 
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been adverted to in a number of prior opinions of this 
Court in which we refused to give the Act narrow inter-
pretations that would have restored many labor dispute 
controversies to the courts." (emphasis added; footnote 
omitted) 
The critical element in determining whether the provisions 
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act apply is whether "the employer-
employee relationship [is] the matrix of the controversy." 
Columbia River Packers Association v. Hinton, 315 U. S. 
143, 147 (1942). In this case, the Employer and the Union 
representing its employees are the disputants, and their dis-
pute concerns the interpretation of the labor contract that de-
fines their relationship. 12 Thus, the employer-employee rela-
tionship is the matrix of this controversy. 
Nevertheless, the Employer argues that a "labor dispute" 
exists only when the Union's action is taken in its own "eco-
nomic self-interest." The Employer cites American Federa-
tion of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U. S. 99 (1968), and Colum-
bia River Packers Association, supra, for this proposition. 
In these cases, however, the Court addressed the very differ-
ent question whether the relevant parties were "labor" 
groups involved in a labor dispute for the purpose of deter-
mining whether their actions were exempt from the antitrust 
laws. 13 These cases do not hold that a union's noneconomic 
12 A labor dispute might be present under the facts of this case even in 
the absence of the dispute over the scope of the no-strike clause. Regard-
less of the political nature of the Union's objections to handling Soviet-
bound cargo, these objections were expressed in a work stoppage by em-
ployees against their employer, which focused on particular work 
assignments. Thus, apart from the collective-bargaining agreement, the 
employer-employee relationship would be the matrix of the controversy. 
We need not decide this question, however, because this case does involve 
a dispute over the interpretation of the parties' collective-bargaining 
agreement. 
13 In American Federation of Musicians, the Court held that, although 
orchestra leaders acted as independent contractors with respect to certain 
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motive inevitably takes the dispute out of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, but only that that protections of that Act do 
not extend to labor organizations when they cease to act as 
labor groups or when they enter into illegal combinations 
with nonlabor groups in restraint of trade. 14 Here, there is no 
question that the Union is a labor group, representing its 
own interests in a dispute with the Employer over the em-
ployees' obligation to provide labor. 
Even in cases where the disputants did not stand in the 
relationship of employer and employee, this Court has held 
that the existence of noneconomic motives does not make the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable. For example, in New 
Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552 
(1938), this Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohib-
ited an injunction against picketing by members of a civic 
group, which was aimed at inducing a store to employ Negro 
employees. In determining that the group and its members 
were "persons interested in a labor dispute" within the mean-
"club-date" engagements, the union's involvement with the leaders was not 
a combination with a nonlabor group in violation of the Sherman Act. In 
finding that leaders were a "labor group," and a party to a labor dispute, 
the Court relied on the "'presence of a job or wage competition or some 
other economic interrelationship affecting legitimate union interests be-
tween the union members and the independent contractors."' 391 U. S., 
at 106 (quoting the opinion of the District Court). In Hinton, the Court 
found that the union was merely an association of independent fish sellers 
involved in a controversy with fish buyers over a contract for the sale of 
fish; they were not employees of the buyers, nor did they seek to be. 315 
U.S., at 147. 
The Employer's reliance on Bakery Drivers Union v. Wagshal, 333 
U. S. 437 (1948), is similarly misplaced. In that case, the Court held only 
that a controversy between two businessmen over delivery times or meth-
ods of payment does not become a labor dispute merely because a union 
representative, with or without his employer's consent, sought to obtain 
payment pursuant to a particular method. Id., at 443-444. 
"The Employer's economic-motive analysis also leads to the untenable 
result that strikes in protest of unreasonably unsafe conditions and some 
sympathy strikes are not "labor disputes." 
80--1045-0PINION 
12 JACKSONVILLE BULK TERMINALS v. LONGSHOREMEN 
ing of § 13, the Court found it immaterial that the picketers, 
who were neither union organizers nor store employees, 
were not asserting economic interests commonly associated 
with labor unions-e. g., terms and conditions of employment 
in the narrower sense of wages, hours, unionization or bet-
terment of working conditions. I d., at 560. Although the 
lower courts found Norris-LaGuardia inapplicable because 
the picketing was motivated by the group's "political" or "so-
cial" goals of improving the position of Negroes generally, 
and not by the desire to improve specific conditions of em-
ployment, this Court reasoned: "The Act does not concern it-
self with the background or the motives of the dispute." 303 
U. S., at 561. 
B 
The Employer's argument that the Union's motivation for 
engaging in a work stoppage determines whether the Norris-
LaGuardia Act applies is also contrary to the legislative his-
tory of that Act. The Act was enacted in response to federal 
court intervention on behalf of employers through the use of 
injunctive powers against unions and other associations of 
employees. This intervention had caused the federal judi-
ciary to fall into disrepute among large segments of this N a-
tion's population. See generally S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong., 
1st Sess. 8, 1~18 (1932); 75 Cong. Rec. 4915 (1932) (remarks 
of Sen. Wagner). 
Apart from the procedural unfairness of many labor injunc-
tions, one of the greatest evils associated with them was the 
use of tort-law doctrines, which often made the lawfulness of 
a strike depend upon judicial views of social and economic 
policy. See, e. g., Cox, Current Problems in the Law of 
Grievance Arbitration, 30 Rocky Mountain L. Rev. 247, 256 
(1958). In debating the Act, its supporters repeatedly ex-
pressed disapproval of this Court's interpretations of the 
Clayton Act's labor exemption-interpretations which per-
mitted a federal judge to find the Act inapplicable based on 
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his or her appraisal of the "legitimacy" of the union's objec-
tives. 15 See, e. g., 75 Cong. Rec. 4916 (1932) (remarks of Sen. 
Wagner) (definition of labor dispute expanded to overrule 
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921)~~ 
(holding a strike and picketing with the purpose of unionizing 
a plant not a labor dispute because the objectives were not 
legitimate and there was no employer-employee relationship 
between the disputants)); id., at 5487-5488 (remarks of Sen. 
Geller) (bill brought forth to remedy decisions allowing in-
junction in Duplex and in Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone 
Cutters Association, 274 U. S. 37 (1927)~(holding that deci-
sion by workers not to work on nonunion goods not a labor 
dispute)). See also id., at 4686 (remarks of Sen. Hebert) 
(committee minority agreed that injunctions should not have 
issued in Bedford and Duplex). See generally H.R. Rep. 
No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 10-11 (1932). The legisla-
tive history is replete with criticisms of the ability of power-
ful employers to use federal judges as "strike-breaking" 
agencies; by virtue of their almost unbridled "equitable dis-
cretion," federal judges could enter injunctions based on their 
disapproval of the employees' objectives, or on the theory 
that these objectives or actions, although lawful if pursued by 
a single employee, became unlawful when pursued through 
the "conspiracy" of concerted activity. See, e. g., 75 Cong. 
Rec. 4928-4938 (1932); id., at 5466--5468; id., at 5478--5481; 
id., at 5487-5490. 
Furthermore, the question whether the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act would apply to politically motivated strikes was brought 
to the attention of the 72nd Congress when it passed the Act. 
Opponents criticized the definition of "labor dispute" in 
§ 13(c) on the ground that it would cover politically motivated 
strikes. Representative Beck argued that federal courts 
15 See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 468-469 
(1921). See also Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters Association, 274 
u. s. 37, 54-55 (1927). 
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should have jurisdiction to enjoin political strikes like those 
threatened by labor unions in Europe. 75 Cong. Rec. 
5471-5473 (1932) (discussing threatened strike by British 
unions protesting the cancellation of leases held by Commu-
nist Party members, and threatened strikes by Belgian 
unions protesting a decision to supply military aid to Po-
land). 16 In response, Representative Oliver argued that the 
federal courts should not have the power to enjoin such 
strikes. !d., at 5480-5481. Finally, Representative Beck 
offered an amendment to the Act that would have permitted 
federal courts to enjoin strikes called for ulterior purposes, 
including political motives. This amendment was defeated 
soundly. See id., at 5507. 
Further support for our conclusion that Congress believed 
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies to work stoppages in-
stituted for political reasons can be found in the legislative 
history of the 1947 amendments to the NLRA. That history \ 
reveals that Congress rejected a proposal to repeal the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act with respect to one broad category of po-
litical strikes. 17 The House bill included definitions of various 
kinds of labor disputes. See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 1 Legislative History of the LMRA 158 (1947) (Leg. 
His.); H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Con., 1st Sess., 18-19, 1 Leg. 
•• The thrust of this objection was that the Act's definition of a labor dis- \ 
pute "takes no account whatever of the motives and purposes with which a 
nation-wide strike or boycott can be commenced and prosecuted." 75 
Cong. Rec. 5472 (1932) (remarks of Rep. Beck). 
17 In relying on this history, we do not argue that congressional rejection 
of a broad repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes accommodation of 
that Act to the LMRA. See Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 
195, 204-210 (1962). In Boys Markets Co. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 
U. S. 235, 249 (1970), this Court put that argument to rest. Rather, we 
rely on this legislative history because it demonstrates that Congress be-
lieved that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did apply to controversies concerning 
politically motivated work stoppages. Furthermore, in this case, unlike 
Boys Markets, we are not asked to accommodate the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act to a specific federal act or to the strong policy favoring arbitration. 
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His. 292, 309-310. Of relevance here, § 2(13) defined a "sym-
pathy" strike as a strike "called or conducted not by reason of 
any dispute between the employer and the employees on 
strike or participating in such concerted interference, but 
rather by reason of either (A) a dispute involving another em-
ployer or other employees of the same employer, or (B) dis-
agreement with some governmental policy." H.R. 3020, 
§ 2(13), 1 Leg. His. 168 (emphasis added). Section 12 of the 
House bill made this kind of strike "unlawful concerted activ-
ity," and "it remove[d] the immunities that the present laws 
confer upon persons who engage in them." H.R. Rep. No. 
245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, 1 Leg. His. 314. In particular, 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act would not apply to suits brought 
by private parties to enjoin such activity, and damages could 
be recovered. See id., at 23-24, 43-44, 1 Leg. His. 314-315, 
334-335. In explaining these provisions, the House Report 
stated that strikes "against a policy of national or local gov-
ernment, which the employer cannot change," should be 
made unlawful, and that "[t]he bill makes inapplicable in such 
suits the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which heretofore has pro-
. tected parties to industrial strife from the consequences of 
their lawlessness." !d., at 24, 44, 1 Leg. His. 315, 335. 
The Conference Committee accepted the Senate version, 
which had eliminated these provisions of the House bill. 18 
The Conference Report explained that its recommendation 
did not go as far as the House bill, that § 8(b) prohibits juris-
' 8 The Senate had declined to adopt these provisions of the House bill. 
The Senate Report explained that it did not want to impair labor's social 
gains under the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the NLRA of 1935, but instead 
wanted to remedy "specific types of injustice" or "clear inequities" by "pre-
cise and carefully drawn legislation." S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1, 1 Leg. His. 407. Some of the concerted activities listed in § 12 of 
the House bill were made unfair labor practices, and the National Labor 
Relations Board, not private parties, could petition a district court for in-
junctions against certain unfair labor practices. See id., at 35, 40, 1 Leg. 
His. 441, 446 (reciting proposed revisions to NLRA, §§ 8(b), lO(k), 10(1)). 
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dictional strikes and illegal secondary boycotts, and that the 
Board, not private parties, may petition a district court 
under § lO(k) or § 10(1) to enjoin these activities notwithstand-
ing the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. H.R. Conf. 
Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 36, 42-43, 57, 5~9, 1 
Leg. His. 540, 54(H)47, 561, 562-563. In short, Congress 
declined in 1947 to adopt a broad "political motivation" excep-
tion to the Norris-LaGuardia Act for strikes in protest of 
some governmental policy. Instead, if a strike of this nature 
takes the form of a secondary boycott prohibited by § 8(b), 
Congress chose to give the Board, not private parties, the 
power to petition a federal district court for an injunction. 
See 29 U. S. C. §§ 160(k), 160(1). 
c 
This case, brought by the Employer to enforce its collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with the Union, involves a "labor 
dispute" within any common-sense meaning of that term. 
Were we to ignore this plain interpretation and hold that the 
political motivation underlying the work stoppage removes 
this controversy from the prohibitions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, we would embroil federal judges in the very 
scrutiny of "legitimate objectives" that Congress intended to 
prevent when it passed that Act. The applicability not only 
of § 4, but of all of the procedural protections embodied in 
that Act, would turn on a single federal judge's perception of 
the motivation underlying the concerted activity. 19 The Em-
19 This proposed exception does not limit the judge's discretion to consid-
eration of specified external conduct or of provisions in a collective-bar-
gaining agreement, as does the Boys Markets exception. It provides no 
guidance to judges in dealing with concerted activity arguably designed to 
achieve both political and labor-related goals. Such mixed-motivation 
cases are bound to arise. For example, in United States Steel Corp. v. 
United Mine Workers, 519 F. 2d 1236 (CA5 1975), miners picketed another 
employer for importing coal from South Africa. The Court of Appeals 
held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act applied, and that the Boys Markets ex-
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ployer's interpretation is simply inconsistent with the need, 
expressed by Congress when it enacted the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, for clear "mileposts for judges to follow." 75 
Cong. Rec. 4935 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bratton). 
In essence, the Employer asks us to disregard the legisla-
tive history of the Act and to distort the definition of a labor 
dispute in order to reach what it believes to be an "equitable" 
result. The Employer's real complaint, however, is not with 
the Union's political objections to the conduct of the Soviet 
Union, but with what the Employer views as the Union's 
breach of contract. The Employer's frustration with this al-
leged breach of contract should not be remedied by charac-
terizing it as other than a labor dispute. We will not adopt 
by judicial fiat an interpretation that Congress specifically re-
jected when it enacted the 1947 amendments to the NLRA. 
See note 17, supra. In the past, we have consistently de-
clined to constrict Norris-LaGuardia's broad prohibitions ex-
cept in narrowly defined situations where accommodation of 
that Act to specific congressional policy is necessary. We 
refuse to deviate from that path today. 
IV 
Alternatively, the Employer argues that the Union's work 
stoppage may be enjoined under the rationale of Boys Mar-
kets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970), and 
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 
(1976), because the dispute underlying the work stoppage is 
arbitrable under the collective-bargaining agreement. In 
ception was not available, because "the miners' action was not aimed at 
[their employer] at all, but rather at the national policy of this country's 
permitting the importation of South African coal." 519 F. 2d, at 1247 
(footnote omitted). Under the political-motivation exception, even if the 
miners had picketed because slave labor was employed to mine the im-
ported coal, the Norris-LaGuardia Act might not apply. Minor variations 
in the facts would endow the courts with, or divest them of, jurisdiction to 
issue an injunction, and would create difficult line-drawing problems. 
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making this argument, the Employer disavows its earlier ar-
gument that the underlying dispute is purely political, and 
asserts that the Union's work stoppage was motivated by a 
disagreement with the Employer over the management-
rights clause in the collective-bargaining agreement. The 
Solicitor General, in an amicus brief filed on behalf of the 
United States, agrees with the Employer that the work stop-
page may be enjoined pending arbitration. He contends that 
in addition to the political dispute, disputes concerning both 
the management-rights clause and the work-conditions clause 
underlie the work stoppage, and that at least one of these dis-
putes is arguably arbitrable. 20 
We disagree. Buffalo Forge makes it clear that a Boys 
Markets injunction pending arbitration should not issue un-
less the dispute underlying the work stoppage is arbitrable. 
The rationale of Buffalo Forge compels the conclusion that 
the Union's work stoppage, called to protest the invasion of 
Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, may not be enjoined pend-
ing the arbitrator's decision on whether the work stoppage 
violates the no-strike clause in the collective-bargaining 
agreement. The underlying dispute, whether viewed as an 
20 The management-rights clause provides: 
"The Management of the Employer's business and the direction of the 
work force in the operation of the business are exclusively vested in the 
Employer as functions of Management. Except as specifically provided in 
the Agreement, all of the rights, powers, and authority Employer had 
prior to signing of this Agreement are retained by the Employer." 
The work-conditions clause provides: 
"Where hardship is claimed by the Union because of unreasonable or 
burdensome conditions or where work methods or operations materially 
change in the future, the problem shall first be discussed between the local 
and Management involved. In the event an agrement cannot be reached, 
either party may refer the dispute to the Joint Negotiating Committee 
and, if the matter cannot be resolved by that Committee, either party may 
then refer the question to an arbitrator in accordance with the procedure 
set forth in Clause 15(B)." 
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expression of the Union's "moral outrage" at Soviet military 
policy or as an expression of sympathy for the people of Af-
ghanistan, is plainly not arbitrable under the collective-bar-
gaining agreement. 
The attempts by the Solicitor General and the Employer to 
characterize the underlying dispute as arbitrable do not with-
stand analysis. The "underlying" disputes concerning the 
management-rights clause or the work-conditions clause sim-
ply did not trigger the work stoppage. To the contrary, the 
applicability of these clauses to the dispute, if any, was trig-
gered by the work stoppage itself. Consideration of 
whether the strike intruded on the management-rights clause 
or was permitted by the work-conditions clause may inform 
the arbitrator's ultimate decision on whether the strike vio-
lates the no-strike clause. Indeed, the question whether 
striking over a nonarbitrable issue violates other provisions 
of the collective-bargaining agreement may itself be an arbi-
trable dispute. The fact remains, however, that the strike 
itself was not over an arbitrable dispute and therefore may 
not be enjoined pending the arbitrator's ruling on the legality 
of the strike under the collective-bargaining agreement. 
The weaknesses in the analysis of the Employer and the 
Solicitor General can perhaps best be demonstrated by apply-
ing it to a pure sympathy strike, which clearly cannot be en-
joined pending arbitration under the rationale of Buffalo 
Forge. If this work stoppage were a pure sympathy strike, 
it could be characterized alternatively as a dispute over the 
Employer's right to choose to do business with the employer 
embroiled in a dispute with a sister union, as a dispute over 
management's right to assign and direct work, or as a dispute 
over whether requiring the union to handle goods of the em-
ployer whose employees are on strike is an unreasonable 
work condition. 21 None of these characterizations, however, 
21 In fact, the employer in Buffalo Forge made just such a claim. In 
addition to alleging breach of the no-strike clause, it claimed that the strike 
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alters the fact, essential to the rationale of Buffalo Forge, 
that the strike was not over an arbitrable issue and therefore 
did not directly frustrate the arbitration process. 
The Employer's argument that this work stoppage may be 
enjoined pending arbitration really reflects a fundamental 
disagreement with the rationale of Buffalo Forge, and not a 
belief that this rationale permits an injunction in this case. 
The Employer apparently disagrees with the Buffalo Forge 
Court's conclusion that, in agreeing to broad arbitration and 
no-strike clauses, the parties do not bargain for injunctive re-
lief to restore the status quo pending the arbitrator's decision 
on the legality of the strike under the collective-bargaining 
agreement, without regard to what triggered the strike. In-
stead, they bargain only for specific enforcement of the 
union's promise to arbitrate the underlying grievance before 
resorting to a strike. See 428 U. S., at 410-412. The Em-
ployer also apparently believes that Buffalo Forge frustrates 
the arbitration process and encourages industrial strife. But 
see id., at 412.22 However, this disagreement with Buffalo 
was caused by "refusal to follow a supervisor's instructions to cross the .. . 
picket line." Buffalo Forge, supra, at 401. The district court found that 
the strike was in sympathy with the sister union and was not over a dispute 
that the parties were contractually bound to arbitrate. !d., at 402-403. 
On appeal, the employer did not press its argument that the work stoppage 
was in part a protest over truck driving assignments. !d., at 403, n. 8. 
22 The Employer argues that industrial strife is encouraged because em-
ployers are given the incentive to discharge or discipline the workers for 
refusing to work, which is likely to precipitate further strikes. According 
to this argument, the strike, which began over a nonarbitrable dispute, is 
transformed into a dispute over an arbitrable issue, i. e. the employer's 
right under the collective-bargaining agreement to discipline these work-
ers, and may be enjoined under the Boys Markets/Buffalo Forge excep-
tion. See, e. g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 614 F. 2d 1110, 
1113-1114 (CA6 1980), affd on other grounds 451 U. S. 401 (1981). This 
Court has not addressed the validity of this "transformation" analysis. 
See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S., at 405, n. 4. 
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Forge only argues for reconsidering that decision. 23 It does 
not justify distorting the rationale of that case beyond recog-
nition in order to reach the result urged by the Employer. 
v 
In conclusion, we hold that an employer's § 301 action to 
enforce the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement 
allegedly violated by a union's work stoppage involves a 
"labor dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act, without regard to the motivation underlying the union's 
decision not to provide labor. Under our decisions in Boys 
Markets and Buffalo Forge, when the underlying dispute is 
not arbitrable, the employer may not obtain injunctive relief 
pending the arbitrator's ruling on the legality of the strike 
under the collective-bargaining agreement. 
Affirmed. 
23 The Employer has also requested that we reconsider our decision in 
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976). We de-
cline this invitation. 
To: The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan 
Justice White 
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JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case, we consider the power of a federal court to en-
join a politically motivated work stoppage in an action 
brought by an employer pursuant to § 301(a) of the Labor 
Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U. S. C. § 185(a), to 
enforce a union's obligations under a collective-bargaining 
agreement. We first address whether the broad anti-injunc-
tion provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. 
§ 101 et seq., apply to politically motivated work stoppages. 
Finding these provisions applicable, we then consider 
whether the work stoppage may be enjoined under the ra-
tionale of Boys Markets , Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 
U. S. 235 (1970), and Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelwork-
ers , 428 U. S. 397 (1976), pending an arbitrator's decision on 
whether the strike violates the collective-bargaining 
agreement. 
I 
On January 4, 1980, President Carter announced that, due 
to the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan, certain 
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Superphosphoric acid (SPA), used in agricultural fertilizer, 
was not included in the Presidential embargo.' On January 9, 
1980, respondent International Longshoremen's Association 
(ILA) announced that its members would not handle any 
cargo bound to, or coming from, the Soviet Union or carried 
on Russian ships. 2 In accordance with this resolution, re-
spondent local union, an ILA affiliate, refused to load SPA 
bound for the Soviet Union aboard three ships that arrived at 
the shipping terminal operated by petitioner Jacksonville 
Bulk Terminals, Inc. (JBT) at the Port of Jacksonville, Flor-
ida during the month of January 1980. 
1 On February 25, 1980, the embargo was extended to include SPA along 
with other products. On April 24, 1981, President Reagan lifted the SPA 
embargo as part of his decision to remove restrictions on the sale of grain 
to the Soviets. By telegrams dated April 24, 1981 and June 5, 1981, the 
ILA has recommended to its members that they resume handling goods to 
and from the Soviet Union. Although the work stoppage is no longer in 
effect, there remains a live controversy over whether the collective-bar-
gaining agreement prohibits politically motivated work stoppages, and the 
Union may resume such a work stoppage at any time. As a result, this 
case is not moot. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 
397, 403, n. 8 (1976). 
• The President of the ILA made the following announcement: 
"In response to overwhelming demands by the rank and file members of 
the Union, the leadership of the ILA today ordered immediate suspension 
in handling all Russian ships and all Russian cargoes in ports from Maine to 
Texas and Puerto Rico where ILA workers are employed. 
"The reason for this action should be apparent in light of international 
events that have affected relations between the U. S. & Soviet Union. 
"However, the decision by the Union leadership was made necessary by 
the demands of the workers. 
"It is their will to refuse to work Russian vessels and Russian cargoes 
under present conditions of the world. 
"People are upset and they refuse to continue the business as usual policy 
as long as the Russians insist on being international bully boys. It is a 
decision in which the Union leadership concurs." Brieffor Respondents 2, 
n. 2. 
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In response to this work stoppage, petitioners JBT, 
Hooker Chemical Corporation, and Occidental Petroleum 
Company (collectively referred to as the Employer) 3 brought 
this action pursuant to §301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U. S. C. 
§ 185(a), against respondents ILA, its affiliated local union, 
and its officers and agents (collectively referred to as the 
Union). The Employer alleged that the Union's work stop-
page violated the collective-bargaining agreement between 
the Union and JBT. The Employer sought to compel ar-
bitration under the agreement, requested a temporary re-
straining order and a preliminary injunction pending arbitra-
tion, and sought damages. 
The agreement contains both a broad no-strike clause and a 
provision requiring the resolution of all disputes through a 
grievance procedure, ending in arbitration. 4 The no-strike 
clause provides: 
"During the term of this Agreement, ... the Union 
agrees there shall not be any strike of any kind or degree 
whatsoever, ... for any cause whatsoever; such causes 
including but not limited to, unfair labor practices by the 
3 JBT is a wholly owned subsidiary of Oxy Chemical Corporation, which 
is a subsidiary of Hooker. Ownership of all these corporations is ulti-
mately vested in Occidental. Hooker Chemical Company manufactures 
SPA at a manufacturing facility in Florida. Pursuant to a bilateral trade 
agreement between Occidental and the Soviet Union, SPA is shipped to 
the Soviet Union from the JBT facility in Jacksonville. 
' The grievance and arbitration clause provides in relevant part: 
"Matters under dispute which cannot be promptly settled between the 
Local and an individual Employer shall . . . be referred . . . to a Port 
Grievance Committee. . . . In the event this Port Grievance Committee 
cannot reach an agreement ... the dispute shall be referred to the Joint 
Negotiating Committee ... . 
"A majority decision of this Committee shall be final and binding on both 
parties and on all Employers signing this Agreement. In the event the 
Committee is unable to reach a majority decision within 72 hours after 
meeting to discuss the case, it shall employ a professional arbitrator ... . " 
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Employer or violation of this Agreement. The right of 
employees not to cross a bona fide picket line is recog-
nized by the Employer .... " 
The United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Florida ordered the Union to process its grievance in accord-
ance with the contractual grievance procedure. The District 
Court also granted the Employer's request for a preliminary 
injunction pending arbitration, reasoning that the political 
motivation behind the work stoppage rendered the Norris-
LaGuardia Act's anti-injunction provisions inapplicable. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the District Court's order to the extent it required 
arbitration of the question whether the work stoppage vio-
lated the collective-bargaining agreement. New Orleans 
Steamship Association v. General Longshore Workers, 626 
F. 2d 455 (1980). 5 However, the Court of Appeals disagreed 
with the District Court's conclusion that the provisions of the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act are inapplicable to politically moti-
vated work stoppages. Relying on Buffalo Forge, the Court 
of Appeals further held that the Employer was not entitled to 
an injunction pending arbitration because the underlying dis-
pute was not arbitrable. We agree with the Court of Ap-
peals that the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act apply 
to this case, and that, under Buffalo Forge, an injunction 
pending arbitration may not issue. 
II 
Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides in part: 
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction 
•The Union concedes that the question whether the work stoppage vio-
lates the no-strike clause is arbitrable. In a consolidated case, the Court 
of Appeals upheld an injunction issued by the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Louisiana enforcing an arbitrator's decision that 
the ILA work stoppage violated a collective-bargaining agreement. New 
Orleans Steamship Association v. General Longshore Workers, 626 F. 2d 
455, 469 (CA5 1980). 
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to issue any restraining order or temporary or perma-
nent injunction in any case involving or growing out of 
any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons par-
ticipating or interested in such dispute ... from doing, 
whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts: 
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to re-
main in any relation of employment." 29 U. S. C. § 104. 
Congress adopted this broad prohibition to remedy the grow-
ing tendency of federal courts to enjoin strikes by narrowly 
construing the Clayton Act's labor exemption from the Sher-
man Act's prohibition against conspiracies to restrain trade, 
see 29 U. S. C. §52. See, e. g., H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8, 10-11 (1931). This Court has consis-
tently given the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act a broad interpretation, recognizing excep-
tions only in limited situations where necessary to 
accommodate the Act to specific federal legislation or para-
mount congressional policy. See, e. g., Boys Markets, Inc. 
v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235, 249-253 (1970); Rail-
road Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 353 
u. s. 30, 39-42 (1957). 
The Boys Markets exception, as refined in Buffalo Forge 
Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976), is relevant 
to our decision today. In Boys Markets, this Court re-exam-
ined Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 195 (1962), 
which held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes a federal 
district court from enjoining a strike in breach of a collective-
bargaining agreement, even where that agreement contains 
provisions for binding arbitration of the grievance concerning 
which the strike was called. 398 U. S., at 237-238. The 
Court overruled Sinclair and held that, in order to accommo-
date the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia to 
the subsequently enacted provisions of § 301(a) and the 
strong federal policy favoring arbitration, it was essential to 
recognize an exception to the anti-injunction provisions for 
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cases in which the employer sought to enforce the union's 
contractual obligation to arbitrate grievances rather than to 
strike over them. I d., at 24~253. 6 
After Boys Markets, the Courts of Appeals divided on the 
question whether a strike could be enjoined under the Boys 
Markets exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act pending ar-
bitration, when the strike was not over a grievance that the 
union had agreed to arbitrate. 7 In Buffalo Forge, the Court 
resolved this conflict and held that the Boys Markets excep-
tion does not apply when only the question whether the 
strike violates the no-strike pledge, and not the dispute that 
precipitated the strike, is arbitrable under the parties' collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. 8 
The Employer argues that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does 
not apply in this case because the political motivation under-
lying the Union's work stoppage removes this controversy 
from that Act's definition of a "labor dispute." Alterna-
tively, the· Employer argues that this case fits within the ex-
ception to that Act recognized in Boys Markets as refined in 
Buffalo Forge. We review these arguments in turn. 
III 
At the outset, we must determine whether this is a "case 
involving or growing out of any labor dispute" within the 
meaning of § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. 
' In Boys Markets, the underlying dispute was clearly subject to the 
grievance and arbitration procedures of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment, and the strike clearly violated the no-strike clause. 
7 See cases cited in Buffalo Forge, 428 U. S., at 404, n. 9. 
8 In Buffalo Forge, the strike at issue was a sympathy strike in support 
of sister unions negotiating with the employer. The Court reasoned that 
there was no need to accommodate the policies of the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act to § 301 and to the federal policy favoring arbitration when a strike is 
not called over an arbitrable dispute, because such a strike does not di-
rectly frustrate the arbitration process by denying or evading the union's 
promise to arbitrate. 428 U. S., at 407-412. 
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§ 104. Section 13(c) of the Act broadly defines the term 
labor dispute to include "any controversy concerning terms 
or conditions of employment." 29 U. S. C. § 113(c).9 
The Employer argues that the existence of political mo-
tives takes this work stoppage controversy outside the broad 
scope of this definition. This argument, however, has no 
basis in the plain statutory language of the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act or in our prior interpretations of that Act. Further-
more, the argument is contradicted by the legislative history 
of not only the Norris-LaGuardia Act but also the 1947 
amendments to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 
A 
. An action brought by an employer against the union repre-
senting its employees to enforce a no-strike pledge generally 
involves two controversies. First, there is the "underlying 
dispute," which is the event or condition that triggers the 
work stoppage. This dispute may or may not be political, 
and it may or may not be arbitrable under the parties' collec-
tive-bargaining agreement. Second, there is the parties' 
dispute over whether the no-strike pledge prohibits the work 
stoppage at issue. This second dispute can always form the 
basis for federal court jurisdiction, because § 301(a) gives fed-
eral courts jurisdiction over "[s]uits for violation of contracts 
between an employer and a labor organization." 29 U. S. 'J. 
§ 185(a). 
It is beyond cavil that the second form of dispute-whether 
the collective-bargaining agreement either forbids or permits 
the union to refuse to perform certain work-is a "contro-
• Section 13(c) provides: 
"(c) The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or 
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation 
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to ar-
range terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the 
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." 
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versy concerning the terms or conditions of employment." 
29 U. S. C. § 113(c). This § 301 action was brought to re-
solve just such a controversy. In its complaint, the Em-
ployer did not seek to enjoin the intervention of the Soviet 
Union in Afghanistan, nor did it ask the District Court to de-
cide whether the Union was justified in expressing disap-
proval of the Soviet Union's actions. Instead, the Employer 
sought to enjoin the Union's decision not to provide labor, a 
decision which the Employer believed violated the terms of 
the collective-bargaining agreement. It is this contract dis-
pute, and not the political dispute, that the arbitrator will re-
solve, and on which the courts are asked to rule. 
The plain language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not \ 
except labor disputes having their genesis in political pro-
tests. Nor is re any basis in the statuto language for 
the argument that the ct requires t at each dispute rele-
vant to the case beaTaoor dispute. The Act merely requires 
that the case involve "any" labor dispute. Therefore, the 
plain terms of § 4(a) and § 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act de-
prive the federal courts of the power to enjoin the Union's 
work stoppage in this§ 301 action, without regard to whether 
the Union also has a nonlabor dispute with another entity. 10 
The conclusion that this case involves a labor dispute l 
within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act comports 
with this Court's consistent int ~rpretation of that Act. 11 Our 
10 Of course, there are exceptions to the Act's prohibitions against en-
joining work stoppages. See, e. g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks 
Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970). The employer may obtain an injunction to 
enforce an arbitrator's decision that the strike violates the collective-bar-
gaining agreement and can recover damages for the violation, pursuant to 
§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U. S. C. § 185. 
See, e. g., Buffalo Forge, 428 U. S., at 405. See also 15-16, and note 18, 
infra (discussing Board's authority under 29 U. S. C. §§ 160(k), 160(1), to 
petition for an injunction upon finding reasonable cause to believe that the 
strike is an unfair labor practice). 
"The Employer's reliance on Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB , 437 U. S. 556 
(1978), to argue that a politically motivated strike is not a labor dispute is 
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decisions have recognized that the tenn "labor dispute" must 
not be narrowly construed because the statutory definition it-
self is extremely broad and because Congress deliberately in-
cluded a broad definition to overrule judicial decisions that 
had unduly restricted the Clayton Act's labor exemption from 
the antitrust laws. For example, in Marine Cooks & Stew-
ards v. Panama Steamship Co., 362 U. S. 365, 369 (1960), 
the Court observed: 
"Th[e] Act's language is broad. The language is 
broad because Congress was intent upon taking the fed-
eral courts out of the labor injunction business except in 
the very limited circumstances left open for federal juris-
diction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The history 
and background that led Congress to take this view have 
misplaced. In Eastex, we addressed whether certain concerted activity 
was protected under § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 157, and we recog-
nized that "[t]here may well be types of conduct or speech that are so 
purely political or so remotely connected to the concerns of employees as 
employees as to be beyond the protection of§ 7." !d., at 570, n. 20. Al-
though the definition of a "labor dispute" in § 2(9) of the NLRA, 29 
U. S. C. § 152(9), is virtually identical to that in § 13(c) of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. § 113(c), and the two provisions have been con-
strued consistently with one another, e. g., United States v. Hutcheson, 
312 F . S. 219, 234, n. 4 (1941), this similarity does not advance the Em-
ploy~ :'s argument. Union activity that prompts a "labor dispute" within 
the meaning of these sections may be protected by§ 7, prohibited by§ 8(b), 
29 U. S. C. § 158(b), or neither protected nor prohibited. The objective of 
the concerted activity is relevant in determining whether such activity is 
protected under§ 7 or prohibited by§ 8(b), but not in determining whether 
the activity is a "labor dispute" under § 2(9). 
Moreover, the conclusion that a purely political work stoppage is not pro-
tected under § 7 means simply that the employer is not prohibited by 
§ 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(1), from discharging or disci-
plining employees for this activity. It hardly establishes that no "labor 
dispute" existed within the meaning of§ 2(9). Similarly, if the employees 
protested such sanctions under the collective-bargaining agreement, an ar-
bitrator might ultimately conclude that the sanctions were proper, but this 
would not alter the obvious fact that the matter is a labor dispute. 
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been adverted to in a number of prior opinions of this 
Court in which we refused to give the Act narrow inter-
pretations that would have restored many labor dispute 
controversies to the courts." (emphasis added; footnote 
omitted) 
The critical element in determining whether the provisions 
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act apply is whether "the employer-
employee relationship [is] the matrix of the controversy." 
Columbia River Packers Association v. Hinton, 315 U. S. 
143, 147 (1942). In this case, the Employer and the Union 
representing its employees are the disputants, and their dis-
pute concerns the interpretation of the labor contract that de-
fines their relationship. 12 Thus, the employer-employee rela-
tionship is the matrix of this controversy. 
Nevertheless, the Employer argues that a "labor dispute" 
exists only when the Union's action is taken in its own "eco-
nomic self.:.interest." The Employer cites American Federa-
tion of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U. S. 99 (1968), and Colum-
bia River Packers Association, supra, for this proposition. 
In these cases, however, the Court addressed the very differ-
ent question whether the relevant parties were "labor'' 
groups involved in a labor dispute for the purpose of deter-
mining whether their actions were exempt from the antitrust 
laws. 13 These cases do not hold that a union's noneconomic 
12 A labor dispute might be present under the facts of this case even in 
the absence of the dispute over the scope of the no-strike clause. Regard-
less of the political nature of the Union's objections to handling Soviet-
bound cargo, these objections were expressed in a work stoppage by em-
ployees against their employer, which focused on particular work 
assignments. Thus, apart from the collective-bargaining agreement, the 
employer-employee relationship would be the matrix of the controversy. 
We need not decide this question, however, because this case does involve 
a dispute over the interpretation of the parties' collective-bargaining 
agreement. 
18 In American Federation of Musicians, the Court held that, although 
orchestra leaders acted as independent contractors with respect to certain 
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motive inevitably takes the dispute out of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, but only that that protections of that Act do 
not extend to labor organizations when they cease to act as 
labor groups or when they enter into illegal combinations 
with nonlabor groups in restraint of trade. 14 Here, there is no 
question that the Union is a labor group, representing its 
own interests in a dispute with the Employer over the em-
ployees' obligation to provide labor. 
Even in cases where the disputants did not stand in the 
relationship of employer and employee, this Court has held 
that the existence of noneconomic motives does not make the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable. For example, in New 
Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552 
(1938), this Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohib-
ited an injunction against picketing by members of a civic 
group, which was aimed at inducing a store to employ Negro 
employees. In determining that the group and its members 
were "persons interested in a labor dispute" within the mean-
"club-date" engagements, the union's involvement with the leaders was not 
a combination with a nonlabor group in violation of the Sherman Act. In 
finding that leaders were a "labor group," and a party to a labor dispute, 
the Court relied on the "'presence of a job or wage competition or some 
other economic interrelationship affecting legitimate union interests be-
tween the union members and the independent contractors."' 391 U. S., 
at 106 (quoting the opinion of the District Court). In Hinton, the Court 
found that the union was merely an association of independent fish sellers 
involved in a controversy with fish buyers over a contract for the sale of 
fish; they were not employees of the buyers, nor did they seek to be. 315 
U. S., at 147. 
The Employer's reliance on Bakery Drivers Union v. Wagshal, 333 
U. S. 437 (1948), is similarly misplaced. In that case, the Court held only 
that a controversy between two businessmen over delivery times or meth-
ods of payment does not become a labor dispute merely because a union 
representative, with or without his employer's consent, sought to obtain 
payment pursuant to a particular method. Id., at 443-444. 
14 The Employer's economic-motive analysis also leads to the untenable 
result that strikes in protest of unreasonably unsafe conditions and some 
sympathy strikes are not "labor disputes." 
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ing of § 13, the Court found it immaterial that the picketers, 
who were neither union organizers nor store employees, 
were not asserting economic interests commonly associated 
with labor unions-e. g., terms and conditions of employment 
in the narrower sense of wages, hours, unionization or bet-
terment of working conditions. I d., at 560. Although the 
lower courts found Norris-LaGuardia inapplicable because 
the picketing was motivated by the group's "political" or "so-
cial" goals of improving the position of Negroes generally, 
and not by the desire to improve specific conditions of em-
ployment, this Court reasoned: "The Act does not concern it-
self with the background or the motives of the dispute." 303 
U. S., at 561. 
B 
The Employer's argument that the Union's motivation for 
engaging in a work stoppage determines whether the Norris- ? 
LaGuardia Act applies is also contrary to the leg!slali_ve his-
tory of that Act. The Act was enacted in response to federal 
court mtervention on behalf of employers through the use of 
injunctive powers against unions and other associations of 
employees. This intervention had caused the federal judi-
ciary to fall into disrepute among large segments of this N a-
tion's population. See generally S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong., 
1st Sess. 8, 1&-18 (1932); 75 Cong. Rec. 4915 (1932) (remarks 
of Sen. Wagner). 
Apart from the procedural unfairness of many labor injunc-
tions, one of the greatest evils associated with them was the 
use of tort-law doctrines, which often made the lawfulness of 
a strike depend upon judicial views of social and economic 
policy. See, e. g., Cox, Current Problems in the Law of 
Grievance Arbitration, 30 Rocky Mountain L. Rev. 247, 256 
(1958). In debating the Act, its supporters repeatedly ex-
pressed disapproval of this Court's interpretations of the 
Clayton Act's labor exemption-interpretations which per-
mitted a federal judge to find the Act inapplicable based on 
80-104&--0PINION 
JACKSONVILLE BULK TERMINALS v. LONGSHOREMEN 13 
his or her appraisal of the "legitimacy" of the union's objec-
tives.15 See, e. g., 75 Cong. Rec. 4916 (1932) (remarks of 
Sen. Wagner) (definition of labor dispute expanded to over-
rule Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 
(1921) (holding a strike and picketing with the purpose of / 
unionizing a plant not a labor dispute because the objectives 
were not legitimate and there was no employer-employee 
relationship between the disputants)); id., at 5487-5488 (re-
marks of Sen. Geller) (bill brought forth to remedy decisions 
allowing injunction in Duplex and in Bedford Cut Stone Co. 
v. Stone Cutters Association, 274 U. S. 37 (1927) (holding / 
that decision by workers not to work on nonunion goods not a 
labor dispute)). See also id., at 4686 (remarks of Sen. He-
bert) (committee minority agreed that injunctions should not 
have issued in Bedford and Duplex). See generally H.R. 
Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 1{}-11 (1932). The leg-
islative history is replete with criticisms of the ability of pow-
erful employers to use federal judges as "strike-breaking'' 
agencies; by virtue of their almost unbridled "equitable dis-
cretion," federal judges could enter injunctions based on their 
disapproval of the employees' objectives, or on the theory 
that these objectives or actions, although lawful if pursued by 
a single employee, became unlawful when pursued through 
the "conspiracy" of concerted activity. See, e. g., 75 Cong. 
Rec. 4928-4938 (1932); id., at 546~5468; id., at 5478-5481; 
id., at 5487-5490. 
Furthermore, the question whether the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act would apply to politically motivated strikes was brought 
to the attention of the 72nd Congress when it passed the Act. 
Opponents criticized the definition of "labor dispute" in 
§ 13(c) on the ground that it would cover politically motivated 
strikes. Representative Beck argued that federal courts 
'" See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 468-469 
(1921). See also Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Stone Cutters Association, 274 
u. s. 37, 54-55 (1927). 
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should have jurisdiction to enjoin political strikes like those 
threatened by labor unions in Europe. 75 Cong. Rec. 
5471-5473 (1932) (discussing threatened strike by British 
unions protesting the cancellation of leases held by Commu-
nist Party members, and threatened strikes by Belgian 
unions protesting a decision to supply military aid to Po-
land).16 In response, Representative Oliver argued that the 
federal courts should not have the power to enjoin such 
strikes. !d., at 5480-5481. Finally, Representative Beck 
offered an amendment to the Act that would have permitted 
federal courts to enjoin strikes called for ulterior purposes, 
including political motives. This amendment was defeated 
soundly. See id., at 5507. 
Further support for our conclusion that Congress believed 
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies to work stoppages in-
stituted for political reasons can be found in the legislative 
history of the 1947 amendments to the NLRA. That history 
reveals that Congress rejected a proposal to repeal the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act with respect to one broad category of po-
litical strikes. 17 The House bill included definitions of vari-
ous kinds of labor disputes. See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 1 Legislative History of the LMRA 158 (1947) (Leg. 
His.); H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Con., 1st Sess., 18-19, 1 Leg. 
16 The thrust of this objection was that the Act's definition of a labor dis-
pute "takes no account whatever of the motives and purposes with which a 
nation-wide strike or boycott can be commenced and prosecuted." 75 
Cong. Rec. 5472 (1932) (remarks of Rep. Beck). 
17 In relying on this history, we do not argue that congressional rejection 
of a broad repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act precludes accommodation of 
that Act to the LMRA. See Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U. S. 
195, 204-210 (1962). In Boys Markets Co. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 
U. S. 235, 249 (1970), this Court put that argument to rest. Rather, we 
rely on this legislative history because it demonstrates that Congress be-
lieved that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did apply to controversies concerning 
politically motivated work stoppages. Furthermore, in this case, unlike 
Boys Markets, we are not asked to accommodate the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act to a specific federal act or to the strong policy favoring arbitration. 
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His. 292, 309-310. Of relevance here, § 2(13) defined a "sym-
pathy" strike as a strike "called or conducted not by reason of 
any dispute between the employer and the employees on 
strike or participating in such concerted interference, but 
rather by reason of either (A) a dispute involving another em-
ployer or other employees of the same employer, or (B) dis-
agreement with some governmental policy." H.R. 3020, 
§ 2(13), 1 Leg. His. 168 (emphasis added). Section 12 of the 
House bill made this kind of strike "unlawful concerted activ-
ity," and "it remove[d] the immunities that the present laws 
confer upon persons who engage in them." H. R. Rep. No. 
245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, 1 Leg. His. 314. In particular, 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act would not apply to suits brought 
by private parties to enjoin such activity, and damages could 
be recovered. See id., at 23-24, 43-44, 1 Leg. His. 314-315, 
334-335. In explaining these provisions, the House Report 
stated that strikes "against a policy of national or local gov-
ernment, which the employer cannot change," should be 
made unlawful, and that "[t]he bill makes inapplicable in such 
suits the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which heretofore has pro-
tected parties to industrial strife from the consequences of 
their lawlessness." !d., at 24, 44, 1 Leg. His. 315, 335. 
The Conference Committee accepted the Senate version, 
which had eliminated these provisions of the House bill. 18 
The Conference Report explained that its recommendation 
did not go as far as the House bill, that § 8(b) prohibits juris-
'
8 The Senate had declined to adopt these provisions of the House bill. 
The Senate Report explained that it did not want to impair labor's social 
gains under the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the NLRA of 1935, but instead 
wanted to remedy "specific types of injustice" or "clear inequities" by "pre-
cise and carefully drawn legislation." S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1, 1 Leg. His. 407. Some of the concerted activities listed in § 12 of 
the House bill were made unfair labor practices, and the National Labor 
Relations Board, not private parties, could petition a district court for in-
junctions against certain unfair labor practices. See id., at 35, 40, 1 Leg. 
His. 441, 446 (reciting proposed revisions to NLRA, §§ 8(b), lO(k), 10(1)). 
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dictional strikes and illegal secondary boycotts, and that the 
Board, not private parties, may petition a district court 
under § lO(k) or § 10(1) to enjoin these activities notwithstand-
ing the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. H. R. Conf. 
Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 36, 42-43, 57, 58-59, 1 
Leg. His. 540, 546-547, 561, 562-563. In short, Congress 
declined in 1947 to adopt a broad "political motivation" excep-
tion to the Norris-LaGuardia Act for strikes in protest of 
some governmental policy. Instead, if a strike of this nature 
takes the form of a secondary boycott prohibited by § 8(b), 
Congress chose to give the Board, not private parties, the 
power to petition a federal district court for an injunction. 
See 29 U. S. C. §§ 160(k), 160(1). 
c 
This case, brought by the Employer to enforce its collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with the Union, involves a "labor 
dispute" within any common-sense meaning of that term. 
Were we to ignore this plain interpretation and hold that the 
political motivation underlying the work stoppage removes 
this controversy from the prohibitions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, we would embroil federal judges in the very 
scrutiny of "legitimate objectives" that Congress intended to 
prevent when it passed that Act. The applicability not only 
of § 4, but of all of the procedural protections embodied in 
that Act, would turn on a single federal judge's perception of 
the motivation underlying the concerted activity. 19 The Em-
'
9 This proposed exception does not limit the judge's discretion to consid-
eration of specified external conduct or of provisions in a collective-bar-
gaining agreement, as does the Boys Markets exception. It provides no 
guidance to judges in dealing with concerted activity arguably designed to 
achieve both political and labor-related goals. Such mixed-motivation 
cases are bound to arise. For example, in United States Steel Corp. v. 
United Mine Workers, 519 F. 2d 1236 (CA5 1975), miners picketed another 
employer for importing coal from South Africa. The Court of Appeals 
held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act applied, and that the Boys Markets ex-
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ployer's interpretation is simply inconsistent with the need, 
expressed by Congress when it enacted the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, for clear "mileposts for judges to follow." 75 
Cong. Rec. 4935 (1932) (remarks of Sen. Bratton). 
In essence, the Employer asks us to disregard the legisla-
tive history of the Act and to distort the definition of a labor 
dispute in order to reach what it believes to be an "equitable" 
result. The Employer's real complaint, however, is not with 
the Union's political objections to the conduct of the Soviet 
Union, but with what the Employer views as the Union's 
breach of contract. The Employer's frustration with this al-
leged breach of contract should not be remedied by charac-
terizing it as other than a labor dispute. We will not adopt 
by judicial fiat an interpretation that Congress specifically re-
jected when it enacted the 1947 amendments to the NLRA. f 
See generally note 17, supra. In the past, we have consis-
tently declined to constrict Norris-LaGuardia's broad prohi-
bitions except in narrowly defined situations where accom-
modation of that Act to specific congressional policy is 
necessary. We refuse to deviate from that path today. 
IV 
Alternatively, the Employer argues that the Union's work 
stoppage may be enjoined under the rationale of Boys Mar-
kets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970), and 
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 
(1976), because the dispute underlying the work stoppage is 
arbitrabletilliler the collective-bargaining agreement. iii 
ception was not available, because "the miners' action was not aimed at 
[their employer] at all, but rather at the national policy of this country's 
permitting the importation of South African coal." 519 F. 2d, at 1247 
(footnote omitted). Under the political-motivation exception, even if the 
miners had picketed because slave labor was employed to mine the im-
ported coal, the Norris-LaGuardia Act might not apply. Minor variations 
in the facts would endow the courts with, or divest them of, jurisdiction to 
issue an injunction, and would create difficult line-drawing problems. 
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making this argument, the Employer disavows its earlier ar-
gument that the underlying dispute is purely political, and 
asserts that the Union's work stoppage was motivated by a 
disagreement with the Employer over the manag_em~nt­
ri hts clause in the collective-bargaining agreement. The 
Solicitor eneral, in an amicus brief filed on behalf of the 
United States, agrees with the Employer that the work stop-
page may be en· oined endin arbitration. He contends that 
in addition to the political dispute, isputes concerning both 
the management-rights clause and the work-conditions clause 
underlie the work stoppage, and that at least one of these dis-
putes is arguably arbitrable. 20 
We disagree. Buffalo Forge makes it clear that a Boys ) 
Markets injuncti9n pendin~,arbitration should not issue un-
less the dispute 'underlying the work sto a e 1s ar6itr'able. 
The ra wna e o u a o orge compels the cone us1on that 
the Union~s work stoppage, called to protest the invasion of 
Mghanistan by the Soviet Union,~ot be enjoined penp-
ing the arbitrator's decision on whether the work sto page 
vio ates e no-s n e clau..§.e in the co ectlve-bargaining 
agreement-:--Tile underlying dispute, whether viewed as an - -
20 The management-rights clause provides: 
"The Management of the Employer's business and the direction of the 
work force in the operation of the business are exclusively vested in the 
Employer as functions of Management. Except as specifically provided in 
the Agreement, all of the rights, powers, and authority Employer had 
prior to signing of this Agreement are retained by the Employer." 
The work-conditions clause provides: 
"Where hardship is claimed by the Union because of unreasonable or 
burdensome conditions or where work methods or operations materially 
change in the future, the problem shall first be discussed between the local 
and Management involved. In the event an agrement cannot be reached, 
either party may refer the dispute to the Joint Negotiating Committee 
and, if the matter cannot be resolved by that Committee, either party may 
then refer the question to an arbitrator in accordance with the procedure 
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expression of the Union's "moral outrage" at Soviet military ( 
policy or as an expression of sympathy for the people of M-
ghanistan, is plainly not arbitrable under the collective-bar-
gaining agreement. 
The attempts by the Solicitor General and the Employer to l 
characterize the underlying dispute as arbitrable do not with-
stand analysis. The~nderlying'' di~utes concerning the 
management-rights clause or the work-conditions clause sim-
ply did not trigger the work sto page. To the contrary, the 
applica Ility o these clauses to the dispute, if any, was trig-
gered by the work stoppage itself. Consideration of 
whether the strike intruded on the management-rights clause 
or was permitted by the work-conditions clause may inform 
the arbitrator's ultimate decision on whether the strike vio-
lates the no-strike clause. Indeed, the question whether 
striking over a nonarbitrable issue violates other provisions 
of the collective-bargaining agreement may itself be an arbi-
trable dispute. The fact remains, however, that the....strike 1 
itself was not over an arbitrable dispute and t herefore may 
not be enjoined pending the arbitrator's ruling on the legality 
of the strike under the collective-bargaining agreement. 
The weaknesses in the analysis of the Employer and the 
Solicitor General can perhaps best be demonstrated by apply-
ing it to a pure sympathy strike, which clearly cannot be en-
joined pending' arbitration under the rationale of Buffalo 
Forge. If this work stoppage were a pure sympathy strike, 
it could be characterized alternatively as a dispute over the 
Employer's right to choose to do business with the employer 
embroiled in a dispute With a sister union, as a dispute over 
management's right to assign and direct work, or as a dispute 
over whether requiring the union to handle goods of the em-
ployer whose employees are on strike is an unreasonable 
work condition.21 None of these characterizations, however, 
21 In fact, the employer in Buffalo Forge made just such a claim. In 
addition to alleging breach of the no-strike clause, it claimed that the strike 
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alters the fact, essential to the rationale of Buffalo Forge, 
that the strike was not over an arbitrable issue and therefore 
did not directly frustrate the arbitration process. 
The Employer's argument that this work stoppage may be 
enjoined pending arbitration really reflects a fundamental 
disagreement with the rationale of Buffalo Forge, and not a 
belief that this rationale permits an injunction in this case. 
The Employer apparently disagrees with the Buffalo Forge 
Court's conclusion that, in agreeing to broad arbitration and 
no-strike clauses, the parties do not bargain for injunctive re-
lief to restore the status quo pending the arbitrator's decision 
on the legality of the strike under the collective-bargaining 
agreement, without regard to what triggered the strike. In-
stead, they bargain only for specific enforcement of the 
union's promise to arbitrate the underlying grievance before 
resorting to a strike. See 428 U. S., at 410-412. The Em- 1 
ployer also apparently believes that Buffalo Forge frustrates 
the arbitration process and encourages industrial strife. But 
see id., at 412. 22 However, this disagreement with Buffalo 
was caused by "refusal to follow a supervisor's instructions to cross the ... 
picket line." Buffalo Forge, supra, at 401. The district court found that 
the strike was in sympathy with the sister union and was not over a dispute 
that the parties were contractually bound to arbitrate. Id., at 402-403. 
On appeal, the employer did not press its argument that the work stoppage 
was in part a protest over truck driving assignments. Id., at 403, n. 8. 
22 The Employer argues that industrial strife is encouraged because em-
ployers are given the incentive to discharge or discipline the workers for 
refusing to work, which is likely to precipitate further strikes. According 
to this argument, the strike, which began over a nonarbitrable dispute, is 
transformed into a dispute over an arbitrable issue, i. e. the employer's 
right under the collective-bargaining agreement to discipline these work-
ers, and may be enjoined under the Boys Markets/Buffalo Forge excep-
tion. See, e. g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 614 F. 2d 1110, 
1113-1114 (CA6 1980), affd on other grounds 451 U. S. 401 (1981). This 
Court has not addressed the validity of this "transformation" analysis. 
See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U. S., at 405, n. 4. 
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Forge ol!!i'~gues for ~onsidering that decision. 23 It does 
not justify ~e rationale--onnarcase beyond recog-
nition in order to reach the result urged by the Employer. 
v 
In conclusion, we hold that an employer's § 301 action to 
enforce the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement 
allegedly violated by a union's work stoppage involves a 
"labor dispute" within the meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act, without regard to the motivation underlying the union's 
decision not to provide labor. Under our decisions in Boys 
Markets and Buffalo Forge, when the underlying dispute is 
not arbitrable, the employer may not obtain injunctive relief 
pending the arbitrator's ruling on the legality of the strike 
under the collective-bargaining agreement. Accordingly, { 
the decision of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
23 The Employer has also requested that we reconsider our decision in 
Buffalo Forge Co . v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976). We de-
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Justice Powell, dissenting. 
The no-strike clause agreed to by the parties in 
this case could scarcely be more emphatic: "Our ing the 
term of this Agreement, .•• the Union agrees there shall 
not be any strike of any kind or degree whatsoever, 
for any cause whatsoever." This clause is one of the most 
significant provisions in the bargaining agreement. It 
2. 
would seem beyond rational doubt that the dispute in this 
case is as much "over" the scope and enforcement of the 
no-strike clause as it is "over" Soviet policy in 
Afghanistan. In light of the strong federal policy in 
support of arbitration recognized in Boys Markets, Inc. v. 
Retail Clerks Union, 398 u.s. 235 (1970), an injunction 
pending arbitration shoul~d:_=b~e~a~v~a~i~l~a~b~l:e~· -------------------------------
Court 
of this nature 
into the "underlying" dispute over Soviet policy and the 
"other" dispute over the scope of the no-strike clause. I 
~~~..,-z.~~~~ 
consider this method of analysis to be •K-ter±y artificial. 
"' 
it appears that the Court agrees: 
"[T]he Employer did not seek to enjoin the 
intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, 
nor did it ask the District Court to decide 
whether the Union was justified in expressing 
disapproval of the Soviet Union's actions. 
Instead, the Employer sought to enjoin the 
Union's dec is ion not to provide labor, a 
decision which the Employer believed violated 
the terms of the collective-bargaining 
agreement. It is this contract dispute, and not 
the political dispute, that the arbitrator will 
resolve, and on which the courts are asked to 





If the Court uncomfortable with the 
analysis in Buffalo Forge, understandable. On the 
one hand, the Court must aracterize the dispute in this 
case as a labor dispute-- nvolving the scope of the no-
strike clause--to bring t e dispute within the scope of 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. But on the other hand, Buffalo 
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therefore that the rule of Boy's Market, and the fede{al 
policy in support of arbitration, are inapplicable. 
~4U>-~-
The Court eann~t have it both ways. So long as 
A 
~-1 
the Court-1 adheres to the aberrant analysis in Buffalo 
Forge, I agree with the Chief Justice that the dispute in 
this case must be viewed as a political dispute outside 
the scope of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. I therefore join 
his dissenting opinion. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The no-strike clause agreed to by the parties in 
this case could scarcely be more emphatic: "During the 
term of this Agreement, ••• the Union agrees there shall 
not be any strike of any kind or degree whatsoever, 
for any cause whatsoever." (emphasis added}. Such a 
LA,.) 
clause ~b e~ one of the most significant elements of the 
bargaining agreement. On can fairly assume that the 
employer gave considerable ground in other areas of the 
~~atning agreement to gain this apparent guarantee that 
~ 
all disagreements would go first to arbitration. 2hder 
.1\ 
the plain language of the agreement of the parties, the 
strike by the respondent should have been enjoined. 
JB ut in labor law - ~ least since this Court's 
deJSsion in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 
u.s. 397 (1978} - plain language agreed to by a union does 
~. 
not bind it. Buffalo Forge is anf ______________ __ 
A d--
Buffalo Forge cannot be reconciled with labor law policy 
to encourage industrial peace through arbitration. It 
2. 
severely undercuts Boy's Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks 
Union, 398 u.s. 235 (1970). In a word, Buffalo Forge 
should be overruled. 
The internal contradictions in today's decision 
by the Court further illustrate absence of principle in 
Buffalo Forge's reasoning. 
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Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. ILA: No. 80-1045 
Justice Powell, dissenting. 
The no-strike clause agreed to by the parties in 
this case could scarcely be more emphatic: "During the 
term of this Agreement, .•• the Union agrees there shall 
not be any strike of any kind or degree whatsoever, ••• 
for any cause whatsoever." (emphasis added). Ante, at 3. 
Such a clause is one of the most significant provisions in 
the bargaining agreement. One can fairly assume that the 
2. 
employer gave consider able ground in other areas of the 
agreement to gain this apparent guarantee that all 
disagreements would go first to arbitration. Thus, under 
the plain language of the agreement of the parties, the 
strike by the respondent should have been enjoined pending 
arbitration. 
But in labor law--since this Court's decision in 
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 u.s. 397 
(197~lain language agreed to by a union does not bind 
it. Buffalo Forge is an aberration. It cannot be 
reconciled with labor law policy to encourage industrial 
peace through arbitration. It severely undercuts Boys 
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 u.s. 235 (1970). 
In a word Buffalo Forge should be overruled. 
The internal contradictions in today's decision 
by the Court further illustrate absence of principle in 
Buffalo Forge's reasoning. The Court argues that now we 
must divide the dispute in this case into the "underlying" 
dispute over Soviet policy and the "other" dispute over 
the scope of the no-strike clause. I consider this method 
of analysis artificial and unprincipled. On the one hand, 
3. 
the Court must characterize the dispute in this case as a 
labor dispute--involving the scope of the no-strike 
clause--to bring the dispute within the scope of the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act. But on the other hand, Buffalo 
Forge requires the Court to contradict itself by insisting 
that the dispute is "really" over Soviet aggression and 
therefore that the rule of Boy's Market, and the federal 
policy in support of arbitration, are inapplicable. 
The Court should not have it both ways. So long 
as it adheres to the aberrant analysis in Buffalo Forge, I 
agree with the Chief Justice that the dispute in this case 
must be viewed as a political dispute outside the scope of 
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. I therefore join his dissenting 
opinion. 
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From: Justice Powell 
C. 1 dJUN 7 1982 ITCU ate :---------
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1045 
JACKSONVILLE BULK TERMINALS, INC. ET AL., PE-
TITIONERS v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S 
ASSOCIATION ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1982] 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The no-strike clause agreed to by the parties in this case 
could scarcely be more emphatic: "During the term of this 
Agreement, ... the Union agrees there shall not be any 
strike of any kind or degree whatsoever; . . . for any cause 
whatsoever." (emphasis added). Ante, at 3. Such a clause 
is one of the most significant provisions in the bargaining 
agreement. One can fairly assume that the employer gave 
considerable ground in other areas of the agreement to gain 
this apparent guarantee that all disagreements would go first 
to arbitration. Thus, under the plain language of the agree-
ment of the parties, the strike by the respondent should.have 
been enjoined pending arbitration. 
But in labor law-since this Court's decision in Buffalo 
Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U. S. 397 (1976)--
plain language agreed to by a union does not bind it. Buffalo 
Forge is an aberration. It cannot be reconciled with labor 
law policy to encourage industrial peace through arbitration. 
It severely undercuts Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks 
Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970). In a word Buffalo Forge should 
be overruled. 
The internal contradictions in today's decision by the Court 
further illustrate absence of principle in Buffalo Forge's rea-
. -""---'.. 
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soning. The Court argues that now we must divide the dis-
pute in this case into the "underlying'' dispute over Soviet 
policy and the "other" dispute over the scope of the no-strike 
clause. I consider this method of analysis artificial and un-
principled. On the one hand, the Court must characterize 
the dispute in this case as a labor dispute-involving the 
scope of the no-strike clause-to bring the dispute within the 
scope of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. But on the other hand, 
Buffalo Forge requires the Court to contradict itself by in-
sisting that the dispute is "really" over Soviet aggression and 
therefore that the rule of Boy's Market, and the federal pol-
icy in support of arbitration, are inapplicable. 
The Court should not have it both ways. So long as it ad-
heres to the aberrant analysis in Buffalo Forge, I agree with 
the CHIEF JusTICE that the dispute in this case must be 
viewed as a political dispute outside the scope of the Norris-
LaGuardia· Act. I therefore join his dissenting opinion. 
To: Justice Brennan 
Justice White H 
Justice Marshall t 
J 1stice Blackmun 
J stice Powell 
Justice O'Connor 
From: The Chief Justice 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: __ J_U_N __ 8_1_9_8_2 __ 
3rd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1045 
JACKSONVILLE BULK TERMINALS, INC. ET AL., PE-
TITIONERS v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S 
ASSOCIATION ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1982] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting. 
I 
This case in no sense involves or gTows out of a labor dis-
pute as that term is defined in § 13( c) of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 29 U. S. C. § 113(c) (1976) . See ante, at 7 n. 
9. Section 13(c) defines a labor dispute as "any controversy 
concerning terms or conditions of employment. . .. " 1 The 
dispute in this case is a political dispute and has no relation to 
any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employ-
ment. If Congress had intended to bar federal courts from 
issuing injunctions in political disputes, it could have simply 
prohibited federal courts from enjoining strikes rather than 
limiting its prohibition to controversies concerning terms or 
conditions of employment. Accordingly, I disagTee with the 
Court's conclusion that the Norris-LaGuardia Act bars a fed-
eral court from enjoining this politically motivated work 
stoppage. 
The International Longshoremen's Association objects to 
the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. As a conse-
'Section 13(c) also includes union organizational activity within its defi-
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quence, it announced that it would not handle any cargo 
. bound to, or coming from, the Soviet Union, or any cargo car-
ried on Soviet ships. This case commenced after the union, 
pursuant to its political position, refused to load 
superphosphoric acid onto certain ships bound for the Soviet 
Union. The union has no objection to any terms or concli-
tions of employment; it would have loaded the 
superphosphoric acid on any non-Soviet ship bound for a des-
tination other than the Soviet Union. No one has suggested 
that the ILA's action is actually motivated to obtain conces-
sions concerning employment conditions. The union refused 
to handle the cargo simply because a foreign country invaded 
a neighboring country and the union desired to express its 
opposition to the invasion. Thus the plain meaning of§ 13(c) 
leads to the conclusion that this case does not involve or grow 
out of a labor dispute because the union members are not 
seeking to change their terms or conditions of employment. 
As the Court recognizes, we have held that the test of 
whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies is whether "the 
employer-employee relationship [is] the matrix of the contro-
versy." Columbia River Packers Association v. Hinton, 
315 U. S. 143, 147 (1947); quoted ante, at 10. Federal courts 
of appeals have stated that unions are protected by the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act when they act to advance the economic in-
terests of their members. See, e. g., Brotherhood of Rail-
road Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line Rail1'oad Company, 
362 F. 2d 649, 654 (CA5 1966). These cases illustrate the 
plain meaning of § 13(c)'s definition of labor dispute-the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act protects union organizational efforts 
and efforts to improve working conditions. 
The Court errs gTavely in finding that the matrix of this 
controversy is the union's relationship with the petitioners. 
The ILA's dispute with the petitioners merely flows from its 
decision to demonstrate its opposition to the invasion of Af-
ghanistan. No economic interests of union members are in-
volved; indeed, the union's policy is contrary to its members' 
economic interests since it reduces the amount of available 
e ,. 
80-1045-DISSENT 
JACKSONVILLE BULK TER:\IINALS u. LONGSHOREMEN 3 
work. 2 Thus, the cases generally explicating the meaning of 
§ 13(c) lend no support to the notion that this case involves a 
labor dispute. 
The federal courts have consistently recognized that the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act does not apply to politically motivated 
work stoppages concerning subjects over which employers 
have no control. These courts, in cases which are for all 
practical purposes indistinguishable from this case-and 
which often involved the International Longshoremen's As-
sociation-properly concluded that the Act only applies to 
economic disputes.l This Court has never before held, as it 
holds here, that the Norris-LaGuardia Act protects strikes 
resulting from political disputes rather than from labor dis-
putes. Since the meaning of the words of the statute is 
plain, and since the applicable precedent supports the conclu-
sion that this is not a labor dispute, we ought to conclude that 
politically motivated strikes are outside the coverage of the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act.' 
'The Court's reliance on New Negl'O Alliance v. Sanitwy Groce1y Co., 
303 U. S. 552 (1938), is misplaced. Ante, at 11-12. The picketers in that 
case might not have been seeking to better their own personal economic 
position, but their purpose was to affect the terms and conditions of em-
ployment of the picketed store, since their object was to persuade the store 
to employ negroes. Section 13(c) explicitly states that the coverage of the 
Act does not depend on whether "the disputants stand in the proximate 
relation of employer and employee." Ante, at 7 n. 9. 
' See Kheclivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers lnteJ'JWtional Union, 278 F. 
2d49, 50-51 (CA2 1960) (politically motivated blacklist of Egyptian ships to 
retaliate for Egyptian blacklist of American ships that dealt with Israel is 
not "labor dispute" triggering Norris-LaGuardia): West Gulf iliaritime 
Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 413 F. Supp. 372 (SD Tex. 
1975, affd summarily, 531 F. 2d 574 CCA5 1976) (union's refusal, on politi-
cal grounds, in violation of a no-strike agreement, to load grain on a ship 
bound for the Soviet Union does not present a "labor dispute"). 
'The excerpts from the legislative history relied upon by the Court fall 
short of the clear evidence required to overcome the plain language of 
~ 13(c). See, e. g., Breacl Political Action Committee v. Federal Election 
Commission,-- U. S. --, -- (1982). In 1947, Congress declined to 
amend the federal labor laws so that strikes protesting "disagreement with 
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Finally, the Court argues that a common-sense interpreta-
tion of the meaning of the term labor dispute supports its con-
clusion. But the "common-sense" meaning of a term is not 
controlling when CongTess has provided, as it provided in 
§ 13(c), an explicit definition of a labor dispute. "Common 
sense" and legislative history ought not change the meaning 
of the unambig1wus words of a statute. It is not contended 
that any act of petitioners to improve the terms or conditions 
of employment would have persuaded the union to load the 
ships. Hence there is no labor dispute under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. 
II 
This case, together with our recent decision in Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Association v. Allied Inter·national, 
Inc.,-- U. S. -- (1982), illustrates the inherent flaw in 
the holding in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 
U. S. 397 (1976). If the Court cannot give to ordinary words 
some government policy" would not be protected by the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act. I Legislative History of the LlVIRA 168 (1947): ante, at 15. How-
ever, the language of the rejected House version of the amendment was 
quite broad. There are cases in which unions might disagTee with govern-
ment policy and properly take collective action protesting it in order to ad-
vance the legitimate economic interests of union members if the terms or 
conditions of their employment would be affected. Congress might have 
rejected the House version because of fear that its broad reach would ren-
der legitimate union activity unprotected. 
In 1932 Congress rejected an amendment which would have permitted 
federal courts to enjoin acts "performed or threatened for an unlawful pur-
pose or with an unlawful intent .... " 75 Cong. Rec. 5507 (1932): ante, at 
14. This amendment would have swept more broadly than the plain lan-
guage of § 13(c) as adopted. Indeed, Representative Beck's amendment 
could have rendered the Norris-LaGuardia Act a nullity, since federal 
judges in the 1930's would have been able to enjoin a strike merely by find-
ing it motivated by an "unlawful purpose." Thus the legislative history 
does not lead to or compel a conclusion in this case contrary to the plain 
language of§ 13(c). 
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their ordinary meaning and gTasp that the dispute in this case 
is a purely political dispute rather than having any relation to 
a labor dispute, it should overrule BI~ffalo Forge. 
The controversy in Allied International also resulted from 
the International Longshoremen's Association's protest over 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There we held that the 
union's refusal to unload shipments from the Soviet Union 
was a secondary boycott prohibited by § 8(b)(4) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 159(b)(4). The 
union is therefore liable for damages as a result of its refusal 
to unload the shipments. Yet the Court today holds that the 
union may not be enjoined from refusing to load cargo onto 
ships bound for the Soviet Union. 
This is all the more perplexing because the union entered 
into an agTeement with petitioner which contained an un-
equivocal no-strike clause: "During the term of this Agree-
ment, ... the Union agTees there shall not be any strike of 
any kind or degTee whatsoever, ... for any cmise whatso-
ever." (Emphasis added). Ante, at 3. In Allied Interna-
tional this union was found liable for damages caused to a 
party with which it had no such agTeement. Here, however, 
despite the existence of the no-strike agTeement between pe-
titioner and the union, the Court holds that the union's illegal 
acts may not be enjoined. 
To reach this strange result, the Court first decides that 
this case involves a labor dispute rather than a political dis-
pute , and therefore is within the scope of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. The Court then contradicts itself and con-
. eludes that, since the dispute is really a political protest over 
Soviet aggression, it may not be enjoined under the Buffalo 
Forge exception to the rule of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail 
Clerks Union, 398 U. S. 235 (1970), since a federal court can-
not resolve the actual dispute. This case, together withAl-
lied International, persuades me that the artificial Buffalo 
Forge exception should be abolished. Rather than continu-
ing to engage in mechanical and contradictory analyses as to 
80-1045---DISSENT 
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the character of disputes such as this one, we should hold that 
a federal court may enjoin a strike pending arbitration when 
the striking union has agreed to a contract with a no-strike 
clause such as the one agTeed to by petitioner and the ILA. 
That is what we seemed to hold in Boys Markets, and we 
should not have tinkered with that holding in Buffalo Forge. 
There is no rational way to reconcile this holding with Al-
lied International. If we must overrule Buffalo Forge to 
come to a consistent result, we should do so. 
1st DRAFT 








From: Justice O'Connor 
Circulated: JtJN 8 198/ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1045 
JACKSONVILLE BULK TERMINALS, INC. ET AL., PE-
TITIONERS v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S 
ASSOCIATION ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1982] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment. 
Based on the legislative history of the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., and our previous cases interpret-
ing it, e. g., New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 
303 U. S. 552 (1938), the ,ourt correctly concludes that this 
case involves a labor dispute within the meaning of § 4 of the 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104. The Court also correctly determines 
that under Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 
U. S. 397 (1976), no injunction may issue pending arbitration 
because the underlying political dispute is not arbitrable 
under the collective bargaining agreement. Unless the 
Court is willing to overrule Buffalo Forge, the conclusion 
reached by the Court in this case is inescapable. Therefore, 




TO: Davifl DATE: June 8, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr . 
80-1045 Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. tLA 
I have now read the Chief's revised dissent in 
which he has anded a new Part II. 
As you say, he largely plagiarizes my little 
opinion. I am still inclined, however, to stay with it. Do 
you have a different view? 
In Justice Marshall's recently circulated draft, 
he cites Allled (on a "cf." basis, as I recall). I assume 
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